6. ANÁLISIS DE DATOS
6.1.3. Compañeros, monitores y coordinadores
Aside from geography and environment, human factors were critical in governing maritime operations. Of particular note is the organisation of naval forces, proceeding from private to state ownership of ships and beginning sometime in the last quarter of the sixth century, generally speaking. Ships were the primary asset in maritime operations, both warships and merchant vessels, and their capabilities and limitations are critical considerations. Ships required a large number of skilled personnel to operate, and shortages of rowers and sailors could have negative impacts on naval operations. Finally, infrastructure was of great importance, from ship sheds and port facilitates through to such constructions as the diolkos of Korinth. This chapter will highlight the material and personnel issues that any polis of the ancient Greek world had to contend with in order to operate a navy. This in turn will illustrate how complex, and expensive, these issues
became when scaling up a polis’ sea power.
Naval organisation
Even more so than for armies, a resilient system of organisation is required for naval operations. This is especially true when conducting extended operations overseas, as both the Athenians and Spartans did during the Peloponnesian War. This is not only in terms of personnel, but also of the ships and associated equipment. Evidence for the sixth century and the two decades before the Persian Wars is slim, yet the growth of sea power can be observed in many Archaic-era Greek poleis, especially from around 550 onwards. Borimir Jordan seems correct in pointing out the unlikelihood of Athenians becoming master seamen and naval warfare tacticians with a large fleet during a few years of the 480s:183
there must have been a robust naval organisation in place long before the Persians attacked in 480. More recent works, especially by Hans van Wees,184 have illustrated the fact that
naval developments stretches back further than has generally been acknowledged and that states took a more active role in naval organisation during the last half of the sixth century.
183 All at the behest of a single politician, Themistokles, – even more unlikely. Jordan (1975): 6.
184He strongly and convincingly makes the case in a 2010 book chapter, ‘“Those Who Sail are to Receive a Wage”: Naval Warfare and finance in Archaic Eretria’, and more recently in his book, Ships and Silver, Taxes and Tribute. A Fiscal History of Archaic Athens (2013).
An inscription uncovered in 1912 illustrates naval organisation in the Euboian polis of Eretria.185 The inscription is dated to approximately 550-525:
Those who sail are to receive a wage if they go beyond the Petalai or Kenaion.
Everyone must contribute. Those who are in the country…Anyone who took…will
not be open to dispute.186
Despite the inscription having been discovered over 100 years ago, as Van Wees points out it is rarely ever mentioned in modern scholarship, and if mentioned at all it is usually dismissed as obscure.187 Van Wees thinks this inscription has not gained much traction in
the literature because it flies in the face of orthodoxy that naval organisation in Greece was a private and not a public affair before 500.188
There are other pieces of evidence that point towards naval organisation in the sixth century, including for Sparta. Passing over the curious and probably spurious
‘thalassocracy lists’ found in later writings,189 it is worth noting that the Spartans had a
specific military position of ‘Admiral’ (ναύαρχος). Thucydides only ever uses the word ναύαρχος to describe a Spartan admiral,190 never for the Athenians had the office of
strategos, a military leader by land and sea. Aeschylus uses ναύαρχος in his play Persians (363), indicating a usage as far back as the Persian Wars.191 Aristotle in Politics heavily
criticises this office, insomuch as it was so powerful as to be like a third kingship (ἐπὶγὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀΐδιος ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία
185 IG XII.9 1273.1274, lines 10-16.
186Translation Van Wees, following Francis Cairns’ 1991 restoration of the text. Van Wees (2010): 205-8. 187 Van Wees (2010): 206. Especially note 2.
188 Van Wees (2010): 210.
189 In particular, the list found in Eusebius. It places Sparta as the dominant sea power for the very short period 517-515, superseding Samos and in turn superseded by Naxos (Myres, 1906: 99-101). Some scholars have been willing to accept a fifth century origin for the Eusebius list, passed down through Diodoros. It is however a contentious area, and Momigliano was willing to accept it as possible, but without any proof in his time (Momigliano, 1944: 1). Later scholars were still not convinced, seeing it as a ‘scissors and paste work’, in all likelihood an attempt to fill in the gap of thalassocracies between Minos and Athens. Jeffrey (1976): 252-3. The most detailed examination of the lists remains: Myres (1906): 84-130.
190 In thirteen instances throughout his work: 2.66.2, 2.80.2, 3.16.3, 3.26.1, 4.11.2, 8.6.5, 8.20.1, 8.23.1, 8.24.6, 8.26.1, 8.29.2, 8.50.2, 8.99.1.
191 Accepting the play was written c. 472. Regardless of whether or not Aeschylus actually fought at Salamis, more likely than not considering the manpower mobilised by Athens, it would have been a term familiar to his audience who had fought at Salamis under the supreme command of the Spartan ναύαρχος Eurybiades.
καθέστηκεν – 1271a, 41-42). The position did cause angst for the Spartans near the end of the Peloponnesian War, when Lysandros, having already undertaken the office once, was
forced into the position of ‘Vice-Admiral’ (ἐπιστολεύς) since no one could hold the office
of ναύαρχος more than once.192 Xenophon says that Lysandros was really in charge despite
not holding the official office, but the existence of a one-term limit to naval command perhaps hints at an appreciation that naval command had very different characteristics to command of armies. All of this helps demonstrate that naval organisation in Sparta was codified back as far as the Persian Wars, if not earlier. While such organisation does not necessarily mean Sparta was a strong sea power – witness their lacklustre performance at sea during the first half of the Peloponnesian War – it is indicative of a military organisational structure that took naval matters seriously. Indeed, as Aristotle’s contention
in Politics and Lysandros’ conduct indicate, the office of ναύαρχος needed to be rigidly
controlled because of its power.
The best evidence of naval organisation is from Athens, and here a large and comprehensive system is found. Hans Van Wees makes convincing arguments for naval organisation in Athens stretching back through the sixth century, much of it governed or at least overseen by the state. This goes back to the Archaic Athenian organisational unit known as the naukrariai (ναυκραρίαι) and the officials in charge of these units, the naukraroi (ναὺκραροι), mentioned in the Athenaion Politeia (8.3). Van Wees sees these naukraroi as officials who combined financial and military functions, on both a local and national level.193 As Borimir Jordan said above, there must have been a solid naval organization in
place long before the Persian Wars. Van Wees puts forward a reasonable and practical explanation for such an organisation, especially in highlighting the naval operations which were conducted by Athens in the period before the Persian wars.194 Further, others have
used coinage to demonstrate evidence for increased expense in Athens during the late sixth century and tied to this the need to pay sailors of a state-owned trireme fleet.195
192 On the disquiet in losing a successful Admiral, see: Xen. Hell. 1.6.2-6; On Lysandros taking up the position of Vice-Admiral: 2.1.7.
193 Van Wees (2013): 44-61. 194 Van Wees (2013): 57-60. 195 Aperghis (2013): 1-24.
Naval organisation in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries was complex and demonstrative of the central role played by the navy and maritime considerations. Borimir Jordan has examined in detail the Athenian Navy in the classical period, including the organisation and administration ashore.196 All organs of the Athenian government were
involved in naval administration, including the ekklesia and the boule.197 This ranged from
high level strategic decisions about fleet movements, down to very specific technical matters. For instance, an inscription refers to the boule making decrees concerning the structural braces (ὑπόζωματα) used for ship construction.198 Importantly, it was not just a
high degree of technical knowledge that helped characterise the democracy’s naval
expertise, but also the high level of participation. With 6000 people needed for a quorum in the ekklesia in the fourth century, 500 sitting on the boule, up to 2000 needed as jurors in the law courts and around 700 annual magistracies, the vast majority of citizens in Athens would have had direct experience in decision-making, quite often about naval matters.199
This is of critical importance when considering the exposure to maritime affairs that was encountered by ordinary Athenians. This participation in government covers all manner of maritime issues, from the strategic positioning of naval assets, naval administration including personnel and equipment, through to maritime trade cases in the law courts. In many different ways, Athenians were involved not just in maritime operations themselves, but also in maritime and naval administration and organisational issues.
A final issue of organisation concerns logistics, for no naval or maritime campaign could be undertaken without a solid logistics plan and infrastructure. This is a very opaque topic, for the ancient authors seem little concerned with the subject. The best evidence comes from Thucydides and the Sicilian expedition. Such a large operation as the Sicilian expedition required a huge amount of support, both local and from mainland Italy and Greece. Nikias realised this, and in his discouraging speech says that the expedition would require a substantial naval and land force, lest they be forced to call for reinforcements (Thuc. 6.21). It is one of the few examples where logistics units are mentioned, albeit briefly.
196 Jordan (1975): 21-116.
197 Jordan (1975): 21-30. See also: Rhodes (1972): 113-122; 153-8. 198 IG II² 1628, lines 231-33; Jordan (1975): 29.
199 See: Hansen (1991): 313, esp. notes 198-204. On the rotation of personnel through the different forms of participation, pp. 313-314.
An advanced force of vessels, including the allied vessels, were assembled at Kerkyra and this included grain transports (Thuc. 6.30.1). Thucydides goes on to say that the expedition was furnished with troops and ships to be ready for a long or a short expedition (Thuc. 6.31.3). Thucydides lists the forces sent across, of which the logistics train consisted of a horse transport (6.43) and thirty merchant vessels carrying grain as well as various tradesmen, and finally boats and merchant vessels who followed of their own volition for the purposes of trade (6.44.1). In a similar example, the Carthaginians, preparing a large invasion force to go to Sicily, assembled a fleet of 1000 cargo ships, according to Diodoros (Diod. 13.80.5). The number is probably exaggerated, but it is important that Diodoros does mention cargo ships as part of the invasion force. These examples give a glimpse at what might be required for a large amphibious force sent on an overseas expedition. Clearly ancient Greek naval forces had some mechanism in place for the sustainment of their fleets, though of course this might involve no more than plundering the nearby territory, a method also utilised by land forces.
While all of these examples are based on Athens, a hegemonic sea power, we can extrapolate for smaller poleis. All must have had some level of basic naval organisation
similar, albeit on a much smaller scale, to Athens’. Navies required the same core
personnel, equipment and infrastructure. The logistics forces that a polis could muster would have been a key factor in the reach and sustainment of maritime forces operating away from home territory. Without the ability to keep a maritime force resupplied, a polis would be severely restricted in the scale of expeditionary operations. In a similar vein, poor naval organisation would have led to poorly equipped and crewed naval forces. This is not necessarily a matter of scale but of competency. Smaller poleis may have been quite effective if backed by a rigorous system of crewing and equipping their warships, and major poleis may have suffered from a lack of proper naval organisation. The level of
sophistication of a polis’ naval organisation may help explain why some poleis were more successful than others.
Ships and ship design
There were many different types and sizes of vessels used by the ancient Greeks, in terms of both civilian ships and warships. The various uses and different operating environments
ensured that ship types varied, and although classes of ships such as the trireme were generally of the same size and construction, this does not indicate a universal design for each particular class of ship. No warships have been found archaeologically; unsurprising since the wooden warships of the period would not have sunk to the bottom of the ocean as in later times. This is an important fact to note, as it tells us that when ships are described
as ‘sunk’ in the ancient sources, they are in all likelihood describing ships that have become
severely disabled or broken up, perhaps remaining neutrally buoyant but for all intents and purposes, sunk.200 The primary evidence for the dimensions of triremes comes from
the remains of shipsheds, which help indicate the size of the triremes housed within. Much existing scholarship is concerned with ship design and construction, and there is still debate on many of the key issues, especially regarding the trireme. This section is not intended to debate the merits of the different arguments,201 but merely to help establish the
general capabilities and limitations of ancient sailing vessels and highlight the potential impact upon maritime operations.
Warship design evolved slowly over the centuries, though older designs of ships could still be found in later fleets. The pentekontor (πεντηκόντορος) appears to have been the main warship of the sixth century, a fifty-oared vessel that was designed for boarding and ramming attacks on enemy warships.202 However, Herodotus says that the Phokaians used
Pentekontors for trade instead of ‘round ships’, that is, traditional merchant vessels (οὐ στρογγύλῃσι νηυσὶ ἀλλὰ πεντηκοντέροισι - 1.163.2). It seems that pentekontors were quite versatile vessels,203 capable of a range of maritime operations, including as a warship
in battle and for the transport of both personnel and cargo. As a smaller vessel with a
200 Wooden ships can be very hard to sink, which would have been especially true of warships that would have held little ballast. They might sink below the surface and subsequently break up but would not really have sunk to the bottom of the seafloor. Ships lost in ancient naval battles in all likelihood would have been in various states of seaworthiness.
201 Of all the work done on naval forces in the ancient world, ships and ship design have received the most attention. There have been endless debates over the design and construction of ancient warships and this thesis will not weigh into the debate too far. The central theme of this thesis is sea power and its use during the period. The merits of a two vs a three-level trireme are important, but not to this thesis. Regardless of how many levels a trireme had, or any other such technical detail, they were used in maritime operations in particular ways and that is what the thesis seeks to explore.
202 For more on the development of the ram in naval vessels, see: Mark (2008): 253-272. 203 For more on pentekontors see: Casson (1971): 53-65; Morrison et. al. (2000): 25-41.
smaller crew, it would also have been a cheaper warship to build and crew – important factors for smaller poleis needing some form of naval capability.
The primary warship of the Classical period was the trireme (τριήρης). Initially combat tactics revolved around boarding actions on other warships, however by the Persian Wars more experienced and trained crews were employing ramming attacks against other warships. According to Thucydides, those using primarily boarding tactics during the Peloponnesian War, such as the battle of Sybota that he describes (1.49.1), were fighting in a more archaic manner than the sophistication of ramming attacks.204 Triremes were also
occasionally used as transport ships, even transporting horses as attested by Thucydides.205
The specific characteristics of a trireme are not known for certain and are based heavily on a reconstructed ship, the Olympias, supposed to represent an Athenian trireme.206 This is an
important distinction to make, as it is unlikely that triremes, or any other warship for that matter, were all of one standard design. Just as modern naval nomenclature talks of
‘destroyers’, ‘frigates’ and ‘patrol boats’, but the size, armament, crew size/makeup and
other details of these ships can vary substantially, so too must have triremes differed in detail from shipbuilder to shipbuilder. An ancient Greek trireme, while certainly standard in many core features, should be thought of as a class of ship rather than as one specific design with one set of physical characteristics. The Olympias underwent much testing and several underway trials, demonstrating the potential of the design.207 However, not all
scholars agree that the Olympias accurately represents an ancient trireme.208 Regardless of
204 Thucydides makes an explicit statement that the battle was conducted in the older manner of fighting a naval battle. Athens was not free from such ‘archaic’ combat at sea, and there is good reason to believe that in Athens ramming tactics were seen as a more democratic way of warfare. Firstly, the emphasis on ramming meant that it was the sailors and rowers, not the hoplite-class, that won the most prestige in naval battles. Secondly, boarding actions were costlier in terms of casualties suffered and this could be politically unacceptable to the Athenian demos. This can be seen in the reaction to the loss of life after Arginousai in 406, built upon the precedent of Kimon’s boarding tactics at Eurymedon in 467 which also saw the Athenians suffer more casualties than was expected. For a good discussion of this, see: Strauss (2000): 315-326.
205 The first instance of triremes used as horse transports in 430, according to his account. 2.56.2. 206 The Olympias was launched a Hellenic Navy ship in June 1987. For details on the history of the reconstruction, see: Morrison, Coates and Rankov (2000): xvii-xxviii.
207 See reports in: Morrison and Coates (eds.) (1989); Shaw (ed.) (1993); and Morrison et. al. (2000). 208 The most vehement critic is Alec Tilley, who argues that triremes never had three levels of rowers. Tilley (2004). However, objections to the Olympias design are older. For a very interesting and little-known work on the topic, see: Nellopoulos (1999). Published posthumously by his son, Nellopoulos criticises the
how representative of a trireme the Olympias is,209 some basic characteristics of the ship can
be highlighted from both ancient sources and modern reconstruction and trials. The ship was fitted with a ram and was propelled by oarsmen in battle in order to ram and disable