2 Marco Referencial
2.4 Marco Legal
3.3.7 Coeficiente “W” Kendall
As this narrative of the politically symbolic and strategically critical USM presence in Asia has been continuously reproduced throughout the post-war period – with little public pushback to it from domestic American and Japanese audiences – this is not to say that it has not gone without some tweaking along the way with regards to its physical size and geographic spread. The current realignment of forces serves as a case in point, though it does not represent the first time since the end of the Cold War that such policies have been carried out. The 2004 Global Posture Review under the Bush administration, for instance, recommended that in order for US forces to be able to
53 See, for example: Paul Wolfowitz, ‘U.S.-Japan Business Conference’, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Washington, DC, 18 February 2002a, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=191; JDA, ‘Defense of Japan 2005’, 2005, available online at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2005.html; and Gordon R. England, ‘Japan Defense Society’, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon R. England, Washington, DC, 16 October 2006, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1058. 54 J.M. Boorda, ‘The Enemy Is Complacency’, Prepared remarks ADM J.M. Boorda, chief of naval operations, the Armed Forces Day luncheon hosted by Military Veterans Education Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, 19 May 1995, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=910.
55 John Roos, ‘Liberal Democratic Party Leadership Discusses Party Direction with DCM’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks cable:09TOKYO2664. 18 November 2009e. Available online at:
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TOKYO2664_a.html.
Yes, we don't have this huge enemy on the other side of the world, an ogre that forces us to spend higher and higher amounts of our tax dollars on military forces. But in its place is a new old risk for our country, one that I believe you in this audience appreciate better than most. The new risk is complacence [emphasis added]. So there has been this cycle throughout this century, a cycle of enormous and costly exertion followed by a false sense of relief. A delusion that we had done our part and that it was time to rest, to collect the dividends for our efforts. Well, this time around, we have to -- we must -- resist the dangerous embrace of complacence.
exercise greater flexibility and project their power ‘rapidly and at long ranges’, their numbers should generally be reduced ‘in host nations where those forces [are concentrated around] large, urban populations’, including in Okinawa.56 Similarly, the current realignment or ‘rebalance’ of forces, said
Gates, is geared towards making the US defence posture in Asia ‘one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable’.57
Speaking to the last of these three aims, Locklear has stated that the rebalance is about ‘collaboration, not containment’, and former DASD for Plans (including, under her purview, America’s global defence posture policy) Janine Davidson, in 2013 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, likewise emphasised in her remarks that ‘[w]hile U.S. military planners must continue to plan for worst-case contingencies, these plans represent only a part of a larger strategy that integrates “partners” – not “host-nations” – and works in a measured, cooperative fashion to promote sustained peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific’.58 In a later speech, Locklear again emphasised the non-military aspects of the plan,
stating that ‘the U.S. rebalance is not about establishing U.S. bases anywhere else in this theatre […] Our objective is to build on the relationships that we have created in peaceful, relatively peaceful Asia-Pacific [and] indo Pacific [in] the last 60 years’.59
The military component of the rebalance plan, however, is not insignificant. ‘Looking purely at resources and level of effort, by 2020 the US Navy will have 60% of its fleet in the Pacific’,
remarked James F. Amos, former Commandant of the USMC.60 The US Quadrennial Defense Review
in 2014 likewise states that the US ‘will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while
enhancing our presence in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean’.61 These enhancements
56 Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century’, Center for a New American Security, June 2008, available online at:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/6/military- ohanlon/06_military_ohanlon.pdf, p. 27.
57 Robert M. Gates, ‘International Institute For Strategic Studies (Shangri-La--Asia Security)’, Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, 5 June 2010, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1483.
58 Janine Davidson, ‘Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs’, Center for a New American Security, 25 April 2013, available online at:
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Davidson%20Testimony%20042513_0.pdf. 59 Samuel J. Locklear III, ‘ADM Locklear roundtable with East Asia Media Hub’, Remarks by Presenters: Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, East Asia and Pacific Media Hub, Tokyo, 21 February 2013b, available online at:
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/565146/adm%C2%ADlocklear%C2%AD roundtable%C2%ADwith%C2%ADeast%C2%ADasia%C2%ADmedia%C2%ADhub.aspx.
60 James F. Amos, ‘General James F. Amos, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps: Remarks to RAND’, US Marine Corps, 28 January 2014, available online at:
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/140128%20--
%20CMC%20Comments%20at%20RAND%20(CMC%20Final%20Formatted%20for%20Posting).pdf. 61 DOD, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’, 4 March 2014, available online at:
include not only the increased naval fleet in the Pacific62 and the relocation of units currently
stationed in Okinawa to Guam and Australia63, but also the move of additional US Air Force (USAF)
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. A 2012 DOD strategy document, in making its case for the rebalance plan, explains:
64
What is evident in this strategy document, as well as in the quotes cited by other defence officials, is a curious mix of operational specifics related to the realignment and peppering of, again, euphemistic or vague language (e.g. ‘we cannot afford to fail’, though what constitutes ‘failure’ is left unexplained)—the meaning of which is assumed to be understood by all, rather than open to interpretation. Nonetheless, the military component of the realignment, combined with the
rhetorical reassurances of the USG and military officials of their continued, ‘credible’ commitment to the region, has attracted the most interest from defence officials within Japan—this interest being, oftentimes, sceptical of the strategy. ‘It’s a very delicate balancing act by the White House: trying to have more engagement in these regions and trying to redress underbalancing in these regions’, one MOD researcher tells me.65 Another MOD researcher sees the rebalance not as a proactive measure
on the part of the US (as it has oft been framed by American officials), but as rather a ‘reaction to the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more important for the United States […] So as a result of that, the United States needs to respond to that in order to safeguard its own interests’.66
62 Including ‘[littoral combat ships] rotated through Singapore, a greater number of destroyers and amphibious ships home-ported in the Pacific, and the deployment of surface vessels such as Joint High Speed Vessels to the region’ (DOD 2014, p. 36).
63 Up to 8,000 Marines were originally to be sent to Guam by the early 2020s, though this number has been revised recently down to 4,000; the Australian contingent, meanwhile, ‘will grow with the goal of establishing a rotational presence of a 2,500 strong Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) over the coming years’ (DOD 2014, p. 36). See also: Erik Slavin, ‘Officials update Okinawa, Guam realignment plans’, Stars and Stripes, 3 October 2013, available online at: http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/officials-update-okinawa-guam- realignment-plans-1.244813.
64 DOD, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, 2012, available online at:
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, pp. 7-8. 65 Anonymous, personal interview, 12 February 2014j, Ministry of Defense, Japan. 66 Anonymous, personal interview, 10 January 2014f, Ministry of Defense, Japan.
Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade. An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention […] Conclusion: The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail.
2. Defining and redefining security
Bases are seen as the ‘necessary evil’.- a current official at the Japanese MOD
While US allies may be reassured by the narratives and policies constituting the rebalance strategy, the same cannot be said within Okinawa itself. Although the construction of the FRF in Henoko was de-linked from the broader relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam in April 2012, the ongoing conflict over the FRF has caused some officials speaking on the subject of the rebalance to be more circumspect in their framing of the issue. ‘I think what we're doing in -- with the
Okinawa, Guam and Korea situation is making sure that people in that region know we're not withdrawing from Northeast Asia’, said former US Senator James Webb (D-VA), ‘[but] we need to put it in a smarter way, so that the people in Okinawa can accommodate our presence, and we can reduce some of these tensions’.67 Japanese defence policy documents similarly stress, like their
diplomatic counterparts, reducing the ‘excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities’68 and note that ‘special consideration must be paid to minimize the burdens
on Okinawa’.69 The February 2014 issue of the MOD’s publication Japan Defense Focus, to this point,
states that the MOD ‘will exert itself to the utmost to realize mitigating the impacts as much as possible so that the people of Okinawa can actually feel it’.70
These statements, just like the ones cited in Chapter 3, always carry the attendant clause that burdens must be minimised while also ‘ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process’71, ‘keeping in mind the current international situation and the
security perspective’72, and allowing the Marines to ‘become more politically sustainable on the
island’.73 Combined, these two conditions for a ‘successful’ relocation effort constitute the primary
components of the larger Okinawa basing strategy which has, in large part, defined the nature of the alliance’s narrative around ‘security’ and how it should be defined within the USG and GOJ for nearly
67 Jim Sciutto, ‘A Conversation with Senator Jim Webb’, Council on Foreign Relations, 13 June 2011a, available online at: http://www.cfr.org/world/conversation-senator-jim-webb/p35038.
68 MOD, ‘Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)’, 2005, available online at:
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/mid-term_defense_program.pdf. 69 MOD, ‘Defense of Japan 2008’, 2008c, available online at:
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2008.html, p. 216.
70 MOD, Japan Defense Focus, 49 (February 2014b), available online at:
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/pdf/jdf_no49.pdf, p. 4.
71 DOD, ‘Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa’, April 2013c, available online at:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Okinawa%20Consolidation%20Plan.pdf, p. 2. 72 MOD, ‘Defense of Japan 2011’, 2011d, available online at:
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html, p. 293.
73 Bob Work, ‘A New Global Posture for a New Era’, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 30 September 2014, available online at:
two decades. Against this background is the increasingly prominent role of Japan within the alliance in providing for its own defence—a development which has not just been encouraged by the USG, but urged since the 1980s. As US forces have become involved in multiple global conflicts, pressure on the GOJ has intensified to engage in a ‘defense transformation’ which would involve increased defence spending, increased SDF contributions to PKOs and multilateral combat missions around the world, and increasing HNS for US forces.
What these policies mean for the USM presence in Okinawa has been made clear: given the proximity of the prefecture to regional ‘hotspots’ and important sea lanes in comparison to other major US bases in Hawaii, Guam, and the continental US, it will continue to be framed as a critical component of the alliance’s security strategy.74 At the same time, the emphasis on the ‘political
sustainability’ of the USM presence (and of the realignment broadly speaking) illustrates a desire not just to improve civil-military relations for their own sake, but to maintain the USM presence in some form or another for the foreseeable future—thus excluding the possibility of removing them
altogether from the range of available policy options. In doing so, actors in defensive sites thus display an unwillingness to negotiate the fundamental narratives underpinning the PBD and the way they define its constitutive, core beliefs.