In the historical account, Javid (2012) tells us that the political settlement in the settled region has been maintained by the politics of patronage, involving the British administration, followed by the Pakistan government, relying on a powerful landed elite. The concept of power and patronage in the post- colonial period of state formation has been explored by Javid (2012) through the examination of the institutional continuity of that landed elite. The author explores how the landed elite that emerged during the colonial period successfully begin to renegotiate their legitimacy with different ruling elites in independent Pakistan. As I explained in Chapter 3, the modus operandi of British rule remained similar in the settled region of the Indian Subcontinent, with the administration channeling the influence of local elites and institutionalised clientelistic politics. The local elites who remained loyal to the administration were rewarded with titles, perks and privileges. In terms of political significance, the landed elites in KPK enjoyed similar levels of political power as the Maliks in FATA, but have been identified by different names and titles. Some of the senior titles relevant to the Pashtun region conferred on Muslim subjects are Khan Bahadur (meaning ‘brave leader’), Wali of Swat (as discussed by Barth (1959)),
Nawabs, and, in other parts of India, Rai Bahadur (similar meaning to Khan Bahadur) etc. Titles of
lesser degree have also been given, such as Khan Sahib.
Javid (2012) informs us that, similar to Maliks in FATA, since the inception of Pakistan these powerful landed elites reproduced and reinforced themselves as significant power brokers and continue to influence the political process in Pakistan. In present times, the landed elite continue to dominate power politics in most parts of Pakistan, and in shaping the political outcomes in regional politics.
Unlike the political structure of FATA, the settled regions experience democratic-style politics. As a local of the region, I know that a new class of political elites has emerged in the recent past that has considerably affected the hold of the landed elite in the political landscape of KPK province. In particular, the presence of political parties over a long period of time has begun to provide a political space for an alternative power structure, taking advantage of the ‘open’ electoral system in KPK. In this way, in the settled region I observed a greater range of democratic actors, and that the notion of representation by Maliks or the landed elite – which was about tradition, community and identity politics – has therefore become less important.
Compared to FATA, where some elements of morals related to identity politics remain intact, in KPK I observed that these elements are not as strong and things have generally become more competitive. In
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the settled region I noted that the meaning of identity remains important, but even more important is the preference given to political candidates who can provide citizens with more access to development projects or social protection. Greater political support is given to political candidates across the ethnic divide, and there is a high variation in intra-clan support. People are competing within the same identity and across identities. The Khattak tribe form the largest ethnic community residing in Nowshera. (Other major tribes there include the Mian clan, Babars and migrants representing other ethnic communities). Elections are often contested by members of all the clans in the community who are associated with multiple mainstream political parties.
In Chapter 5 I noted that in FATA independent candidates continue to dominate the election process. In the settled region, there is a greater acceptability of political parties, or at least their candidates. The figures for the 2013 elections bear out the significance of political parties. There are 35 National Assembly seats in KPK, of which the PTI secured 18 in 2013. Only one independent candidate won a seat. My respondents considered the decision to run as an independent risky, generally believing that most political parties have a developed voter base. The general impression amongst community members is that, since the political parties are more institutionalised and localised, this provides more political and economic opportunities to the community members. It is also understood that the political parties have more power, with access to provincial funds or to links to central government.
I learned from discussions that some landed elites in Nowshera have adapted to the changing political environment. They began to take opportunities by developing relationships with political parties and the federal leadership. In my research constituency in Nowshera district, one family in particular hold on firmly to their influence in regional politics. A candidate from the ruling political party (PTI), Pervez Khattak, won the PK-13 constituency (Nowshera-II) in the 2013 general election. He is the current Chief Minister of KPK. His nephew and son-in-law, Imran Khattak, won the NA-5 constituency (Nowshera-I). The Chief Minister’s younger brother, Liaqat Khattak, was elected as District Nazim. The family has many shopping markets, cinemas, land and business in construction contracts across Pakistan. Politically the family is well connected with the senior leadership in Pakistan – federal ministers and members of the Senate and national and provincial assemblies. In the senior level of politics in Nowshera, other rich and influential candidates are associated with other mainstream political parties. The politics of the rest of KPK is also dominated by political parties, as illustrated in the make-up of the Provincial Assembly:
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Table 7.6: The Ruling Political Parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (2002–13)
General election 2013 2008 2002 Ruling party, Provincial Assembly Pakistan Tehreek-e- Insaf (PTI)
Awami National Party (ANP)
Muthaida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)
Source: Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa website. Available at http://www.pakp.gov.pk/2013/about- assembly/an-overview/.
The provincial government in KPK is formed of a tripartite alliance between the PTI, JUI and QWP. Table 7.7 shows that no single party has a majority, and the political parties form coalitions (the tripartite coalition has around 59 seats out of the total of 97 regular seats) in order to gain power. The opposition is formed of the JUI-F, PML (N), ANP and other political parties.
Table 7.7: Party Position in KPK: General Election, 2013
Party Elected PTI 44 JUI-F 13 PML (N) 13 QWP 8 JI 7 ANP 4 AJIP 65 4 PPPP 3 APML 1 Total 97
Source: Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa website. Available at: http://www.pakp.gov.pk/2013/about- assembly/an-overview/.
The role of Member of the Assembly becomes more powerful in the settled areas. Elected politicians have strong control over access to resources and the local administration is under the control of politicians in the ruling party.
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Local elections were held in KPK in 2015, two years after the general elections in 2013. From my own informal conversations (as a local) with people, the general impression amongst the public appears to be that the ruling political party often influences the result in local elections. There also seems to be a perception that the general public prefer candidates who are associated with the ruling political party. In Nowshera, the Tehsil and village council seats were contested competitively. These councils are made up of elected members from multiple mainstream political parties. However, the ruling political party won most of the top leadership positions.
In my research constituency, four political parties are well supported: PTI, ANP, JI and JUI-F. The village-level elite are younger political entrepreneurs and are effectively associated with one of these political parties. In a sense, a group of established political brokers is emerging in the settled region compared to the political workers and Lungi holders in the FATA region. One way of analysing maturity is through links with political parties; the success of village-level elites lies in being part of the networks connected to the main political leaders.
A majority of political brokers I interacted with were educated to college level and had small-scale businesses. Others, associated with religious parties, had an educational background from Islamic
madrassas. When I examined the source of authority of the political brokers, in effect they are similar to
the low- and middle-class political workers described in Chapter 5. Moreover, they have identical roles in a political party and use the same performance-based tactics to gain promotion within it, but they have a much wider range of functions than political workers in FATA.
These operators seek to gain authority through brokerage and access entitlements. My years of observation and informal discussions in the field confirmed that the legitimacy and loyalty of the followers in the settled region remains the same. It includes the ability of political brokers to connect and deliver, but this is more advanced in KPK than in the FATA region. I discuss the modalities of political relations in more detail in section 7.7. First, I describe how significant the Maliks are in the political settlement of the settled region.