LA CONSTITUCIÓN Y LOS TRIBUTOS

The years after Chaironeia witnessed the political coexistence of Lykourgos, Demosthenes, Hyperides and Demades, to refer to the most prominent orators. It is significant that as long as Lykourgos was alive (until 326) these people^ who according to the communis opinio did not share the same political or ideological principles, managed to co-operate quite successfully. In fact, the only clash to be observed is between Lykourgos and Demades when the former attacked with a graphe paranomon the honours proposed for the latter (Lykourgos, frg. 14). Otherwise, on the level of practical politics, modern scholars have not failed to observe the co-operation between the two in the sphere of public finance as well as that of religion; both Demades and Lykourgos represented Athens at the celebration of the Pythais at Delphi {SICj 296)

and in 329/8 they supervised the celebration at the Amphiaraeion.il

Hyperides is commonly designated as the anti-Macedonian par excellence but neither in 335 nor especially in 330 do we hear of any conflict of his with other leaders who advised the Athenian people to abstain from military risks.12 I believe that it is basically due to the speech he delivered against Demosthenes in 323 that his policy has been characterised as belligerent. Yet this belligerence is only retrospectively applied.

Demosthenes’ position in the political scene is well worth examining. Was his prestige diminished? It would appear that this was the case immediately after Chaironeia when the Athenians denied him the office of etpTivocpuXa^ (Aes., III.158-9). However, when immediate impressions faded he was honoured with delivering the Funeral speech for the dead of Chaironeia. E. Badian ardently rejects the “myth - implied or expressed in many modern accounts, but unknown to the sources - that Demosthenes was kept out of power and had little

Badian, “Harpalus”, p.37; Mitchel, “Lykourgan Athens”, pp.178-9.

^2 Mitchel, “Lykourgan Athens”, pp.185-6 for an appraisal of Hyperides’ not so belligerent policy.

influence.” after 338 and believes him to have been a protagonist in the moderate foreign policy of Athens.^^ Badian is right but only to a certain extent: Demosthenes appears to give way to Demades and Lykourgos, or at least he does not dominate the ekklesia the way he did before 338.^^

Demosthenes and Demades are quite frequently grouped together as practising the same cautious policy. Plutarch in his L ife o f D em osthenes ofiQn compares Demosthenes and Demades in terms of their rhetorical talent and he appears to favour the latter; it is emphasized that Demades surpassed Demosthenes in improvising and even that his improvisations were superior to Demosthenes’ well-prepared speeches (7, 10). In support of this view Plutarch adds that Demades supported Demosthenes on various occasions in the ekklesia but the latter never reciprocated it. Now, this could be taken to mean exactly what it says but there might be more to it; namely, the passage indicates a lack of active support on Demosthenes’ part for Demades’ policy. Demosthenes, however, does not appear to have opposed Demades’ policy of conferring honours upon Macedonian officials; he did not oppose the honours for Philip or other Macedonians, and as far as concerns the honours for Alexander, he opposed them at first only to change his mind later.15 Both Demades and Demosthenes seem to have shared opinion on ill-timed military activities, like the revolt of Agis III in 330.i^ A. Lingua has treated the changed political profile of Demosthenes after Chaironeia and has pointed out that both he and Demades favoured neutrality and were both prepared to attribute Alexander d i v i n i t y . I would not go as far as to describe relations between Demosthenes and Demades as collaborative

“Harpalus”, p.34 and n.l34.

Mitchel, “Lykourgan Athens”, p.l75 on Demosthenes’ secondary role in the ekklesia. [Plut.], X Orat Vit. 842d, Mor. 804b; Polybius XII.12; Din., 1.94; Hyp., Epit. 21; id. V. col.31. See I Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth Century Athens, Ann Arbor 1992, p.ôl; he argues quite plausibly that the reason for his change was his wish to increase the chances of Athens to gain Alexander’s favour on the matter of Samos.

Plut., Dem. 24; Aes., III.166; Din., 1.35. Both Aeschines and Dinarchus accuse Demosthenes for Athens’ (supposedly) lost opportunity to join Agis’ war.

or to hold that Demosthenes approved of Alexander’s deification, but it is useful, when passing harsh judgements on the political behaviour of Demades, to bear in mind that Demosthenes had also compromised his position, especially after the revolt of Thebes in 336/5.

Immediately after the battle of Chaironeia there were developed contacts with Macedonia; a feature shared by Demosthenes and Demades (and by Phokion), but not by Lykourgos and Hyperides, is that they established connections with the Macedonian court. Demades was a

philos of Antipatros (D.S., XVIII.48.2; Plut., Phoc. 30.2) and most probably a xenos of Philip II^B Demosthenes had established some sort of link with Hephaistion but there is no evidence of a more regular contact.19 On the other hand, it seems that Athens at the same time was relying on Persia to destroy Macedonian power; there is evidence that Demosthenes was communicating with the Persian court. In fact, Persia played an important in the revolt of Thebes in 336/5 and the involvement of Athens in it.

The only time before the Lamian War that Athens found herself involved in an uprising was when Demosthenes launched a campaign in support of the Theban revolt (Plut, Dem. 23.1-2). Philip’s death in 336 and even more so the rumour that the young Alexander had died in Illyria made Demosthenes and even Lykourgos think that this was Athens’ opportunity, and the people voted to dispatch an army, but Athens did not pursue her belligerent policy to the end. Hammond and Walbank provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the various dealings during the revolt of Thebes;20 Demosthenes was in contact with Attalos (the man who had doubted Alexander’s right to the Macedonian throne) as well as with generals of Dareios; the latter had offered three hundred talents which the Athenian demos had cautiously denied but the

18 The policies of Demades and the honours passed for Macedonians will be discussed separately below.

^9 Aeschines (III.162) reports that Demosthenes dispatched a certain Aristion o f Plataia to Hephaistion with the purpose o f establishing some sort of arrangement. A fragment of Marsyas of Pella {FGHXiS, F8) recorded by Harpocration (s.v . ’Apiaxiœ v) provides a similar account.

rumour was that Demosthenes had taken the funds and equipped the Thebans (Aes., III.238-9; Din., 1.10, 18; D.S., XVII.4.8); at the same time, one or more envoys were dispatched to Persia (Curt., 111.13; Arr., Anab. 2.15.2); Demosthenes even went to Arkadia in order to prevent the Arkadians from joining Alexander ([Plut.], X. Orat V it 851b). Alexander’s notoriously rapid advance to the South (D.S., XVII.8.6) caused the Arkadian allies of Thebes to withdraw their support from the revolt and offer it to Alexander instead. Both Aeschines (III. 239-40) and Dinarchus (1.20-1) accuse Demosthenes of not offering the funds necessary to maintain the loyalty of the Arkadians, but of course they want to present him in the most unfavourable light. It is reasonable that Demosthenes, and Athens as^wholej would withdraw his support when he heard about Alexander’s rapid advance to the South. Not only that, but the people were intimidated enough to send a mission to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from his campaign. Demosthenes was elected as an envoy but he never made it to his destination. Plutarch records that the prospect of meeting Alexander was intimidating enough to make him return halfway to Athens. Alternatively, Diodorus interprets his action as a result of having been bribed by Dareios to pursue an anti-Macedonian policy (XVII.4.7-8). I do not see why this particular embassy should be interpreted as a pro-Macedonian move, when its aim was to save Athens from Alexander’s rage. At any rate, Demosthenes was absent giving way to Demades and Phokion.

The revolt of Thebes occurred only two years after the battle of Chaironeia, when memories were still fresh, and before the true dimensions of the Macedonian power had become visible and before it had outgrown Greece. In the future, however, after Alexander’s victories, Athens was to become more and more cautious or even uncertain and rely more on diplomacy.

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