COMPROBANTES DE PAGO

24 See Badian, “Harpalus”, p.38; I. Worthington “The Harpalus Affair”, pp.307-30; also Cawkwell, “Deification”, pp.301-2.

the war had been openly declared, but it is dubious whether he approved beforehand of an Athenian uprising at that moment.

It is a m atter of dispute whether the Athenians prepared to revolt against Alexander immediately after the proclamation of the restoration of the exiles or if they set out to revolt only after the embassies to Alexander had failed to promote Athenian claims (on Samos) or even after Alexander’s death. N. G. Ashton attributes to the Athenians a determination to settle the issue by force of arms immediately after the restoration of the exiles had become known.25 I. Worthington, on the other hand, rejects any such notion and argues that the Athenians (apart from such “war-hawks as Hyperides”) were inclined to settle the issue rather by diplomacy than by armed resistance.^6 Interwoven with this question is the question concerning the extent to which the preparations for the Lamian War were triggered by the arrival of Harpalos. He was the Treasurer of Alexander who had escaped from Asia with an enormous amount of money and asked asylum in Athens. He arrived in Greece shortly after the arrival of Nikanor who had come to proclaim the restoration of the exiles at the Olympic Festival (end of July - beginning of August), an edict which was extremely disturbing for Athens. At first he was denied access to the city but when he appeared for the second time the Athenians allowed him entrance only to arrest him shortly afterwards on the proposal of Demosthenes; in addition the latter proposed that Harpalos’ funds should be kept on the Akropolis (Hyp., V.

c o1s.8-9).27

“The Lamian War”, pp.51-3. 26 “The Harpalus A ffair”, 307-330.

27 I follow the chronological pattern presented by I. Worthington (“The Chronology o f the Harpalus A ffair”, SO 61,1986, 63-76, pp.70-71.) according to which Nikanor arrived in Greece in the first week of June while Harpalos’ first arrival in Athens should be dated in mid-June; his second arrival and subsequent arrest is to be dated at the beginning o f July. In mid-July Demosthenes went to Olympia to discuss with Nikanor the issue of the exiles to return by mid-August. A couple o f weeks later Harpalos fled, and shortly afterwards an Athenian embassy left to meet Alexander. See, however, Badian, “Harpalus”, pp.42-43 for a slightly different chronological arrangement o f events.

As to the initial refusal o f the Athenians to accept Harpalos, Badian (“Harpalus”, p.31) thinks that this was because the Athenians feared that the band of mercenaries he was accompanied by would cause upheaval in the city; Ashton, on the other hand, (“The Lamian War”, p.57) argues that the Athenians were not aware of Harpalos’ escape and feared that he

The presence of Harpalos brought about a dilemma over the attitude Athens should employ towards him and consequently towards Alexander. To provide him refuge was translated into causing Alexander’s irritation. The question is: did the Athenians feel ready to face Alexander’s wrath?

Why did the Athenians allow Harpalos entrance in the city (on his second arrival), when it had become known that he had escaped? Was it because he had returned as a suppliant? Was it because they had in mind to lay their hands on Harpalos’ funds in order to use them for the war they were preparing? Why did they vote Demosthenes’ proposal to arrest him? I think that the motives of the Athenian people as a whole are as difficult to establish as those of Demosthenes in particular. We should ascribe validity to Plutarch’s notice {Dem. 25.3) on Demosthenes’ advice not to face Alexander on an unjust cause, i.e. the issue of Harpalos in particular; this notice indicates that, in Demosthenes’ opinion, Athens was not prepared, yet, to face A le x a n d e r .2 8 I am rather inclined to think that

the Athenians had not resolved on the course of action to follow (diplomacy or war), but they bore in mind that there was a very strong possibility of war. It is significant that Harpalos was an honorary Athenian citizen (Athenaeus 586d, 596a) but the Athenians did not treat him as such; in other words, by not showing friendliness towards Harpalos they expressed, indirectly, a more favourable disposition towards Alexander. Still, they did not yield to the latter’s demand for surrender, which was very risky, and instead they adopted Demosthenes’ proposal to wait for an official delegate from Alexander. The pressure on Athens was quite hard: there arrived envoys from Philoxenos, governor of Kilikia, (Hyp., V. col.8), from Olympias (D.S., XVII.108.7), and probably from Antipatros ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 846b). I. Worthington has maintained that Demosthenes put Harpalos under arrest in order to use

was on a punitive mission, ordered by Alexander. I think that neither possibility should be excluded; both could operate simultaneously on Athenian minds.

28 “ Ô 6è Ar|)j,oCT0évr|Ç TcpÔTOv pev (XTCEXabveiv CTt)VEPo\)Xe\)£ xov "ApTiaXov, Kai (pa)X,aTXECT0ai, pT] xfiv tcoXiv èpPàXœaiv eIç TcôXEpov ovk â v a y K a ia ç Kal ôiK ataç TcpotpàcTECûç.” See also Ashton, “The Lamian War”, p.59.

his surrender as a means of pressure in his negotiations with Nikanor and also kept an eye on his funds to be used for the possible war. I am not sure that we can ascribe the first motive to the Athenian people but the second seems plausible enough. As a conclusion then, I think that the Athenian attitude can only be explained in terms of indecisiveness. The arrival of Harpalos complicated matters but I do not believe that it affected Athenian attitude directly and drastically. His funds would have made the possibility of war seem more feasible, but it was not the catalyst that brought about the war. In fact, the Athenian inclination was to solve the problem of the exiles through diplomatic means, if possible. How else could we explain the interval of a whole year between the announcement of the restoration of the exiles and the outbreak of the war? The reliance on diplomacy, though indicative of caution or even fear does not have to be identified with subservient b e h a v io u r .2 9

In his speech against Demosthenes (in the context of his trial for the Harpalos affair) Hyperides connects the presence of Harpalos with preparations for war and states that his (Demosthenes’) proposal to arrest Harpalos forestalled united Greek military action against Alexander, thus implying that Demosthenes’ aim was to placate Alexander and to avoid military action (V, col. 19).^^ He makes it seem as if the Greek cities (Athens included) sent envoys to Alexander only after Athens (through the agency of Demosthenes) had failed to lead them to war.

We cannot draw safe conclusions about Hyperides’ militant policy based on this speech; surely, he seems to have been war oriented, but his main objective in this speech is to secure the conviction of Demosthenes by casting on his policies the worst possible light, i.e. that he did not want the people to be liberated from Alexander. On the other hand, why had not Hyperides come up with a counter-proposal? I would think that

^9 For the Athenian subservient behaviour see Worthington, “The Harpalus A ffair”, p.329.

30 “xabxa au 7ta[peCTKEv]aKaç t ô i \j/r|(p[iapaxi], avTiXaPœv xô[v "Ap7ca]X,ov, Kal xobç pè[v "EX]XT|[v]ag ôcTravxaç [TCpecJpebeaGai 7ce7c[oiri]Kaç œç ’AXé^av5[pov], oùk ë%ovxaç a^Xfriv] obSepiav àTcoofxpoJcpTiv, xouç ôé ofaxpaTcaç], oï avxol av f|Ko[v éKÔv]xeç Trpôç xauxT^v xfiv] Suvap-iv, ëxovxEç xoc xpripaxa Kal xoù[g] axpaxiœxaç ôaovç EK[a](Jxoç abxcov Et%Ev, xo'üxouç c\))j.7cavxaç où pôvov KEKœXuKaç àTuoaxnvai ÈKE[l]vou xfj CT\)X,Xfi\|/Ei xfj

Hyperides agreed with Harpalos’ arrest, for whatever reasons, but he later on parted company with Demosthenes and when the scandal of the embezzlement broke out he became his prosecutor. It would seem that he was not clear of suspicion: before the Areiopagos announced its verdict there were rumours of his having been bribed as well.^l

However, Harpalos escaped and his escape was followed by a tremendous scandal: it was discovered that half of the money he had brought with him and deposited on the Akropolis was missing. Demosthenes entrusted the Areiopagos with the investigation; it took the Areiopagos c. six months to publish the results. Almost every leading Athenian statesman was involved: those who were not defendants became prosecutors; only Phokion was not in any way involved. Plutarch records that he was indeed approached by Harpalos but that he declined his offers {Phoc. 21.3-4). It is significant that Phokion was not included among the prosecutors either, perhaps because of the fact that his own son-in- law, Charikles, was charged with receiving bribes (Plut, Phoc. 22.3-4). Demosthenes and Demades were persistently grouped together by Dinarchus and Hyperides as those who had principally received bribes, and both were found guilty. W hether or not Demosthenes was guilty has always a vexed historical problem; if he had indeed misappropriated Harpalos’ funds, had he used them to provide for the maintenance of Leosthenes’ mercenaries at Tainaron?

E. Badian has argued for co-operation between Demosthenes and Leosthenes in connection with the treasure of Harpalos. He bases his argument on a passage of Hyperides (V. cols.12-13) in which Demosthenes admits having received a certain amount of money from Harpalos but holds that he used it for a public cause, the nature of which could not be revealed. Badian concludes that only secret dealings with the mercenaries at Tainaron would be too hazardous to reveal at that moment. Moreover, he traces the link between Demosthenes and Leosthenes back to Leosthenes’ father when both were (allegedly) associates of

31 On this point I would rather adopt D avies’s conviction {APF, p.351) that Hyperides actually