Dimensión de integración

Shortly after losing federally in 1983, the party ordered a wide-ranging review of the party

organisation, its relationships with its members and MPs a d the pa t s ele to al p ospe ts. W itte by a large committee comprising both party organisational figures and parliamentarians, Facing the Facts (also known as the Valder Report) raised three concerns in relation to policy development and its capacity to support the federal parliamentary party in opposition.591Fi st, the epo t s autho s linked the development of a professional party organisatio to the Li e al pa t s e su i al.592 A professional party would be better equipped to support the party in appropriate policy

development.

While concluding that the federal se eta iat st u tu e as sou d , o l eedi g a oost to staffi g levels to support the party in opposition, the report expressed concern about many of the state divisions, which they judged had not reached the same levels of professionalism as the federal secretariat.593 The committee also called for a re-think of expectations in some state divisions that organisational staff should not have political ambitions. The report writers argued that this party norm limited the potential supply of quality staff and discouraged party members from seeking experience in a political office before pursuing a political career.594 Last, Facing the Facts noted that

the pa t s fu d aisi g effo ts te ded to p odu e peaks a d t oughs i fu di g, hi h ould lead to

over spending in election years and leave the party struggling to run basic operations during non- election years.595 Without matching La o s efforts to professionalise their state branches, the

588

Ibid., 8.

589_{G ae e “ta , The Pa t Ma hi e , i}

Looking at the Liberals, ed. Ray Aitchison (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1974), 57–58.

590

Ma sh, Poli Maki g i the Li e al Pa t , –15.

591

Liberal Party of Australia. Committee of Review and Valder, Facing the Facts, 4.

592 Ibid., 81. 593 Ibid., 81–82. 594 Ibid., 84. 595 Ibid., 84–85.

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Liberal party would be ill equipped to compete with a resurgent and incumbent Labor party federally.596

The epo t s autho s also e p essed o e at the la k of o u i atio et ee the

parliamentary party, the organisation and its branches. The committee reminded parliamentarians

that it as thei p i a espo si ilit to put the pa t s philosoph i to p a ti e th ough

policies.597 The committee reaffirmed its commitment to Burkean representation, explicitly outlining that elected representatives primary responsibility was to their electorates, not the party

organisation.598I deed, it a k o ledged the pa lia e ta pa t s p e-eminence in both making final policy decisions and coming to compromise with the national party.599 However, it was

e pe ted that poli judg e ts of the pa lia e ta pa t ill e ea hed i a o da e ith

Li e al p i iples and that the parliamentary party was expected to fully explain the basis and rationale to the party organisation.600 The committee added that a of the LPA s p o le s originated with poor communication between different levels of the party, lack of interest in the policy development processes of the state divisions, or simply ignoring ordinary party members.601 The same complaints would be repeated after electoral defeats in 2007 and 2010.

Finally, the authors of Facing the Facts urged the Liberal party to take up the intellectual fight and win the battle of ideas u de a i Aust alia.602 To do this, they called for the party to make greater use of think tanks in order to exploit high quality policy thinking and enrich that part s policy offerings.603 Yet, adding to its troubles, the Liberal party was unclear about its philosophical direction and how to address directly the challenges of a world in which both the post-war and the original federation settlement was fraying under the strain of global competition. The epo t s authors glossed over this conundrum and the reality that the LPA was divided about how it should approach its future.

Thus, the loss of the 1983 election, presented a significant challenge to the LPA. At a time when policy ideas had become more important than ever to the political contest, the party found itself in opposition. While satisfied with the structure of the federal secretariat, the reality was that the secretariat was out of practice in terms of supporting the party in opposition. Yet, what the party lacked for in internal research capacity (it did not possess anything like the famous British

596 Ibid., 81. 597 Ibid., 97. 598 Ibid., 98. 599 Ibid., 98, 100. 600 Ibid., 98. 601 Ibid., 100–101. 602 Ibid., 55. 603 Ibid., 56.

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Conservative Research Department, for example) it made up for with a corps of MPs invigorated by the neo-liberal turn that emerged in the late 1970s and the rise of a number of right leaning think tanks established by fellow travellers or former MPs.604 The challenge then remained to build up internal capacity both within the parliamentary party and the federal secretariat and to manage both the development of policy ideas and to manage effectively their timing and sale to the Australian electorate. How did the LPA go about establishing its policy making infrastructure and how important was it considered by the party?

Peacock and Howard: attempts to institutionalise and professionalise