6.1.1 The base year, 2015
At the turn of the century, population growth had moderated in the MENA region, yet, due to demographic momentum, the average population growth was still 1.4
% annually from 2000 to 2015, and the total population of the MENA region reached 459 million in 2015; about half lived in Middle Eastern countries (233 million or 51 %), the other half in North Africa. Despite the general shift from high to low mortality and fertility that can be observed throughout the region, MENA countries experience the demographic transition at different paces. As a result, the MENA countries presented an array of demographic regimes in 2015. Egypt had the largest population (94 million with relatively high fertility rates, 3.4 in 2010-2015), whilst Iraq, Sudan and Yemen had the highest fertility rates recorded in the region (more than four children per woman). On the opposite side, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Qatar and Iran have reached fertility below replacement levels.
The decline of fertility was preceded by a decline in mortality: it benefited young children as infant mortality rates dropped from 200 deaths per one thousand live births in 1950 to 50 deaths per one thousand in 2000.
Nevertheless, the population in some MENA countries was stricken by war, i.e. Syria, and some countries had relatively low life expectancies in 2015, like in Sudan, where the life expectancy at birth was 63 years for males and 66 years for females.
At the end of 2015, over 6 million refugees worldwide originated from the MENA region (UNHCR, 2016). Three
countries accounted for more than half of the annual conflict-related displacements in the world: around 2.5 million Yemenites, nearly 10 % of the population of Yemen, an estimated 6.6 million Syrians, and 4.4 million Iraqis.
6.1.2 The projected population in 2060 and 2100
According to the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario, the MENA population is expected to exceed 728 million in 2060, representing a 59 % increase for the whole region since 2015, with significant growth in some countries, such as Iraq (115 %), Jordan (109 %), Yemen (119 %) and Western Sahara (112 %). From 2060 to 2100, MENA’s population growth might not be more than 2 %, with different trends between countries: the population would decrease in Morocco (-18 %) and Tunisia (-15 %), while it would still increase rapidly in countries, such as Western Sahara and Iraq (more than +20 %).
Doubling migration, both emigration and immigration rates (CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) scenario) would not affect the MENA population substantially, as it would reach 718 million in 2060, which implies 1 % less compared to the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario. By contrast, under the hypothesis of a closed population (as described by the CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2) scenario), the MENA population is estimated to reach more than 740 million. Meaning that, if the growth could be only governed by fertility and mortality regimes, the MENA population would be 12 million larger compared to the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario.
Migration effects can be assessed as the difference between the estimated population by the CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2) scenario and the estimated population by the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario. Referring to the period 2055-2060, countries can be then classified as follows: a) countries experiencing depopulation as the result of emigration and low fertility: Syrian Arab Republic, State of Palestine, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq and Yemen; where conflicts and conditions of political and economic instability would be determinants;
b) countries facing an enlargement of their populations, as a consequence of immigration, such as United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Western Sahara, Kuwait and Bahrain
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(nonetheless, in 2015, some of those, like Western Sahara, would be defined as transit countries).
The significance of migration appears even greater when analysing separately North Africa and the Middle East. In 2060, according to the CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2) scenario, North African sub-regional population would account for 368 million, increasing by 24 million in comparison with the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario and by more than 46 million in comparison with the CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) scenario. By contrast, in 2060, Middle Eastern sub-regional population would be 396 million (+ 70 % in comparison with the population size in 2015) as a result of the migration hypothesis (CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) scenario), engendering an increase of around 11 million in comparison with the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario, and 24 million in comparison with the CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2) scenario.
The SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios would show more dramatic effects on the future population of the MENA region as can be seen from Figure 6.1.
According to the SSP1 scenario, the MENA population would grow steadily from 459 million in 2015 to 665 million by 2060 (+ 45 %); after peaking in 2060, it would start declining to reach 613 million in 2100 (-8 %), in line with the SSP1 scenario’s hypotheses of sustainability and social development. With respect to the sub-regional
populations, from 2015 to 2060, the Middle Eastern countries would grow faster (+ 47 %) than the North African ones (+ 42 %); in 2060, the Middle Eastern populations would account for 344 million, against 320 million for the North African populations. Specifically, some countries, such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Morocco would record a larger population under the SSP1 scenario in comparison with the populations resulting from the CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) scenario.
By contrast, according to the SSP3 scenario the MENA population would approximately double, from 459 million in 2015 to 865 million in 2060 (+ 89 %), and would continue growing to 1,159 million by 2100 (+ 34 %).
During the period 2015-2060, the highest population increase would be experienced by Iraq (+ 179 %), State of Palestine, Sudan (+ 164 %), Yemen (+ 162 %) and Jordan (109 %).
In 2060, the comparison between the SSP3 and the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenarios would show a larger population in all MENA countries under the SSP3 scenario. This divergence would be more significant in countries, such as Syrian Arab Republic (48 %), Sudan (42 %), State of Palestine (41 %), Morocco (36 %) and Iraq (30 %), where assumptions related to the conditions of extreme poverty would not limit immigration and the level of predicted demographic pressure would partially act as one of the emigration drivers.
FIGURE 6.1: MENA Population by scenario, 2015-2100 (Source: own calculations)
Thousands
0 200 000 400 000 600 000 800 000 1 000 000 1 200 000 1 400 000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 MENA, countries by scenario
■ SSP1 ■ CEPAM Medium (SSP2) ■ CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2)
■ CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) ■ SSP3
66 D E M O G R A P H I C A N D H U M A N C A P I TA L S C E N A R I O S FO R T H E 21S T C E N T U RY 2018 A S S E S S M E N T FO R 201 C O U N T R I E S
FIGURE 6.2: North Africa Population by scenario, 2015-2100 (Source: own calculations)
0 100 000 200 000 300 000 400 000 500 000 600 000 700 000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 North Africa, countries by scenario
■ SSP1 ■ CEPAM Medium (SSP2) ■ CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2)
■ CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) ■ SSP3
Thousands
FIGURE 6.3: Middle East population by scenario, 2015-2100 (Source: own calculations)
0 100 000 200 000 300 000 400 000 500 000 600 000 700 000
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 Middle East, countries by scenario
■ SSP1 ■ CEPAM Medium (SSP2) ■ CEPAM Zero Migration (SSP2)
■ CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) ■ SSP3
Thousands
6.1.3 Population growth rates and trends in specific countries
Under the assumptions of the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario, MENA populations would rise faster than the world overall, driven largely by increasing numbers of people surviving to reproductive age. Figure 6.4 displays
the annual growth (in percent) for all countries in the world and MENA countries from 2015 to 2100: it shows how population growth would remain positive in all MENA countries until 2085-2090, given the population momentum and despite a general decline in fertility rates (indeed, after 2055, only Sudan and Yemen would have a total fertility rate above replacement level).
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FIGURE 6.4: Annual growth (in percent*), in MENA and World in 2015-2100 — CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario (Source: own calculations)
-0.50 % 0.00 % 0.50 % 1.00 % 1.50 % 2.00 %
Annual growth
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095
■ World ■ MENA countries
Note: * The annual rate is calculated by each 5-year interval, comparing the population at the beginning of the period with the population projected after 5 years and dividing this difference by 5.
This tendency towards a stable (stationary or declining) population is particularly evident in some countries, such as Morocco, whose population is projected to slowly increase from 2015 to 2060 according to the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario. Different phases of Moroccan population growth would be detected: — from an annual population growth of 1.2 % in 2015-2020, to a stationary condition in 2055-2060; — then, a decrease which progressively would attain the annual rate of -0.74 % in the last interval 2095-2100. The process would even become faster, taking into account the CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) scenario: migration would accelerate the process bringing 20 years forward (period 2040-2045) the occurrence of the stationary population
and the following decline (Figure 6.A1 Appendix).
Otherwise, migration could play a different role for the dynamics and stability of populations. In Egypt, migration would not significantly affect population growth: the projected annual rate under the assumption of the CEPAM Double Migration (SSP2) rates would be close to the projected rate under the CEPAM Medium (SSP2) scenario. The Egyptian population (Figure 6.A2 Appendix) would steadily rise from 2015 to 2090, despite a drop of its total fertility rate from 3 to 1.58 children by woman in 2055 (-41 %). Furthermore, according to the SSP-1 scenario, potential effects generated by educational and health investments could speed up the achievement of the stationary condition in the period 2080-2085 (in 2030, the total fertility rate is predicted to fall below
replacement level).
Indeed, in some countries, such as Iraq, future of educational investments would be the dominant factor: the education more than migration would shape Iraqi annual population growth. As described by the Figure 6.A3 Appendix, according to the CEPAM Double
Migration (SSP2) scenario, Iraqi population enlargement would persist until 2100, representing an exception if compared with the MENA countries’ annual growth. On the contrary, under the hypothesis of the SSP1 scenario, Iraqi population would start decreasing in 2080-2085.