AAE México-Japón
¾ Mercancías Similares: “los productos que aún y cuando no sean iguales en todos sus aspectos, tienen características y composición semejante, que les permite cumplir las mismas funciones y ser
4.3 Como se instalaron las cuotas compensatorias a China
Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over his Atty Lien. The RTC declared that Counsel was entitled to 10% of the shares of the heirs.
Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien on the title of parcels of land of the estate which the heirs had inherited. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue:
Is the order of annotation proper?
Held:
No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation.
SESBRENO V. CA Facts:
Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed that Atty would take 30% of whatever they may recover. The trial court ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. The employer appealed the decision.
Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromise agreement that they waived their right to be reinstated with the agreement of payment of full backwages at once. The court adopted the compromise and ordered the withholding of the payment of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead of withholding, the employer directly paid the workers in full. Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection against the employer and employees.
Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees.
Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Is the employer liable for the Atty’s fees?
Held:
No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action against both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against employers because, according to him, the computation of the employees money claims should have been
based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should be made liable for the difference.
Atty’s act in withdrawing the case against the employees and agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien.
Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he had waived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those who were primarily liable to him.
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA Facts:
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked from complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket fees and that the court could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for
$2.5K.
Issue:
Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?
Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldn’t be dismissed. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly preponderant evidence.
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case and vice versa.
Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
SANTOS V. LLAMAS Facts:
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This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO AREVALO JR REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUTIES
FACTS:
Atty Arevalo wrote a letter in Sept 2004, asking to be exempted from payment of IBP duties amounting to P12,035 (unpaid duties from 1977-2005). Atty Arevalo was admitted to the Bar in 1961. He was with the Philippine Civil Service from 1962 to 1986. After that, he migrated and worked in the USA until 2003. His main contention was that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the above amount because he was working with the Civil Service then, and the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of one’s profession while in government service. He also contends that he cannot be assessed for the years he was working in the USA.
IBP commented on the letter saying that the IBP membership is NOT based on the actual practice of law. Once a lawyer passes the Bar, he continues to be a member of the IBP, and one of his obligations as member is the payment of annual dues. The validity of such dues has been upheld by the SC in saying that it is necessary to defray the cost of the Integrated Bar Program and no one is exempted from paying the dues. What was allowed was the voluntary termination and reinstatement later on of membership. If membership is terminated, dues wouldn’t be assessed.
Basically, the main contention of Atty. Arevalo is that the IBP’s policy of Non-Exemption in payment of annual membership dues is invalid because it would be oppressive for one who has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. Also, it is a deprivation of property right without due process.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he was inactive in the practice of law, when he was in the Civil Service and abroad?
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the
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Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT
Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer
(Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his revolver on his lap when she refused to do so)
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs.
Barrera) in the estate proceedings of her late husband. Laput presented to her several papers or pleadings for her signature. However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign the pleadings but requested Laput to leave them so that she may ask somebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry and drew his revolver from its holster and placed it on his lap to intimidate the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers. Mrs. Barrera was compelled to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput.
Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct Held:
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering that they were performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offender should have set an example of a man of peace and champion of the Rule of Law.
Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender had pledged to defend and protect – his client. He was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty.
Daarol went to her house because he was a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO (electic cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos’ house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason’s convention so the latter said he should ask for the permission of her parents. They consented and so she served as an usherette, Daarol picking her up and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioner’s house and invited her for a joy ride, with the permission of her mother (who was Daarol’s former classmate). They went to the beach and Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within 6 months from her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to get married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an airport in Sicayab where there were no houses around. There, he pressured her into having sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that he would marry her and that December was very near anyway they would marry soon.
She gave in after much hesitation because she loved him. She cried after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where she consented because she loved him. Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He however suggested that she have the baby aborted. She refused. He told her that she didn’t have to worry because they were getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told them that he could not marry her because he was already married. He reassured them though that he has been separated from his wife for 16 years and that he would work for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. So Barrientos waited and delivered the baby but eventually wasn’t able to contact Daarol anymore (he went MIA).
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. He is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing
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wrong with this relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order.
FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.
Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was being claimed by FIlinvest Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a certain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was arrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the assistance of a law for his release. Someone recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty.
Barcelona went to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty.
Barcelona for his release. Atty. Barcelona told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so that he could secure Daen’s release the following day. Berbano didn’t have enough money and time to immediately come up with such big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the money. He said that he would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that they should just meet tomorrow.
The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth P24,000. The day after, they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter). There were other payments of money, the total amounting to P64,000. After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again and he didn’t return their calls. Daen was still in jail.
Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings but recommended only suspension.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of