Capítulo VI Conclusiones y Recomendaciones
Gráfica 3.12 Clima organizacional en la DOFV
The pa t s effo ts i poli aki g e e odest a d efle ted a st u tu e that i o ed the
go e e t s a i et p o ess, namely a shadow cabinet structure (see figure 5.2). An explicit policy review committee (PRC, later rebadged by Peacock as the Policy Implementation Committee), chaired by John Howard, was established to help the opposition co-ordinate its policies more
effectively. Policy making structures were quickly established and drew upon both the parliamentary and the organisational wings.
Figure 5.2 Policy making process
Shadow ministers were the key actors in this structure (see figure 5.3) and enjoyed considerably more autonomy than their modern counterparts. Shadow ministers were responsible for developing policy options in their portfolio area — they were expected to consult with their relevant
parliamentary committee and to produce a draft policy for consideration by the PRC before it would go on for final approval by the shadow cabinet.
Policy-making for shadow ministers was an ad-hoc activity conducted by non-experts. The ad-hoc nature of policy development was compounded by the decentralised structure of the party. As a senior former shadow minister explained, the process that de eloped Liberal party policy like everything else [in the] Liberal party was very informal, so e did t ha e those fo alized i te al debate that the Labor party has.608 Learning on the job was essential to policy making in opposition
e ause politics demands that you be an instant expert about everything — yesterday. Clearly, you
a ot. 609 For members of the opposition, it was an iterative process, like being permanently at
608
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on June 5 2013.
609
170
u i e sit .610Fo a shado i iste s thei staff e e ital: I al a s edit su ess, su h that
it was, by appointing …the est people to o k ith e.611
Figure . Individual shadow minister’s policy processes and relationships
For opposition policy makers, the task was largely one of making judgments, but with inferior
esou es. As o e se io shado a i et i iste e plai ed, o o e ha d I did t eall ha e people
who knew what they were talking about except for some of the axe-grinders who were committed to one camp or another.612 And while some opposition members did develop expertise, the more typical experience was one of learning to manage the information available:
I ould e e lai to ha e a o igi al idea i life. I ould lai that I e ee smart enough to recognise the good ideas and what are the bad ideas, to be, at least, a good listener, and to be able to synthesise ideas, bridge gaps.613
Internal consultations were also important for some shadow ministers. Although they were often ignored in internal memos, backbench committees were an important sounding board for policies.614
610
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on June 18 2013.
611
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on March 10 2013.
612
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on December 20 2013.
613
Ibid.
614
For an example see NAA: M2239/3, 5, memo, Joi t “ta di g Co ittee o Fede al Poli : Chai a s ief
171
The committee would be given near-final drafts to make comments and suggestions. Other shadow ministers shared drafts with their ideological fellow-travellers. Given policies were not so tightly held centrally, the party room also was a more important site for policy making than it is today. Policies
that ould ot ake it out of the shado a i et ould ot e goi g to the pa t oo fo fi al app o al. I esse e the jo of a shado i iste as to e espo si le fo taki g the lead, ut
e ause it is al a s a o sultati e, olla o ati e p o ess that eeds fi al o se sus, ou e al a s t i g to i g people ith ou.615
Thus, policy-making was an activity made to fit in around the rest of a busy day, dominated by
espo di g to the go e e t s age da. But, it was always in the background, [a] program that
ou e o ki g o k o i g that ou a ted to get it do e su h a d su h deadli e.616 For some
opposition shadows, it was an intense experience, as one shadow put it, I found it very lonely.617
Afte his ele atio to the leade ship i “epte e , Ho a d o ti ued a d uilt upo Pea o k s
policy infrastructure. Within weeks of becoming leader, Howard announced new policy review arrangements. The Opposition Policy and Implementation Committee (PIC) again became the Policy
‘e ie Co ittee o P‘C. Ho a d e phasised that the pa t s poli -making processes would
e ai the sa e: i di idual shadow ministers will of course remain responsible for the preparation of policy statements in consultation with opposition members committees and relevant sections of
the pa t o ga isatio .618Poli state e ts ould o ti ue to e su je t to app o al by shadow
a i et a d the joi t pa t oo efo e adoptio as Coalitio poli .619 The purpose of the PRC was
not to undertake a major overhaul of policy but rather to develop policies further, facilitate internal dialogue between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings and co-ordinate policies more thematically into portfolio areas. Over the course of his tenure as opposition leader, Howard experimented with specific ministerial sub committees such as committees to manage tax policy, and others to deal with privatisation and government waste.620
Howard differentiated himself from Peacock by emphasising the importance of policy to the Liberal
pa t s o e all st ateg a d the se ious ess of the pa t s i te t to e a espo si le a d edi le
alternative government. Howard repeatedly and earnestly claimed that the opposition would win office on the strength of their policy platfo : hen I became the Leader of the Opposition eight
615
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on March 10 2013.
616
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on March 10 2013.
617
Personal communication with the author, interviewed on December 20 2013.
618
Joh Ho a d, Poli ‘e ie A a ge e ts , P ess ‘elease, O to e .
619
Ibid.
620Joh Ho a d, “hado Mi ist , P ess ‘elease, Ma ; Ho a d, Poli ‘e ie A a ge e ts , P ess
172
months ago, I promised that the opposition would not simply feed off the go e e t s istakes
ut ould p ese t itself as a alte ati e go e e t.621
Ea l i his leade ship, Ho a d outli ed that poli ies ould e eleased ell efo e the ele tio , i
time for the opposition to develop momentum and develop a program around those alternative
poli ies.622 In mid- , Ho a d laid the a ke s of his philosophi al f a e o k fo the Coalitio s
policy ideals. These fo used o : e ha i g i di idual f eedo ; p o idi g atio al se u it a d
p o ote fa il se u it ; e ou agi g e te p ise a d self- elia e ; pu sui g su ess a d
e elle e a d; sho i g compassion to those i ge ui e eed of help .623
At the start of May 1987, Howard reduced the number of shadow ministry positions from 27 to 22.
The p ess elease a ou i g this lai oasted of the LPA s st o gl held ie s i fa ou of s alle go e e t .624 In reality, it was far more likely the result of attempting to deal with the
mass exodus of National party members from shadow cabinet in the wake of the split in the Coalition — especially given that the shadow cabinet increased in size dramatically after the 1987 election and the restoration of the Coalition.625
In contrast to contemporary policy-making practices, which are explored in chapter six, policy review committees were larger and given the nature of their size and personnel, less secret. Peacock characterised his review committee as the eal o kho se i thepa t s poli aki g st u tu e
a d e e oasted that it had de eloped a health e o d of eje ti g d aft do u e ts.626 It was a style that shadow ministers were familiar with from their time in government, but also it
complemented Peacock s self-des i ed app oa h to encourage the maximum initiative from shadow ministers in their areas.627 Peacock was comfortable allowing shadows to bring policy ideas to cabinet, his main concern was achieving an eventual consensus. In contrast, Howard, whose policy emphasis was stronger, did not appear to outline his expectations in writing as he would later do in government. A shadow minister at the time noted that I do t e e e hi gi i g e a
iefi g, ote, ut just so t of k o what would be approved by shadow cabinet.628
621
Joh Ho a d, Fou datio s fo go e e t: Add ess the Ho Joh Ho a d MP Leader of the
Oppositio , Natio al P ess Clu , Ca e a, Ma , .
622
Joh Ho a d, T a s ipt of the P ess Co fe e e the Ho . J.W. Ho a d, M.P., Leade of the Oppositio ,
October 1, 1985, 2.
623
Ibid., 2.
624Ho a d, “hado Mi ist , P ess ‘elease,
May 1 1987.
625
Joh Ho a d, “hado Mi ist , P ess ‘elease, August , .
626
Ibid.
627
NAA: M2239/3, 20, letter, Andrew Peacock to Paul Everingham, January 24 1985.
628
173
Ho a d s fi st poli e ie o ittee, a ou ed i , as hai ed Wal Fife, ho as ot a
member of the shadow cabinet, let alone the leadership group. The committee had ten members, some of whom were known factional antagonists, such as Chris Puplick. After enduring the spate of
leaks dis ussed i hapte fou , Ho a d s poli e ie o ittee afte the ele tio as
significantly smaller with only five members. It was still led by a non-shadow cabinet minister, Senator Peter Durack, reflecting that the role was likely still envisaged in a similar fashion to the one envisaged for Wal Fife — oth of these politi ia s e e a le to i g thei ide e pe ie e i
go e e t a d good politi al judg e t to the task of poli o-ordination.629
A policy role for the extra-parliamentary party?
In the LPA s early opposition years, Peacock attempted to consult more deeply and widely with the party organisation. Pea o k s offi e also sought to e gage ith o ittee p o esses u de pi i g
Facing the Facts, with the federal secretariat and his own parliamentary colleagues about how policy should be developed and how it should be used to help the LPA win government. At the end of 1983,
the pa t s fi st ea i oppositio , Pea o k acknowledged in a letter to the state division presidents and state directors that the resources that could be deployed towards policy making were
dau ti gl li ited .630
To further facilitate the LPA s poli aki g apa it , Peacock with the assistance of the federal director, Tony Eggleton, set about organising a revitalisation and strengthening the organisational
i gs joint divisional policy advisory capacity. The hope was that the organisational and parliamentary party streams would flow seamlessly together, feedi g the LPA s poli aki g
a hi e . The Joi t “ta di g Co ittee o Fede al Poli J“CFP d e o the pa t s state
divisions, usuall th ough the atte da e of the LPA s state di e to s, to a t as a ad iso od fo the federal party leader. At the organisational level, the policy committees of each state division would filter ideas up through to the JSCFP.631 Now that the party was out of office, the parliamentary wing ight pa o e atte tio to the pa t o ga isatio s ideas. I its fi st post-defeat meeting, Peacock as chai a gued that it as ti e fo the J“CFP to take o e e g eate sig ifi a e o that the party was in opposition — a state e t see i gl at odds ith Pea o k s a k o ledge e t that
i the past the Joi t “ta di g Co ittee s role had been allowed to erode and flounder. 632 Peacock acknowledged that the state divisions had not always had an incentive to give serious input to the JSCFP and, equally, the parliamentary party had not always had an incentive to contribute seriously
629
Ho a d, Poli ‘e ie A a ge e ts , P ess ‘elease, O to e .
630
NAA: M2239/2, 3, letter, Andrew Peacock to Division Presidents and State Directors, November 2, 1983, 2.
631
NAA: , M2239/3, 5, e o, Joi t “ta di g Co ittee o Fede al Poli : Chai a s ief fo eeting on
O to e , , 8.
632
174
to the committee either.633 Moreover, without continuity of staff support from meeting to meeting the utility of the Joint Standing Committee was undermined.
Yet, despite Pea o k a d Eggleto s effo ts at i lusio , Pea o k s ope i g e a ks lea l outli ed
the limitations of such a body and the realities and difficulties of seeking co-operation and co- ordination in a confederated party. Seeking to direct the discussion to follow, Peacock began by outlining what the JSCFP could not do. Due to its large size and the infrequency of its meetings, it could not be a drafting committee, nor could it conduct detailed analysis and research. Moreover, the JSCFP should not serve as merely a sounding board for interest groups or as simply a post box for the state divisio s ie s.634 I stead, Pea o k offe ed that the J“CFP ould p o ide leade ship a d policy development fo all se tio s of the Pa t by identifying key issues and promoting dialogue between the state divisions and the federal party.635 The JSCFP agreed to these measures, also acknowledging the importance of shadow ministers, and insisted on adequate consultation between the federal party and the JSCFP.636 Nonetheless, given the limitations outlined by Peacock and acknowledged by the committee, it is hard to see how the JSCFP could act as anything other than an advisory body — at best, a better consulted post box for the latest thinking in the divisions.
As 1984 unfolded, there were increasing signs that the Hawke government would go to an early election, forcing the Coalition to scramble to finalise policies without giving shadow cabinet much time for deliberation. The task was all the more difficult because the opposition clearly lacked the resources to come up with definitive costings for their policies, instead having to settle for a
easo a le le el of detail a d ou hi g p o ises fo ta efo as when budgetary circumstances permit.637
In the mid-1980s, the federal secretariat gained additional resources to support the federal
pa lia e ta pa t . The pa t hi ed the deput di e to of the Natio al Fa e s Fede atio , Da id
Trebeck, to head up a modest policy unit. The federal secretariat also became more alert to the political communication dimensions of policy development. A su issio to Pea o k s offi e, drawn up by the federal secretariat, advised that existing policies should act as a benchmark for further development by shadows ministers and that they [shadow ministers] should look out for initiatives that would demonstrate that the part as li el a d a ti e . 638 Just as it had counselled in the 633 Ibid. 634 Ibid., 4. 635 Ibid. 636
NAA: M2239/3, 5, memo, Li e al Pa t of Aust alia “ta di g Co ittee o Fede al Poli , Fede al
“e eta iat, Ca e a, F ida O to e , 2.
637
NAA: M1198/3, 11, memo, Brian Jeffriess, Costi g Ou Poli ies, October 18 1984.
638
175
weeks after the 1983 election that not every government statement requires a response, the federal se eta iat a gued that that the e as o side a le e it i ot issui g poli ies ui kl , i stead leaving shadow ministers free to announce initiatives either closer to the election or at times which would be politically advantageous to the party.639 This concept will be further explored in chapter seven.