support completely the notion that there is so much blurring of the ideas of magic and
sorcery on the part of primitive people. Evans-Pritchard's study actually supports some
of Malinowski's findings, except that he poses the question explicitly of the social value
of sorcery (1931 a:51). In doing so he challenges Malinowski's view of the cathartic
value of magic. For Evans-Pritchard it is a cultural and social phenomenon and n o t'.. .a
naked product of emotion...' (1931a:52). Malinowski proposes arriving at a '...clear
distinction of primitive law from other forms of custom, and at a new, dynamic
conception of the social organization of savages' (1926:15-16). Thus far his stated aims
are very little removed from Evans-Pritchard's. Malinowski bases his exposition on a
notion of law and order for which he employs the conditions of use and concrete facts of
ownership regarding canoes as an example of the '...sum of duties, privileges and
mutualities which bind the joint owners to the object and to each other' (1926:20-21).
Integral to the system of mutualities is the concept of reciprocity, which, in Malinowski's
view, is the weapon each community possesses to enforce its rights (1926:23).
Reciprocity functions legally in respect to marriage, cooperation regarding fishing teams,
food barter, and some of the ceremonial duties of mourning (1926:39).
Malinowski asserts that the real mechanism of law is 'social and psychological
constraint' (1926:39), which constitutes 'the actual forces, motives, and reasons which
make men keep to their obligations' (1926:39). In this approach there is the suggestion,
at least, of an echo of Durkheim's concept of collective representation, against which
Malinowski offers a 'caution'. He does so because he regards the 'savage' as being
'.. .neither an extreme "collectivist" nor an intransigent "individualist", but that he is "like
man in general a mixture of both’" (1926:56). Law, Malinowski argues, '...represents
...an aspect of their tribal life, one side of their structure, [rather] than any independent,
self-contained social arrangements' (1926:59, and 1926:93-94). From this is derived a
view of primitive morality which is not as completely distinct as the one articulated by
Evans-Pritchard.
aberrant. W hereas in Malinowski's account sorcery fulfils a role similar to what Evans- Pritchard calls legal magic, which upholds the social structure through the maintenance of ju stice. Sorcery, for the Trobrianders, (the chiefs especially), has a positive, constructive, role in the culture, whereas for the Azande it plays the opposite part. In both instances magic, in all its modes, is a form of vested interest. Malinowski’s statement that
'In whatever way it works, it is a way o f emphasizing the status quox a method of expressing the traditional inequalities and of counteracting the formation of any new ones' (1926:94)
is parallelled in Evans-Pritchard's argument. Accordingly, sorcery has ’...th e same subjective role to perform in human culture, and this role among the Azande is similar to that of witchcraft' (193la:52). The aspects o f their argument which are parallel are their efforts to establish the cultural validity o f sorcery from the point of view of the indigenous people. Evans-Pritchard and Malinowski’s particular emphases, however, are rather different. The issue here is definitional rather than substantive, and it is an example o f persons who have very sim ilar view s, but who argue these w ithout really acknowledging the common ground that exists between them. Homans makes the same point about the dispute between Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski (in Lessa & Vogt,
1979:62).
The clearest difference in the perspective merges over the question of whether the concept, as M alinowski expresses it '..."ju stice" in our sense' (1926:94), is applicable to indigenous law. Malinowski argues that it is 'hardly' so, because of the ambiguity o f native attitudes to quasi-legal and quasi-criminal applications of sorcery (1926:94). For example, he presents the fulfilment of obligations to trading partners in terms o f enlightened self-interest and obedience to personal social am bitions and sentiments (1926:30). M alinowski re-states this view later in his argument when he asserts that the real mechanism of law is social and psychological constraint (1926:37). Sorcery is then a conservative force serving vested interest, and is both a method of administering justice, and a form of criminal practice, and as such emphasises the status quo (1926:97). Evans-Pritchard »meanwhile, takes the view that '...A ll magic with destructive functions can only receive the moral and legal sanction of the community if it
some measure of what Europeans might call equity present in Zande practice of law, it may therefore be understood to proceed with similar principles. Evans-Pritchard and M alinowski are not actually opposed here either, but Evans-Pritchard does imply a difference. They are making the same basic points : (a) sorcery provides a complex context for reciprocity and sanctions; (b) it is a means o f acquiring power; and (c) it is a social and cultural feature that is effective because it adheres to the logic of the particular world-view involved.
From another point of view a concurrence of interest between Evans-Pritchard and Malinowski is found. Both of them state quite strongly that the indigenous practice of justice needs to be considered without applying European moral or legal principles in too
simple a fashion. Malinowski argues that
T h e rash, haphazard, unscientific application o f our morals, laws, and customs to native societies, and the destruction of native law, quasi-legal m achinery and instrum ents o f power leads only to anarchy and moral atrophy and in the long run to the extinction of culture and race' (1926:93).
Evans-Pritchard comments that Europeans are generally ignorant about native attitudes towards the practice of magic :
'...in no other sphere of native life is ignorance more likely to lead to infliction of injustice and the.destruction of good institutions...[and]...w e may well leave the natives to decide between good and evil, morality and immorality, right and wrong, crime and law' (193la:53).
With this rational treatment Evans-Pritchard counters the view that magic is the native's method of overcoming 'irremovable misfortunes' and paralysing helplessness (1931a:53). Evans-Pritchard has produced an account o f sorcery which challenges, for example, Bergson's assumption that magic functions to calm temporarily
'...th e uneasiness of an intelligence whose form exceeds its content, which is vaguely aware o f its ignorance and realizes the danger of it, which divines, outside the very small circle in which action is sure of its effect, .. .a vast area of the unpredictable such as may well discourage action' (The Two Sources o f Morality and Religion, 1935:161).
At the same time Evans-Pritchard's exposition of Zande sorcery bears out the theoretical position adopted by Hubert and Mauss in which they argue :
'In magic and religion the individual does not reason, or if he does his reasoning is unconscious. Just as he has no need to reflect on the structure
of the properties he employs, caring very little to justify in a rational manner the choice and use of his materials' (1972:75).
The process o f sorcery (and magic) within Zande culture is fundamentally subjective, as Evans-Pritchard states:
'It is likely that much Zande sorcery is a creation of the im agination produced by a realization of the spite, envy, and ill-wishing of others. But even if this is the case it has a role in culture to perform, and to make its role more useful it is not a naked product of emotion but is clothed with the robes o f culture, with rites and spells, with medicines and traditions.At least it is an elaborate fact of human imagination which is transmitted from one generation to another as surely as more objective products of tradition' (193 la:52).
Evans-Pritchard states that Zande sorcery does exist, and recognises that envy a n d anjprits emotional staring-point and energy, so that '...w e may presume that its function is cathartic' (193la:52). At the same time this admission places Evans-Pritchard very close to M alinowski's position. Evans-Pritchard concludes with an ambivalent statem e n t: '...B u t whether sorcery is an objective reality or a fact of imagination it had the same subjective role to perform in human culture...' (1931a:52). The ambivalence arises because to remain true to his Durkheim ian approach, Evans-Pritchard has to maintain that he is dealing with social facts, objective realities. At the same time the 'content' of the social fact (sorcery) is subjective experience. The same point is made in more general terms by Hubert and Mauss who argue that in his mind the individual '.. .has only the vaguest idea o f a possible action, for which tradition furnishes him with a ready made means, yet he has an extraordinarily precise idea of the end he wishes to achieve' (1972:75). Or, as Evans-Pritchard expresses it, the person who can successfully combat the evils of sorcery can enjoy peace and fortune (193la :53). The achievement sought is happiness, a sense o f well-being, of knowing and being comfortable with oneself and the world, at least the part one is familiar with. To that extent magic is clarity itself, but its means are far from being so. Its haphazardness of means is at odds with its clarity of purpose. In these ambivalences and seeming confusion of categories, and in Evans-Pritchard's handling of them, we begin to sense an undertow pulling against the formal and scientific nicety of the 'clear and distinct ideas'. The empirical evidence of the Azande experience at least poses this question. Evans-Pritchard seems to be, however diffidently, suggesting this by his return to centering the conclusion of his analysis on the subjective role of magic and sorcery in Zande culture.