Las causales de divorcio en el Perú

Given our discussion of the differences between Sen and Nussbaum in chapter two, as well as our discussion of Nussbaum in the previous chapter, it ought to be fairly clear that the needs and goals distinction (at least as it has been described above) is not going to fit so well with Nussbaum’s account. At least, that is, not without some changes.

Nussbaum acknowledges the centrality that goals have in life, when she writes that ‘we see the person as having activity, goals, projects – as somehow awe-inspiringly above the mechanical workings of nature, and yet in need of support for the fulfilment of many central projects’.39 What is missing, however, is that Nussbaum does not include a rich account of agency (as Sen does) that incorporates goals and being able to pursue projects that one finds meaningful, in the list itself. To be sure, Nussbaum’s capability for practical reason includes the ability to plan one’s life, but the capability refers only to being able to engage in critical reflection about one’s life, and not actively pursuing those plans. Given that Nussbaum directly refers to goals (above), it is surprising that there is no provision for the pursuit and realisation of goals as a functioning itself. It seems, at least as far as the list goes, that a dignified existence does not require that one is able to pursue and realise meaningful goals at all.

We could (and ought to) be a little bit more charitable here. In the end, while there is no obvious provision for actively pursuing and realising goals – it seems clear that goals themselves (and living a life one values) are central to the aims of the approach.40 _{For this reason, it would be} inconsistent with the approach to maintain that goals (and the functionings required in light of them) are missing altogether. What’s more, given Nussbaum’s association with political liberalism we ought to deduce that in the end the list and the conception of dignity tends to be about being able to have, value, and pursue goals of one’s own. So, as far as Nussbaum’s account goes, it is not that goals seem to be absent from the list – since something very much like goals are

38 _{As we have pointed out, Sen recognises that ‘capability’ also involves having a power and so we ought to do what} we are able to do. However, Sen does not recognise that we are able to generate moral communities on the back of this insight. Sen (2009) pp.205-7

39 _{Nussbaum (2001) p.73}

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important for a dignified life – but that we can enrich Nussbaum’s list by making this much clearer.

We could say that (at least) one of the reasons why goals are not (more) prominent within the list is because the list is protecting more than the goals of (human) agents. Quite simply, Nussbaum wants to capture the way that a good life for some beings does not require having goals in the sense that Mulgan claims. Unlike Sen and Mulgan who recognise different components of well- being, Nussbaum skips straight to listing capabilities without saying very much at all about whether those capabilities can be (or ought to be) organised or situated in light of different aspects of well-being. To be sure, one could point to various capabilities that look very much like needs and those which underwrite having goals41_{, but to do any more than describe them would} undermine the entire list and its concern for dignity. So it is important for Nussbaum not to highlight goals at the expense of the good of non-goal pursuing beings, and those who are unable to choose, pursue, and realise goals. In other words, including more than agents leads Nussbaum to downplay the importance of goals (or more specifically, to downplay agency). To be sure, this is not to say that agency does not matter at all. After all, something like agency is important for the dignity of many human beings. Rather the point here is that ensuring that all beings are able to flourish means that agency is simply one of many valuable functionings.

This helps us to raise an obvious question: can the needs and goals distinction include more than goal-pursuing agents? Two things might be put forward for incorporating non-goal-pursuing beings into the framework. Given the importance of goals, the first strategy would be to hold that the space of goals – and the richness that it brings through its concern with more than choosing, but also actively pursuing and realising – is pluralistic enough to capture non-goal- pursuing beings (albeit indirectly). After all, we benefit from the goals that others pursue and realise (as Sen helps us to see) – and we often seek the good for others as part of our own good (as Nussbaum helps us to see). Thus, non-goal-pursuing beings (such as the severely mentally impaired, nonhuman animals, as well as other living beings) benefit from the goals that we (as agents) pursue, and benefit from the way in which we seek their good as part of our own.

41 _{As we pointed out in chapter 2, Brock’s list of human needs mapped well into Nussbaum’s list, while practical reason}

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However, an approach that focuses entirely on goal-pursuing-agents leaves other beings in an incredibly vulnerable position in terms of what their lives will be like. It seems counter-intuitive to say that their lives ought to depend entirely on the choices, actions, and values of others. It is, after all, difficult to maintain that it matters in no way at all what kind of life non-goal-pursuing beings live – and that they matter only indirectly. We don’t need to know whether the severely mentally impaired or nonhuman animals are able to contemplate, choose, pursue, and realise their own goals, to know that there are things (even above basic survival) that are good for them (such as music or nonhuman animals).42 _{Nor is it the case that their lives matter only when our goals} happen to include them. Rather it matters because their lives matter. Of course this leaves us in a position where we are required to concede that more than agents matter and that including them within the goals of others is not quite enough.

The second obvious move, then, is to say that the space of needs sufficiently captures non-goal pursuing beings. Even Mulgan seems to opt for this strategy (if only in passing), when he points out that needs are general and could include any being that has them.43 _{This seems} straightforward enough and largely uncontroversial, given that nonhuman animals, the severely mentally impaired, and even other living beings have needs. Even so, this move raises the question of whether the space of needs is enough, given that it commits us to the claim that a meaningful life consists solely in the meeting of needs. There seems to be at least two reasons why this is problematic. Firstly, focusing entirely on needs commits us to the claim that whatever is good for the lives of non-goal pursuing beings can (and ought to) be characterised as needs. However, as we have already said, we know that there are things that we are able to do for the severely mentally impaired and nonhuman animals that would make their lives better (such as music). Yet, we also know that they do not need these things to survive. In other words, we want to say that there is more to life than just needs.

Secondly, and in line with the first point, we want to be able to say that meeting the needs of nonhuman animals and the severely mentally disabled is important because their lives are and can be valuable, not merely because we think that meeting needs (wherever and whenever this may be) is a good thing to do. The space of goals and the contribution that goals make to life allows us to

42 _{For instance: a lot of research has been done into the benefits of music for mental illness, with some researchers} claiming that music enhances the quality of life for advanced dementia patients, see chapters 8 and 9 of Koen (2008) 43 _{Mulgan (2002) p.178}

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say something about agency, something that could not be captured entirely within the space of needs (because goals are conceptually and practically distinct). In the same way, we want to be able to capture the lives of non-goal-pursuing beings beyond needs. The space of needs (like goals), then, does not provide us with a clear way of capturing all of what it is about the lives of non-goal-pursuing beings that matter. It seems, quite simply, that the needs and goals distinction, while important, tells us only part (though to be sure, an important part) of what well-being consists in. If this is the case, then we need to be able to say a bit more.