• No se han encontrado resultados

Introducción

In document UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA CHAPINGO (página 83-88)

limitations as may be provided by law.

“The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

XXXXXXXXXXX

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. XXXXX

N

o

v

e

m

b

e

r

2

9

,

2

0

0

8

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.” (Valmonte v. Belmonte)

a. Rights guaranteed-

1. The right to information on matters of public concern

2. The corollary right of access to official records and documents. b. Limitations

-only matters of public concern subject to limitations as may be provided by law. -Example:

1. National security matters- include state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security, and information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. 2. Trade secrets and banking transactions

3. Criminal matters

4. other confidential matters- diplomatic correspondence, closed door cabinet and executive meetings, internal deliberations of the SC.

XV. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Section 10.No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

“The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the

community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them.

Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.” (conference of maritime manning agencies v. poea)

a. When may a law be said to have impaired the obligation of contracts?

A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either: 1.time or mode of

performance; 2. Imposes new conditions; 3. Dispenses with those expressed; or 4. Authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms.

Note: there is impairment if it is made to retroact to existing contracts

XVI. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Art. III, Section 16.All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi- judicial, or administrative bodies.

Art. VIII, Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

Art. VII, Sec. 18 (3). The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

N

o

v

e

m

b

e

r

2

9

,

2

0

0

8

In document UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA CHAPINGO (página 83-88)

Documento similar