Tercer Libro
THEMA MUND
Evans-Pritchard states that to bring clarity to the discussion o f magic the problems involved must be kept distinct (1933a:307). Frazer's view of magical practice that like produces like, and that contiguous things remain in contact even when their contiguity has become an image in the memory is regarded by Evans-Pritchard as misleading (1933a:306). Evans-Pritchard focuses his attention on the difficulties raised by the expressions 'implicitly believed' and 'tacitly assumed' used by Frazer regarding prim itive beliefs in magic. 'For the same principles which the magician applies in the practice o f his art are implicitly believed by him to regulate the operation of inanimate nature; in other words he tacitly assumes that the Laws of Similarity and Contact are of universal application and are not lim ited to human actions' {The Golden Bough, 1922:11). Beliefs and assumptions are judgem ents, he argues, '...th ey are conscious processes in which the middle term between two associated images is known to the thinker' (1933a:306). Evans-Pritchard argues against Frazer's assertion that primitive magicians know only the practical side of magic and that they never reflect on the abstract principles involved -
'...A t the same time it is to be borne in mind that the primitive magician knows magic only on its practical side; he never analyses the mental processes on which his action is based, never reflects on the abstract principles involved in his actions' (1922:11).
The approach to the process of abstraction, and the relationship of objects, colour and other sensory perceptions, that are based on 'im plicit belief and 'tacit assum ption1 creates, for Evans-Pritchard, a ’terminological haze'. The situation is made more difficult because of the '...hopeless jumble of psychological and sociological problems in which psychological concepts are used where they are quite irrelevant' (1933a:306).
The point that Evans-Pritchard makes about the psychological aspect of the problem is helpful. He argues that
'Sensations and abstractions and simple comparison o f abstractions are psychological processes common to all mankind and in a sociological study of magic they do not concern us as psychological facts' (1933a:307).
He expands this view, stating that the problem '...is related to social value or social indication which is given to objects and qualities' (1933a:307).
Value may be considered in two ways, empirically and mystically. The first way indicates qualities attributed to an object of which it is in actual possession. 'For example, a stone is considered to be hard and is therefore used as a tool' (1933a:307). Secondly, qualities are attributed which the object does not possess, and that are beyond sensory perception. "For example, a stone may be used in magical rites or be considered the dwelling place of a spirit (1933a:307). In commenting on the example of gold being used in the treatm ent of jaundice, Evans-Pritchard argues that the perception o f similar colouring in gold and jaundice is a psychological fact requiring a psychological explanation (1933a:307). He asserts further that the '...em bodim ent of this perception in a social technique is a sociological fact and requires a sociological explanation' (1933a:307). Evans-Pritchard stresses the need to focus on explaining the social qualities with which people invest the object (1933a:307).
The distinction of the concept of 'value' into an empirical and a mystical view of reality parallels that which is made between the morality of magic, and the moral basis of magic. The morality of magic provides the empirical question, and the moral basis the theoretical aspect. We have to be careful, however, not to identify the concept of mystical with that o f theoretical. One problem which faces us here is Evans-Pritchard's use of the term 'social value'. His em ploym ent of it indicates the degree to which Radcliffe- Brown's theoretical position had influenced his own. The other problem concerning the term 'mystical' will be examined later during the discussion of Levy-Bruhl's theory.
Radcliffe-Brown proposes an exact definition
'By the social value of anything I mean the way in which that thing affects or is capable of affecting social life' (1922:264).
Value may be viewed negatively and positively
'...positive value being possessed by anything that contributes to the well being of the society, negative value by anything that can adversely affect that well-being' (1922:264).
member of the society, but the individual does not of necessity consciously and directly realize that value. He is made to realize it indirectly through the belief, impressed upon him by tradition...' (1922:264).
He notes a distinction between 'beliefs and sentiments' which have regular outlets in action and those which 'rarely or never influence conduct' (1922:264) There is a gap betw een the relationship of the notions o f 'b elief and 'tradition', and the fact that individuals are not necessarily conscious or directly aware o f the value of things which are taken for granted at the level of experience (e.g. fire). Radcliffe-Brown's explanation, while stressing the social nature of such 'value', fails to provide a more exact explanation o f how tradition inspires belief. His use of the term reflects his adaptation of aspects of Dürkheim's theoretical perspective.
Dürkheim's use of the concept of 'representation', in regard to religion is part of his effort to produce a scientific method for analysing religion and religious experience. Som ething sim ilar to the notion of social value, seems to underlie the concept of 'representation', in so far as the latter is understood to embody a perception of some aspect o f reality. Dürkheim asserts that 'religious forces are...hum an forces, moral forces' (1915:419). An organic understanding o f society emerges in both these views. A lso there is a very real sense in which both Radcliffe-Brown and Dürkheim see tradition, the collective sentiments, as giving direction and discipline to individual consciousness (1915:419). The argument opens with the assumption that '...collective sentiments can become conscious of themselves only by fixing themselves upon external o b jects...' and that '...th ey have not been able to take form without adopting some of their characteristics from other th in g s...' (1915:419). In this way they acquire a physicality and consequently consider 'themselves capable of explaining what passes there' (1915:419). This process extends to include the most impersonal and anonymous o f forces, which are regarded as 'nothing else than objectified sentiments' (1915:419). Dürkheim tries to establish here that this view o f religion is the means of seeing its real significance (1915:419). The point of similarity being established here between Radcliffe- Brown and Dürkheim is that both propose that in some way the individual is subordinate to the social whole, and in doing so becomes more individualised (Dürkheim 1915:423; Radcliffe-Brown 1922:402).