Today’s MAGTF commanders have access to a wide range of nonstop, in-depth information pro- duced by a variety of human and machine collec- tion nodes. The commander has access to so much information that it is difficult to sort out the key decisions that need to be made. The explo- sion of information is due, in large part, to the rapid technological advances that continue to pro- vide more and more complex data gathering and correlation capabilities. The MAGTF C2 opera- tion must manage this flow of information so the commander gets only the information needed to be effective, but also has access to the wider information flow when required.
Marine Corps C2 consists of the means and meth- ods by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done in any given situation, and then sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Fur- ther, the foundations of Marine Corps C2 are rooted in the warrior ethos and warfighting phi- losophy of expeditionary maneuver warfare. When pursuing MAGTF C2, however, the term “command” refers to all of the functionality that supports the commander's contribution to the planning phase and his decisionmaking processes from pre-deployment planning to execution and redeployment. Regarding “control,” MAGTF C2 captures feedback—the continuous flow of infor- mation about the unfolding situation—returning to the commander. This philosophy imbeds cap- tured feedback into all planning, execution, and specified or implied reporting functionality. Effective and timely decisionmaking using C2 and communications systems is one of the primary
objectives of MAGTF C2. The MAGTF structure assures unity of command and facilitates the full integration of air, ground, and logistic operations in support of the commander’s overall mission. The scope of MAGTF C2 requires providing the capabilities necessary for the full range of Marine Corps operations: joint and multinational enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tacti- cal flexibility, and support and sustainment. The MAGTF C2 capabilities must be developed across the following areas:
• The fully scalable MAGTF, from MEF to MEU, including units such as distributed operations platoons and individual fire teams.
• All warfighting functions—command and control, fires, maneuver, intelligence, logistics, and force protection.
• Quadrennial Defense Review quadrants— traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and dis- ruptive.
• Levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical.
• Joint and multinational involvement—USAF, USA, USN, alliance, coalition, multinational, interagency, joint force component, and special operations forces.
• Operational phases of warfare—planning, deterrence, employment, execution, and redeployment.
• The expansion of MAGTF C2 to include the nonwarfighting or business operations of the Marine Corps will likewise require greater exploitation of the network, integration of additional processes, and vastly improved interoperability.
Commander Centric
Marine Corps command and control is com- mander centric. Command and control is essen- tially about people; the system exists to facilitate the needs of its users. According to MCDP 6, Command and Control, “An effective command and control system must account for the charac- teristics and limits of human nature and at the same time exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. At any level, the key individual in the com- mand and control system is the commander who has the final responsibility for success.” The MAGTF C2 system supports the individual styles of commanders with the flexibility and adaptabil- ity necessary to enhance their skills and accom- modate their preferences.
Marine leaders use MAGTF C2 to issue broad mission intent, and then maintain “control” through improved situational awareness and shared understanding. A shared appreciation of the situation is supported by common information that enables rapid collaborative maneuver, engage- ment, and support. The fog of war can never be eliminated, nor will it ever achieve perfect clarity. Therefore, the aim of MAGTF C2 is to empower Marine Corps leaders at every level to make more effective decisions despite this uncertainty by focusing resources upon a mission and enabling the creativity and initiative of subordinates.
Network Centric
As described in the DOD Office of Force Trans- formation’s Network Centric Operations Concep- tual Framework document, the United States is facing an unprecedented transformation in its national security landscape that has been acceler- ating over the past decade. With the decline of tra- ditional peer adversaries has come the rise of new irregular threats and enemies, capable of carrying out attacks such as those of September 11, 2001.
In addition to these irregular threats, the US mili- tary is also widely engaged across the globe in foreign humanitarian assistance, peace enforce- ment, and foreign military assistance missions. As Marine Corps operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the January 2005 post-tsunami operations in Southeast Asia demonstrated, there is a growing need to transform MAGTF C2, warfighting, and other business functions into a network centric environment. This is necessary to implement electronic and streamlined processes that allow decisions to be made rapidly, transparently, and across disparate platforms, systems, and domains. The Marine Corps has always defined itself in terms of the capabilities it provides, rather than the specific mission Marines are deployed to accomplish. So far, this self-perception has enabled the Marine Corps to be relatively agile in transforming to meet the changing strategic land- scape, as defined by the Quadrennial Defense Review released in 2006. However, this holds critical lessons for the development of MAGTF C2 information technology programs. To avoid obsolescence and irrelevancy, these programs need to be defined in terms of capabilities rather than around specific missions or threats.
A robustly networked force uses network centric warfare to improve information sharing and col- laboration and enhance the quality of informa- tion and shared situational awareness. This capability enables further collaboration and self- synchronization and improves sustainability and speed of command, ultimately resulting in dra- matically increased mission effectiveness.
Figure 4-1 depicts how network centric operations increase command and control and force agility. When Information Age technologies are paired with transformational changes in organizations and processes, dramatic improvements in effec- tiveness can be achieved. These improvements can
be applied in any operational environment and across different warfare levels—tactical, opera- tional, and strategic—because mission effective- ness is greatly enhanced by agility and the ability to be quick, nimble, adaptive, responsive to chang- ing circumstances, and innovative problem-solvers on demand.
Integrated
Marine Corps Strategy 21 states, “Marines instinctively understand the logic and synergy behind joint and multinational operations. Based on our experience operating as combined-arms, multidimensional MAGTFs, Marines seamlessly integrate into and operate as part of a joint or
multinational force.” However, the growing number of C2 and communications systems that are not integrated place an increasing burden on the Marine Corps for both time and funding required for operation, maintenance, and train- ing. These burdens impact the ability of the Marine Corps to support troops on the front lines at the same time as it transforms to meet the challenges of the future. Two of the key near- term goals of MAGTF C2 are to reduce the oper- ating, maintenance, and training requirements of C2 systems and to support the overall transfor- mation of DOD.
Joint concepts describe the capabilities that mili- tary forces must acquire or exhibit in future Information Sources Quality of Organic Information Quality of Interactions Quality of Individual Information
Degree of Decisions Synchronization
Degree of Actions/Entities Synchronization
Degree of Effectiveness
Quality of Networking
Degree of Shared Information Degree of Shareability
Degree of Networking Availability of Networking Value Added
Services Force C2 Effectors
Degree of Shared Sensemaking Shared Awareness Shared Understanding Collaborative Decisions Quality of Individual Sensemaking Individual Awareness Individual Understanding Individual Decisions Physical Domain Cognitive Domain Information Domain V ariables C2Agility Force Agility
operations, and they serve to guide capability development toward an end state of integrated people, processes, and technology. For MAGTF C 2 , t h e j o i n t c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l a n d FORCEnet concepts provide the primary guid- ance for developing new capabilities. Communi- cating closely with other Services and their respective C2 systems commands will help ensure that MAGTF C2 is well integrated into the next generation of JC2 initiatives.
Supportive of Command and Control Principles
While command and control is complex, it con- tains a number of timeless principles. These must be recognized and understood within any future concepts, including MAGTF C2. They include the following:
• Command and control is always commander centric. Its purpose is to give the commander the best possible understanding of the situation, support effective decisionmaking, ensure effective implementation, and provide feed- back on the progress of the operation.
• Command and control always occurs in an operational environment. The operational environment consists of several connected elements—both physical, such as terrain and weather, and social, such as the political and economic environment.
• Every military organization’s mission operates within rules of engagement. Commanders are often included in the discussions that define their missions but ultimately must operate within the boundaries of those missions and the constraints associated with them.
• Throughout history, the essence of command and control has been the reduction of un- certainty, including uncertainty about the en- vironment, the adversary, and our own forces— o Uncertainty is inherent in military operations and will never be removed completely, regardless of the technologies employed or
the quality of the forces and their com- manders.
o Manipulation of uncertainty is always an element of command and control. This manipulation of uncertainty is achieved by reducing our own, increasing the ad- versary’s, and managing and operating with the uncertainty that remains.
• Command and control above the simplest tactical level is always a complex adaptive system—
o The goal of command and control is to select crucial aspects of the operating environment and establish control over them.
o Because the operating environment is complex and dynamic and because each adversary, neutral, or friendly pursues individual missions or goals, control is transitory until one side is victorious. For that reason, military operations are organized into phases and campaigns.
• Leadership is an essential element of command and control. The presence of the commander— whether physical or virtual—and the quality of the communication between the commander and the force are core elements of command and control. Leadership is necessary to create trust and understanding in an organization. It is necessary to enlist the committed, enthusiastic, and loyal performance of subordinates. Lead- ership is also important in coordinating the actions of multinational and interagency peers.
• Because command and control is a dynamic interaction between a military organization and its operating environment, it can be understood as a cyclic process. The observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop reflects this process:
o Observe refers to obtaining the best information available.
o Orient refers to bringing together what is known about the military situation and the knowledge—developed through training, ex- perience, and intuition—of the commander and senior staff to understand that situation.
o Decide refers to the process of selecting a COA, which includes consideration of alternatives as well as adversary reactions to them.
o Act refers to implementing decisions in the battlespace. It also initiates a new cycle of observation.
• The HQ organizes and prepares its forces for warfighting. It provides guidance and plans that support subordinate forces and the
commander’s leadership responsibilities and decisionmaking.
• The C2 element relies on the best available information systems, but sometimes they must sacrifice the number of users who may participate and the quality of the information content and the user interaction. These sacrifices, however, are likely to diminish over time as new technology is developed