In this section, I explore the workings of intra-clan support extended to a political candidate through the role played by Maliks in Khyber Agency in order to secure their legitimacy. This explains the strategic alliances that take place at the local level, which determines why political support should be given to a political candidate. In particular, it discusses the changing role of Maliks in pacts with local elites and discusses the type of tactics they employ to overcome what used to be the nature of identity politics in FATA. One way for the Maliks to gain loyalty is to trace their identity to a particular community, and use their influence in order to mobilise support from local social and kinship ties. Intra-clan support for a
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candidate is a complex phenomenon as the clan members have free choice over giving their political support. I observed that political support for a particular candidate is not certain, and indeed in some cases where alliances are more competitive in nature, pacts fall apart.
The term ‘identity politics’ is generally used to refer to clans or groups of people who are members of an ethnic group (Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Qamber Khel, Zaka Khel and so forth), and particularly with a tendency to form political alliances within that ethnic group. Amongst the ethnic clans in the town of Jamrud, political candidates from the two larger clans – the Kuki Khel and Zakha Khel tribes – are more likely to run for election because of their larger population. In 2013, a total of 18 candidates contested the general elections, amongst them eight candidates from the Kuki Khel tribe and four from the Zakha Khel.
I learned from my discussions with respondents that tribes in FATA prefer to elect a candidate (as an independent) from within their tribes for National Assembly elections. The nomination of a candidate in the general elections is generally subject to approval by the qaum (tribe), often mediated by Maliks. Without the qaum’s support, chances of success are minimal. Gul Shad explains the demography of his clan and the process of engagement that take place at village level:
In Kuki Khel, we have six sub-tribes … each has around 500 homes … we arrange Jirga at village level, and consultation sessions before coming to a decision. (Gul Shad, Interview, 7th November 2014)
What Gul Shad is trying to explain here is that in FATA the Malik is considered a mashr, and the clan members vote for him out of respect. In addition, most of the village comprises tight-knit family structures so the people, who are used to the Maliki system, rely on the word of a Malik when coming to a decision. The role of a Malik is to find common ground that binds the candidate and members of a tribe. Votes are often (but not necessarily) cast in a pool by the immediate family members of the candidate, biradari (brotherhood), sub-clans etc.
During my fieldwork, Maliks told me about the intra-clan political support they thought they could mobilise in favour of a political candidate. Often the term used here was ‘my vote bank’, as some Maliks considered they enjoyed considerable influence over the community. Some adaptive Maliks participate directly in the elections, and hence use this political support for themselves. One told me:
I ran for elections because I wanted to analyse my strength. I wanted to see where I stood in terms of significance. (Malik Israr, Interview, 14th October 2014)
The Malik’s decision to run as a candidate in the general election is inspired in order to take advantage of his political support and become an MNA, but the elections are also contested by these Maliks to demonstrate an ‘established base’ of voters through the level of support. The Maliks may then use this established base when negotiating with the new political elites in the future. Other Maliks gave me
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some conservative figures of their ‘vote bank’, from as low as 100, with Noor Maraz, a tribal elder, explaining the mechanism for how they could be generated:
In my family I have around 70 to 80 votes. If you include distant relatives, then it would reach around 100. (Noor Maraz, Interview13th October 2014)
Others cited figures of between 300 and 2,000 (the latter probably exaggerated). However, they did concede that there was no certainty that all of the votes are cast in a pool for a candidate, and that the vote is also dependent on the profile of the political candidate, and their welfare activities and level of respect amongst their community.
Moreover, the Maliks use their local support to negotiate with political parties in return for personal benefit. The political actors, being wealthier patrons, use clientelistic mechanisms to gain the Maliks’ support. One Malik supported a political candidate who was not as rich as the winning candidate. He explained that his chosen candidate lost the election because of his financial status:
… why did a rich candidate win the elections? Because of slaughtering animals in every Jirga, arranging a public meeting and … providing gifts of vehicles [Toyota Corolla diesel cars] for some influential elders. If you buy two motorcars as a gift for someone, don’t you think he would vote for you and ask the people as well? (Malik Seemab, Interview19th November 2014)
These discussions show that the role of Maliks has changed to be that of a broker in the political process. I explained the main changes in the elite structure in Chapter 5. In the early phase of elections in FATA, the Maliks had overriding powers to elect a National Assembly candidate via a limited franchise system. In 1997, after the universal adult franchise system was implemented, political candidates and Maliks needed to seek the clan’s opinion on who to support. The extension of the adult franchise system offered citizens a greater choice of candidates. The intermediary role of the Malik changed from a dominant agent to a situation where there is competition from other intermediaries associated with political parties. Figure 14 illustrates these changes.
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Figure 14: The PPA and the Dynamics of Identity Politics
The PPA has effected change within the dynamics of identity politics in Khyber Agency (as Figure 14 illustrates) as it offered multiple political party ideologies. Some aspects of the diagram were discussed in section 5.6.3, and the final section will be discussed in Chapter 7. In this section, I focus on two significant changes. First, the PPA has opened up opportunities for political actors to engage directly with citizens or nominate party workers to act as intermediaries to gain political support. The traditional channels of the Maliks’ mediatory role, although getting weaker, continue to shape the political dynamics of FATA – in particular, the Maliks’ support for independent candidates, as explained in Chapter 5. Second, the PPA has altered the nature of identity politics. The meaning of identity remains significant in Jamrud, but under the PPA a greater number of candidates contests elections, which has produced a dual effect: (a) more choice for citizens and increased competition for intra-ethnic mobilisation, and (b) these choices enable intra-clan divisions over political support to emerge.
Limited suffrage: Only Malik has right
to vote (1947–96)
• Loyalty: Between Malik and political candidate • Intermediary role: Malik
• Community involvement for political support: Negligible
Adult suffrage: Independent
candidate elections (1997–2012)
• Loyalty: Strong for ethnic candidate, unless competition with a strong religious political figure • Intermediary role: Significance of Malik
• Acceptability of political candidates: Independent • Variation in intra-clan support (for a candidate): Low
Adult suffrage: PPA (2013–present)
• Loyalty: Ethnic candidate high, political parties low. Identity politics important, but weakening • Intermediary role: Competition between Malik and political party workers
• Acceptability of political candidates: High for independent candidates. Low for political parties. (Regional variations: high for political candidates in some areas)
• Variation in intra-clan support: Medium
Political party system (Pakistan, 1947–
present)
• Loyalty: Preference for political party. Preference for governance work, other ethnic candidates accepted. Variation in influence of identity politics; low in some areas of Pakistan, such as KPK province.
• Intermediary role: Significance of political workers
• Acceptability of political candidates: High for political parties. Low for independent candidates. • Variation in intra-clan support: High
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As there is increased competition for political support at the local level, the traditional voting pattern has been disturbed as different options become available to citizens and clan leaders. The following statement by a tribal elder captures the changing and complex nature of local voter behaviour:
The people may vote [for us] [if I ask them] but people are generally greedy and hypocritical. They tell us they will vote [for us] but most probably will vote for someone else at the last moment. What I don’t understand is the hypocrisy – why they would vote for someone else when they have pledged to give it to us. Is it because of money, or for some other reason? I don’t understand. So, on the one hand they try to keep me happy by telling me that they have voted for my candidate, and on the other they might have voted for someone else. So basically keeping all parties happy … (Qoaat Khan, Interview, 4th
December, 2014).
In this manner, as Qoaat Khan explains, the introduction of the PPA has created options within clans at the local level and hence a level of uncertainty amongst the Maliks when predicting voter behaviour. The intra-clan political division is not new to FATA, as there has been more than one candidate running for elections within a tribe, but the intrusion of the PPA has created a larger range of options. The greater division is empirically investigated in Chapter 7, looking at a settled region in Pakistan experiencing prolonged political party systems. Chapter 7 will illustrate a high variation in identity politics and the increased significance of political party workers in intermediary roles.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on two key areas around the reinvention of Maliks. The first concerned the weakening of their political power as a result of the reworked political architecture in FATA. Discussion revolved around the ways in which the political reforms and changes have affected the power and authority of Maliks at the local level. The emergence of new political elites has had a significant impact on the readjustment strategies of Maliks to renegotiate their legitimacy. The real difference between the
Maliks and the new political elites is not only in the moral discourse, but also that the Maliks are less
significant patrons, i.e. they cannot afford to spend as much money or conduct the same level of welfare activities as the new political elites. Nor do the Maliks have the same level of political connections outside the FATA region. They are reworking their strategies in relation to their relationship with the state, which is about building a discourse over political order, tradition and the politics of fear, asserting that without their role there might be more terrorism. Moreover, the Maliks have strategies for achieving smaller victories, knowing they may not have the same money or connections as the new political elites.
The second aim of this chapter was to identify the segregation of Maliks into traditional and adaptive, in an attempt to show how they consolidate their power. The chapter explored how adaptive Maliks
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renegotiate their legitimacy by using strategies of loyalty, rhetoric and networks similar to those that made the new political elites powerful, except they are not such wealthy patrons. This chapter described how adaptive Maliks are trying to circumvent relationships with political parties in order to reposition their legitimacy and authority. On the other hand, traditional Maliks rely on other sources – mostly tradition, values, community, blood relationships and kinship etc. – in an effort to survive in the new context. The adaptive Maliks seem to be successful, as they can make greater inroads into the central state. One way that the adaptive Maliks seem more successful in this new order is through a better connection to the political administration and the political parties by learning new tactics through interaction with the new political elites and exposure to political systems outside FATA. In addition, the adaptive Maliks see opportunities and get involved in them in order to stay on the platform. Whether the traditional Maliks slowly disappear depends on how they negotiate the political settlement in the future. This chapter outlined the Maliks’ response to the PPA, including their motivations and frustrations, and how they have adapted. The next chapter seeks to explore how the structure of political relations unfolds and is substantiated in a politically more settled nearby geography of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province whose system of governance is now being proposed for the FATA region.
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Chapter Seven: The Significance of Networks: A Case of Local Elites Negotiating
Legitimacy in a Settled PPA System
7.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I examined the role of local elites from the perspective of being entrepreneurial and reworking strategies to gain political legitimacy and authority. As I have explained in Chapter 4 (Methodology), I was constrained in my fieldwork to gain an in-depth picture about the dynamics of legitimacy and loyalty negotiated by ‘political workers’ at the local level. Given this background, this chapter seeks to explore how the structure of political relations unfolds and is substantiated in KPK, which has a system of governance that is now being proposed for the FATA region.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. The first aim is to take the same two institutional forms (new political elites and Maliks) and examine how they operate and behave in a different and slightly more settled geographical context. The second aim is to explore the architecture of local elites in this context, and I investigate at the same time what principles drive their consolidation of power. In the settled region competition for political power is driven by working on a basic focus on brokerage and access. I examine the significance of networks in the political settlement through a more focused case study of a dam construction project, where I begin to explore how the local elites negotiate their authority and legitimacy through party-political connections. In other words, the dam case study uses that brokerage and I try to gain a closer, micro-explanation of how the different constellation of power and actors interacts around a specific case.