An intentional action is something which an agent does, under some description meaning to do it (i.e. with the intention of doing it56)—such as raising his hand, saying the word ‘hand’, shooting a man, or closing a door. We often
do an intentional action by doing another intentional action. I kill a man by shooting him; shoot him by pulling the trigger; pull the trigger by squeezing my finger. I cheer you up by complimenting you on your work; I compliment you on your work by saying ‘Well done!’ When an agent does A by doing B, then normally either doing B causes some effect, the production of which is doing A; or, in the circumstances in which it is done, doing B is doing A.57By pulling
the trigger I cause a bullet to enter the man; causing a bullet to enter the man is shooting him. Saying ‘Well done!’ in circumstances where these words mean that the hearer has done well (i.e. when English is spoken) is complimenting him.
In such cases we can think of the agent as simultaneously doing many different actions (pulling the trigger, shooting, killing), or as doing just one action which is described in many different ways.
56 In writing about ‘intention’ in this chapter, I am writing about the intentions which agents have in doing what they do; not the intentions which they have now as to what
they will do at some future time. My concern in this chapter is with what agents are trying to achieve as they act, not with what they have resolved to do on another occasion. I shall discuss intention for the future in Chapter 6.
57 A. Goldman has distinguished carefully four ways in which by doing one thing, we do another, which he calls ‘level generation’. See his A Theory of Human Action, Prentice-
Although we can think in either way, it is, I believe, more natural to think in the latter way and I shall do so. In that case the essence of the action, as it were, is the agent moving his body in a certain way, intending thereby to bring about certain further consequences.58 If we describe the action as the bringing about of those consequences, we describe it
not solely as it is in itself, but as it is (in part) in virtue of the effects which it produces. The intentional action of pulling the trigger is an action of shooting a man because it is an action of producing some bodily movement, intending thereby to cause a bullet to enter a man, in fact causing a bullet to enter a man.
Actions are events and, as I argued in Chapter 3, the same event may be described in many different ways. The event of my moving my body in a certain way has within its boundaries the movements of my body and my internal state (e.g. purposes and beliefs) yet to be analysed, which brings about those movements. A description which describes only what lies within those boundaries is an intrinsic description. A description which describes what lies within those boundaries, in whole or part in terms of its effects or what it amounts to in the circumstances of its occurrence, is an extrinsic description. If the extrinsic description of the action is one which the agent intended should apply to it, then as so described, the action is an intentional action, otherwise it is an unintentional action. If in squeezing my finger I had the intention of killing, then the resultant killing was an intentional action of mine; otherwise, it was an unintentional action.
So, of such cases which I described as cases where an agent does one action by doing another, a more correct description is that he does an action under one description by doing it under another description. He does an action of complimenting by doing that action under the description of saying ‘Well done!’ When an agent does an action intentionally under one description by doing an action intentionally under another description (other than the description ‘trying’, ‘seeking’, ‘endeavouring’, etc. to do the action under the former description), then the latter action is the same action as the former, but described by a more basic act
58 ‘We never do more than move our bodies: the rest is up to nature’—D. Davidson, ‘Agency’, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 59 . See
description.59An act is given its (most) basic act-description when it is described in such a way that the agent does not
do the act under that description by doing that act under any other description, or by doing any other act.60When I kill
the man by shooting him, etc., there is only one action and the basic act description of it is ‘squeezing my finger’. I may squeeze my finger by trying to squeeze my finger, but my definition rules that out as a description of the same act. (A basic act is an act of a kind picked out by a basic act-description—e.g. any act of moving a limb or saying a word; an act of a kind which the agent just does, does not do by doing anything else.) Conversely, we may say, an action is given its ultimate (i.e. least basic) act-description when it is described in such a way that the agent does not do the act intentionally under any other description by doing the act under that description. If there is nothing else which I am doing intentionally by complimenting you (e.g. calming you down, or buttering you up), then the ultimate act- description of my act is complimenting you.
Normally for an agent to perform an action under some description is for him to bring about some event with the intention of so doing. This event is one which could have been brought about by inanimate causes (in which case the bringing of it about
59 An agent may do an action under one description, X, by doing an action under another description, Y, in the sense that he does the act under the description Y naturally,
not by following a recipe—whereas he does the action under the description X by following the recipe ‘Do Y ’. In such a case, the description Y is teleologically more basic than the description X. Alternatively, he may do the action under the description X by doing the action under the description Y in the sense that he does the action under the description Y intentionally in certain circumstances with that action having certain effects, and doing that action intentionally, knowing those to be the circumstances and effects, constitutes doing an action under the description X intentionally. In such a case the description of Y is causally more basic than the description of X. Normally the teleologically more basic is also causally more basic, and conversely. These seem to be the two main kinds of basic act-description among the narrower kinds distinguished by Annette Baier (‘The Search for Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1971, 8, 161–70) . My concern is with causal basicness. I understand by an action described under its basic act-description, an action which the agent does not do by doing an action under any causally more basic description (except such actions as ‘trying’, etc.).
60 The basic/non-basic distinction was introduced by Danto (A. C. Danto, ‘Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1965, 2, 141–48 ) as a distinction between different
actions done simultaneously, rather than different descriptions of the same action. For a general description of different theories of when two actions are the same, see L. H. Davis, Theory of Action, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1979, ch. 2.
would not be an intentional action). This event may be called the result of the action. My moving my hand is my bringing about the motion of my hand, which latter is the result of my action. My killing the man is my bringing about his death; his death is the result of the action. The motion of my hand and the death of the man are both events which could have been brought about by inanimate causes, and so not through intentional agency. They are, thus, the results of the two actions.
My action of saying the words ‘You are a fool’ (bringing it about that these words come out of my mouth) may, given the circumstances of their utterance (e.g. my looking at you), be an act of insulting you intentionally or unintentionally. The act, under this latter description, is not an act of bringing about some state of affairs which could have been brought by inanimate causes; in my sense the act under this description does not have a result. But, with one exception to which we will come shortly, its basic act-description is always a description of an action in which it consists in bringing about a result which could be brought about by inanimate causes. Inanimate causes could have caused the words ‘You are a fool’ to come out of my mouth. The result of an action under its basic act-description I will call its basic result. Intentional actions (described intrinsically, that is, by their basic act-description) are not always bringing about bodily movements. They may, instead, be the bringing about of some effect in or around the agent's body, as when I tie my shoelaces or say any word (e.g. ‘king’). I do not intentionally move certain parts of my body in order to tie my shoe-laces or to say the word ‘king’; for I would not know which parts to move to secure these ends. Rather, I intentionally bring about these effects, and certain things happen in or around my body, unintended by me, which bring about the result. Likewise, whenever I move my limbs intentionally, things have to happen in my nerves, but I do not intentionally bring about these things (even if I do know what they are)—at least, not normally. I can learn how to set up certain neural circuits or produce certain electrochemical rhythms in my brain; and then come to do these things intentionally. Mental actions, such as the bringing about intentionally of a thought or sensation, also consist in bringing about a result other than a bodily movement. As we have seen earlier—images and thoughts may either be brought about by the thinker or be caused to occur in him by other means.
There is one exception to the general thesis that intentional action (described by its basic act-description) consists in bringing about a result in my sense. Trying, endeavouring, seeking to do something, do not, as such, consist in bringing about a result, and, indeed, they may have no effect at all, but they are intentional actions all the same. I may try to bring about some bodily movement or other basic result, and simply fail. If I try to move my hand, but fail, because you are holding it down, I still perform an action—try to move my hand. Trying is something which I do intentionally. Still, I achieve nothing which I intend to achieve, apart from trying, and that is an intentional action. There is no result describable independently of the process of bringing it about. The same applies when I try to utter some word, but cannot articulate it; or try to form some mental image, but am too tired to construct the lines of my mental picture.61
We saw in Chapter 3 that some events involve others. In recommending on p. 86 that we regard agents who do one thing by doing another as doing just one action described in many different ways, I am recommending that—for the sake of simplicity of our conceptual scheme—we regard as actions only those events whose canonical (intrinsic) descriptions include all the purposes and beliefs involved in bringing about a basic result—whereas its other effects (intended or not) lie outside the boundaries of the action. There are after all no actions occurring which are not involved in those actions. Actions however still have different extrinsic descriptions according to the effects which they bring about.