The modification of desire, that hard-to-change involuntary readiness to act which we find within ourselves, is not the only, or even the most frequent, way by which agents influence their future actions. There is also the method of forming a voluntary intention, i.e. making a decision, and it is important to contrast the two methods. By the method of forming a voluntary intention I mean forming an intention today to do something tomorrow, or the next day, or for the rest of my life—to go to London tomorrow, to apply for the job, or to marry Jane. Such an act is a decision, a choice. Today's decision affects tomorrow's movements not
72 I take it that it is this kind of point which St Paul is making by saying: ‘Though I bestow all my gifts to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing’. (1 Cor.
13: 3.)
blindly but only in so far as it is recalled. It affects them by giving me a very good reason for doing the appropriate action when the appropriate time arrives. If I decide today to go to London tomorrow, I give myself a reason which I will recognize tomorrow (barring exceptional circumstances) as an overriding reason for going to London, whatever other reasons I may have now or then for going or not going. It provides such a reason because I believe that (barring exceptional circumstances) I ought to do what I have decided to do. I hold this view because I think that on important matters I ought to do what the balance of reasons indicates that I should do. Before reaching a decision, I consider that balance carefully and reach a view as to whether I should go or not. Tomorrow I shall have no time to reach a balanced view; but I shall know that I did so today and that I incorporated it in my decision. Hence I shall know that the way to act on a balanced view is to act on my decision. Also, I know the value of having a fixed course of action, not broken off by continual changes of mind. For these two reasons I regard the fact of a decision having been made as a reason for carrying it out. True, between now and tomorrow something quite unexpected may happen—e.g. my wife may get ill—which will give me even stronger reason for not going to London. In that case I will recognize that I ought not to act on my decision. But in general I will recognize that I ought so to act. The believed worth of an act is, we saw earlier, something which will lead an agent to perform that act—in the absence of contrary desire. My decision to do it gives me a new reason for doing the act in question. As well as thinking it right to act on my decisions, I may also have a desire, a natural inclination, to do so. In that case, too, the decision does not act by modifying my desires; they remain as before. It acts by using an existing desire—to carry out my decisions, which I believe in general to be a good thing—and adding to it belief that the way to satisfy that desire is to do so-and-so, e.g. to go to London. Forming an intention is thus doing an intentional act which is performative—rather like making myself a promise. It provides me with a reason for action which did not exist before and it may also provide me with a way of satisfying a pre-existing desire.
Some decisions are a matter of the agent saying to himself ‘I will do so-and-so’; other decisions are simply a matter of an agent beginning a course of action (e.g. a journey to London, or writing
a chapter of a book) when he regards having started the action as constituting a reason for finishing it. Only those who make decisions, at least of this latter kind, are likely to get very far in attaining any long-term goal. For, notoriously, reasons in the form of tiredness and other things to do will crop up before the goal is achieved. In those circumstances the fact of the past decision gives an additional reason for continuing to pursue the goal, and may also bring into play another desire (to do what I have decided), additional to the desire (which may now be weakening) to achieve the goal for other reasons.
Among the decisions or intentions which people form are conditional intentions—to do so-and-so if and when such- and-such circumstances arise. My earlier example of deciding to choose to play tennis when asked was an example of the formation of a conditional intention. Of course, some people don't make decisions; some people don't have any strong moral view about the keeping of decisions, or any desire to keep them. And even if they do believe that on balance they ought to fulfil their decisions, they may not do so—weakness of will again may operate. But decision remains for many people an efficacious means of affecting future conduct.
Decision is for many people the means by which they continue to pursue long-term goals, such as writing a thesis, building a house, or walking across Antarctica. The decision to do so gives them a reason for continuing the project when the desire to pursue the project has grown weak.