Clasificación de los ornamentos religiosos

In addition to test the association between types of ownership structure and aggressive tax activities, we also control for year-fixed effects, industry-fixed effects and several additional firm-specific characteristics that the prior literature (e.g., Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Rego, 2003; Mills, 1998; Dyreng et al, 2008; Frank et al, 2009; Chen et al, 2009;Zeng, 2010;Khurana & Moser, 2013) suggest that could be associated with aggressive tax reporting to capture unobserved heterogeneity across firms so as to ensure that the results are not driven by fundamental differences among the level of ownership structure. As

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Institutional shareholding disclosed in Chinese stock market including shareholding held by mutual funds, insurance companies, securities companies, wealth management products, QFII, pension funds, financial companies, trust companies, banks and the general legal persons. In this study, the INSTit is measured as the total institutional shareholding minus the general legal persons shareholding.

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indicated by Marra et al. (2011), failure to control for potentially confounding factors may result in a misleading interpretation of results.

We include variables commonly found in the tax literature that affect costs, benefits and opportunities of firms to engage in tax sheltering activities. We include LOSSit and LEVit to controls for a firm's need to tax planning. we include LOSSit to capture a firm's current profitability and whether loss firms have greater incentive to engage in aggressive tax strategies (Chan, Lin & Mo, 2010; Tang & Firth 2011; Badertscher et al, 2013), which is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when a consolidated entity has a loss in the current year t and 0 otherwise. we use LEVitto measure a firm's leverage level in order to capture the impact of the firm's capital structure on firm risk and the extent of the tax shield of debt (Hanlon, Maydew & Shevlin, 2008;Wilson, 2009; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Armstrong, Blouin & Larcker, 2012), which is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. This is due to the fact that firms have less incentives to tax planning with greater leverage arise from the associated tax benefits of debt financing such as interest on borrowing is tax deductible (Stickney & McGee, 1982; Porcano, 1986). Meanwhile, leverage could imply the increasing monitory by debt-holders and managers are also concerned with increased financing reporting costs associated with tax savings (Zeng, 2010). A higher non-tax cost of conforming book income will be associated with a tax aggressiveness position given the higher leverage, and thus a negative relationship between leverage and aggressiveness can be expected (Chan, et al. 2010). However, due to the mixed empirical evidences on the relationship between leverage and BTDs in prior literature (Mills & Newberry, 2001; Frank et al. 2009; Moore, 2012), therefore, we make no prediction about the sign of the coefficient on LEVit .

In addition, market value of equity, all in natural logarithm (SIZEit) is added

to capture changes in the scale or size of the firm and also proxy for the benefits of tax sheltering (Jiang, Lee & Anandarajan, 2008; Wilson, 2009; Armstrong, Blouin & Larcker, 2012; Tang & Firth, 2012; Khurana & Moser, 2013). The impact of firm size on tax aggressiveness is inconclusive, on the

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one hand, larger firms have higher political pressure to be less aggressive, and onthe other hand, larger firms may take advantage of greater political influence and are better able to enjoy tax benefits (Wu, Wang, Gills & Luo, 2012). Dyreng et al. (2008) find that long-run tax sheltering is positively associated with firm size. Larger firms are more likely to have asophisticated internal tax department, given the presence of economies of scale of tax planning (Armstrong, Blouin, & Larcker, 2010). Capital intensity (CAPINTit),

which is measured as fixed assets divided by total assets, isadded to control for the opportunities related to investments in fixed assets, and can affect book-tax differences through its accelerated depreciation relative to its actual lives of assets (Porcano, 1986; Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Mills & Newberry, 2001; Phillips, 2003; Frank et al. 2009; Lin, Lu & Zhang, 2012; Wu, Wang, Gills & Luo, 2012; Wu, Rui & Wu, 2013). Capital-intensive (CAPINT) firms are more influenced by the differences in financial reporting and tax treatments of depreciation.

The other variables are related to firms' financial performance, ROEit is added

to control for firm's profitability because growing and profitable firms are more likely to make larger investments in depreciable assets. Therefore, the overall firm performance is controlled and the specific effects of tax management is teased out by inclusion of variable ROEit (Hanlon, Maydew &

Shevlin, 2008; Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shelvin, 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012;Khurana & Moser, 2013).

Finally,measure for earning management (EMit) is added to control for

Chinese listed firms' engage in earning management for financial reporting purpose, due to the fact that ABTD can be indicative of earning management and tax management of the Chinese listed firms (Mills & Newberry, 2001; Phillips et al. 2003; McGill & Outslay, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Tang & Firth, 2011; Firth, Lo & Wong, 2013). The study conducted by Phillips et al (2003) find firms' management of their book income in order to avoid reported losses, which in Chinese listed firms, Jiang & Wang (2008) find that percentage of firms with small profits is significantly

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higher than that of firms with small losses, which further provide evidence on Chinese listed firms' engagement in earning management (Firth, Lo & Wong, 2013); meanwhile, it is regulated by CSRC (2001) in terms of delisting and trading restrictions that losses for three consecutive years cannot be reported by Chinese listed firms in case of their shares being suspended and delisted. As a result, there is propensity for Chinese listed firms to report positive earning to avoid delisting (Tang & Firth, 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to control for earning management as it can give rise to similar differences in examining effects of BTDs (Phillips, Pincus & Rego, 2003; Hanlon, 2005; Wahab & Holland, 2012). We do not predict the sign for control variables including LEV, ROA and SIZE as prior studies do not have consistent results (Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Wu, Wang, Lin & Li, 2007;Zeng, 2010).