Las cuotas compensatorias con China después del 11 de diciembre de 2007

Oktubre is the administrator of Paler Building, owned by Peggy D’Arcy.

D’Arcy is the aunt-in-law of Judge Velasco.

Shortly after Velasco’s appointment to the MTC of Maasin, he asked D’Arcy if he could reside at the Paler Building. He was initially allowed by D’Arcy however when he sought an extension to stay thereat he was denied by D’Arcy. Nevertheless, Judge Velasco was able to stay in the building albeit in another room.

Judge Velasco then sent letters to the tenants of the building declaring that he was the lawful owner of the building and all rentals should be deposited by them at his office in the MTC. He also sent a strongly worded letter using the MTC’s letterhead to D’Arcy asserting possession over the building.

Judge Velasco caused the removal of the building’s service jeep from its garage. D’Arcy then instructed Oktubre to replace the vehicle in the building and to take measures to ensure that the removal would not be repeated. Oktubre successfully replaced the vehicle and removed one of its wheels and put it inside the computer room of the building.

Thereafter, Judge Velasco caused the destruction and replacement of the padlock to Oktubre’s room and the access gate to the third floor of the building.

Oktubre then filed a complaint against the judge in the Punong Baranggay.

Conciliation proceedings failed.

After the hearing, Oktubre was asked by a police officer to come with him to the station at the chief’s request. Upon arrival, he was confronted with an arrest warrant signed under authority by Judge Velasco in connection with the alleged robbery of the jeepney’s wheel and he was put behind bars pursuant thereto.

After obtaining his release he was again filed suit for malicious mischief and falsification of documents again by Judge Velasco. All the complaints were supported by the sole affidavit of Judge Velasco which he prosecuted using his Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Velasco is guilty of grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:

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Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority.

Note Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 3.12 of the same code. For inappropriately using his Office’s letterhead and for acting on his own criminal complaints against complainant and D’Arcy, respondent Judge violated these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct ^[and grave abuse of authority.

On Respondent Judge’s failure to Recuse Himself from His Criminal Complaints. Note the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed.

Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.

Respondent Judge’s subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due process. This became fait accompli when respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of this date.

SANDOVAL V. CA Facts:

It appears that an impostor succeeded in selling property lawfully titled in another’s name by misrepresenting himself as the latter. The lower court ruled in favor of the original owner and nullified the deed of sale in favor of the buyer who claims to be a purchaser in good faith. CA affirmed.

[…]

Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First, petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the ponente of the decision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against private respondent Tan, Jr.

Issue:

Whether or not the Justice who penned the assailed decision in the Court of Appeals should have inhibited himself from taking part in the case.

Held:

In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.”

A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.”

From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiff’s evidence and ruled on motions.

The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.

The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his “ruling in a lower court is the subject of review” or “in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.” Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case.

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it

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is our considered view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a

“just or valid reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ V. JUSTICE DICDICAN Facts:

This is an administrative complaint against Justice Dicdican filed by Ma.

Asparen, a party to a case involving St. Mary Mazzarello School. In that case, the school imposed disciplinary sanctions on Ms. Asparen but the same was lifted by Hon. Elumba, judge of the Trial Court. The respondent justice of the CA issued a TRO.

So complainant here sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on the ground that the latter had previously represented various religious organizations during his practice in law and the petitioner in this case is run by a religious organization.

Respondent denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the case but he nevertheless inhibited himself.

Despite such inhibition, it was still alleged that Justice still appeared as one of the signatories of a resolution dated Nov. 21, 2006 of the CA admitting the memorandum of the petitioner school and which deemed the petition as submitted for resolution.

Complainant alleged that respondent justice’s actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client in the case. Respondent Justice however, was able to show that no document was forwarded to him when he inhibited from the case. It was also shown that another Justice took over the same. It was also shown that his inclusion as a signatory was a mere mistake by the stenographer as shown by the letter of apology.

Held:

Complaint was devoid of merit. In administrative proceedings, burden of proof is upon complainant. If complainant fails to do so, respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.

In the present case, the complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent justice. He failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges.

A party’s remedy if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the office of the court administrator by means of an administrative complaint. When some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.

CANON 4

J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS Facts:

Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et amore."

Held:

We agree with the Investigating Justice’s finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.

Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.

It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that respondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe that respondent’s actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on the matter

As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due care in examining the supporting papers. The respondent should know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond.

It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondent’s defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar are quite clear that respondent’s wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by

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said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.

Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the legal order by judicial corruption.

CENTRUM AGRI-BUSINESS REALTY CORP V. JUDGE BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON

Facts:

Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for ejectment of several stores leasing its building (JVLS Building). Centrum bought this property from JVLS Co. Inc., but the tenants refused to pay rent to Centrum (These tenants on the other hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of first option). MTCC ruled for Centrum, ordered the tenants to pay rent covering 53 months + interests.

The tenants appealed this decision to RTC where respondent is the presiding judge. In that appeal, Centrum moved for the execution of the MTCC decision, but respondent refused. The tenants moved for 30 days within which to file their supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, but limited the period to 10 days. Centrum urged for the early resolution of the case, but the judge said that Centrum’s motion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to give the tenants a chance to file their memorandum (meaning a ruling was already made).

The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour of Centrum, but with different rental rates (higher, in favour of Centrum). This decision was dated June 15.

In the present administrative case against respondent judge, Centrum charged her with 1. Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct;

2. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law.

Centrum states that not only were the amounts in the decision substantially increased, it also disclosed that it had received a duplicate copy of the decision even before it was promulgated, signed by the respondent. Judge claimed she was innocent and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum also alleges that the judge unjustly denied its motion for execution.

Held:

Respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and is dismissed from office.

Although there is no proof of how Centrum obtained a copy of the decision even before its promulgation, the fact is that a copy was obtained by it and this is highly irregular. Since the judge is ultimately responsible for the safekeeping of her papers, the burden of accounting is on her.

(judge claims that her stenographer was at fault)

This was not merely a simple case of breach of confidentiality, but evidence suggests a scheme to extort money from Centrum.

There was a negotiation between the Judge and Centrum, as admitted by the latter’s counsel. Why Centrum filed this case against the judge appears to be that the decision, although it was completed as of June 15, was not promulgated until after

nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear that respondent judge would welsh on her undertaking to increase the awards in its favour.

On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law, the court finds the judge’s errors in this case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge violated certain provisions in the rules of court applicable to ejectment proceedings.

RIZALINA CAPCO-UMALI V. PAULITA ACOSTA-VILLARANTE Facts:

Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge Paulita Acosta-Villarante (respondent) with violation of Canon 4.

The petitioner and other judges made a courtesy call to the Mayor of Mandaluyong and they talked about local allowance of judges. The Mayor noticed the disparity in the amounts received (respondent was receiving more, compared to petitioner and other judges). So the Mayor ordered that the allowance received by respondent be reverted to the previous rates.

During the first ever monthly meetingof RTC judges, what happened in the courtesy call was reported. Angered, respondent yelled accusations of paninira at the Executive judge (she was there during the courtesy call and was presiding over the meeting). Petitioner, also present at the meeting, felt that she had to rescue the executive judge and explained what happened. This time, respondent yelled at petitioner, called her sinungaling and told petitioner to stop talking because

“nakakahiwa boses mo.” Petitioner yelled back, “matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami,” to which the respondent answered that she was ready to die any moment because she did no wrong. Basically, they had a screaming match until they were pacified.

“nakakahiwa boses mo.” Petitioner yelled back, “matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami,” to which the respondent answered that she was ready to die any moment because she did no wrong. Basically, they had a screaming match until they were pacified.