CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LOS ACTOS DE HABLA ENCONTRADOS

Exports of Israeli natural gas and the riches of the Mediterranean are of great importance not only to the countries in the region but also to great powers. The United States, the European Union, and Russia have showed great interests in East Mediterranean riches, however, each of them has their own interests. Their leverage is part of any dilemma that these countries face in their decision-making processes. Great powers have had a great impact on cooperation in this

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region, especially security cooperation and energy cooperation. The U.S. Johnston mission in the 1950s tried but failed to secure regime cooperation between Levant countries over water allocation. The energy opportunities in the Levant basin could present yet another effective tool to enhance cooperative behavior. The EU, US, would likely welcome cooperation. On the other hand, Russia role is to play spoiler in any deal that would involve exports to Europe.

The EU and the United States have similar visions of the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU has a number of interests in the development of the natural gas sector. EU member countries overreliance on Russian energy is a strategic flaw to an independent Europe. The EU is seeking to develop strategic diversification. Brussels has already indicated its partnership with former Soviet countries such as Azerbaijan and partnerships with countries in North Africa especially Libya and Algeria continue. The riches of the Levant offer another excellent opportunity to diversify its energy resources.

The EU has an interest in also maintaining security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece, Italy, France, and Spain do not want to see a naval arms race on their backdoor. Increase in tension, especially between Israel and Turkey, could drag Cyprus and possibly Greece into a wider conflict. The United States continues to be the region’s predominant naval power. The US has a great interest in the stability of the region, especially preventing an arms race between its two best allies, Israel and Turkey, and increasing cooperation between Israel and its neighbors has always been Washington’s intention.

More recently the sovereign debt crisis and the non-performing southern economies of the EU have posed the greatest threat to the cohesion of the super-national entity. Greece and Cyprus have suffered through fiscal austerity and low economic growth. The riches of the Levant could present an opportunity for these countries to capitalize on natural resources and stimulate

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their economies. The weak Cypriot economy could use EU stimulus to build an LNG facility,197 this could be conditioned on accepting a peace agreement with Turkish Cyprus.

Encouraging cooperation between the countries in the region could also assist in the ongoing peace process. The Kerry peace negotiations could be Washington’s last effort for an agreement through the current framework. Since the start of the peace process Israel has signaled that it will allow the cash strapped Palestinian Authority (PA) to monetize the offshore gas fields discovered off the coast of Gaza.198 More recently, the PA electric company signed a deal that would make it the first foreign purchaser from Tamar gas field production. However, the deal will only occur when a power plant is built in the West Bank.199 Cooperation on energy issues could produce the right linkages to decrease the opportunities for conflict among countries in the region if the peace process fails. On the other hand, success of the peace process could assist Washington in creating a web of cooperation in the region between its partners to promote its political and security agenda.

The United States will most likely be interested in playing a role of cooperation on the high seas. Washington can coordinate and facilitate maritime activities between its two most strategic allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Washington and Brussels’ greatest leverage comes from their ability to mediate for peaceful settlements between Cyprus and Turkey or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Cyprus could demand that in case of a settlement, Israel and Turkey must agree to make commitments to fund a Cypriot LNG plant. Cyprus decides to play the role of spoiler by not agreeing on Turkish-Israeli cooperation or not settling the Cypriot- Turkish conflict, which could further restrict Cypriot exploration activities.

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"European Investment Bank Considers Financing for Cyprus LNG Facility." Natural Gas Europe. May 31, 2013. Accessed October 12, 2013. http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/europe-ready-to-finance-cyprus-lng-facility.

198

Reed, John, and Guy Chazan. "Gaza Strip Gas Project Poised for Approval." Financial Times. October 9, 2013. Accessed November 26, 2013. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13474ef2-3027-11e3-80a4-00144feab7de.html#axzz2qWIhg11h.

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"Palestinian Power Company Signs Natural Gas Deal." Maan News Agency. January 8, 2014. Accessed January 21, 2014. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=662891.

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Russia has significantly different interests in the Levant than the EU and the US. Losing market share or increased competition from firms operating in the Eastern Mediterranean is not in Russia’s interest. Initially Gazprom (government owned energy firm) seemed to be on track to own rights for Cypriot natural gas production. But under EU pressure, Cyprus decided to end negotiations with the company.200 Gazprom has also displayed strong interest in Israeli gas. In February 2013, the company signed a letter of intent on the Tamar field that would make it a substantial owner and to build a liquefied natural gas station.201 Multiple reports suggested that the Russian firm, with heavy lobbying from the government, is trying to gain favorable terms that would include a “deal” where Israel will promise not to export natural gas to Europe.202 These talks have not produced any concrete results and are likely off the table. Russia’s position is to be a spoiler in any deal that would send natural gas to the EU.

200

"State Switches Bidder in Block 9 Negotiations." Cyprus Gas News. December 20, 2012. Accessed January 26, 2014. http://www.cyprusgasnews.com/archives/1703.

201

Trilnick, Itai. "Tamar Partners, Gazprom Agree to Join Forces to Export Liquefied Gas." Haaretz.com. February 27, 2013. Accessed November 29, 2013. http://www.haaretz.com/business/tamar-partners-gazprom-agree-to-join-forces-to-export- liquefied-gas.premium-1.506060.

202

Barkat, Amiram. "Israel in Gas Talks with Russia." Globes Israel Business Arena. October 29, 2013. Accessed November 10, 2013. http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000889580&fid=1725.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Resolving the long drawn-out territorial disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean continue to hamper economic opportunities. The natural gas discoveries present great opportunities for regime building in the Levant. Under the best conditions, planning for Israel’s export policy could have been fairly simple. Israel could send natural gas to Egypt’s LNG plant for a very small investment and build a pipeline to Turkey simultaneously. These two options together present Israel with access to Asian market through liquefied natural gas and use the least expensive method of exporting natural gas to Turkey and EU markets. Creating a web of natural gas interconnections could foster greater security cooperation and eventually cause a spillover effect. While the conditions of 2014 are substantially better for cooperation than the conditions of 2012, cooperation continues to face geopolitical and internal pressure. Israel is likely to defect rather than cooperate with either Turkey or Egypt. The long-time horizon of concluding regional settlements along with the increasing costs of inactivity will cause companies to invest in the least politically risky option, sidestepping any regional cooperation.