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informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (For CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178: Accused, being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy,with the use of the said firearm which resulted to his death) and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866 (For CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179: Accused, in his possession, custody and control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said firearm from competent authorities which firearm was carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was used by him in committing the crime of Murder with Diosdado Iroy).

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm

Ruling:

The Supreme Court confirmed and applied the doctrine laid down in the case of People v. Tac-an, stating that these are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply.

It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.

The appeal was dismissed and the challenged decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 was AFFIRMED.

Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998 Facts:

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

……WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

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On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. (Decision rendered on July 30, 1991).

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.

The CA clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused.

Issue:WON the promulgation of conviction is barred by Double Jeopardy. Ruling:

Petitioner submits that the trial court's promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 "cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered" because to do so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy. He contends that the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case.

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;

(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment;

(d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and

(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused

Petitioner contends that "the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court's decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner . . . ." In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.

The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.

As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. 29

We must stress that Respondent Court's questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.

The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same

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decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. The promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.

“If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”

B. When you are prosecuted under an Ordinance and a Law for the Same Act

This applies if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute.