Concepto de Cambio Climático

In order that civil liability for negligence may arise, there must be a direct causal connection between the damage suffered by the plaintiff and the act or omission of the defendant. In other words, the act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the loss or damage of the plaintiff.

DEFINITION

Bataclan v. Medina:

PROXIMATE CAUSE: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE: that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom

Quezon City vs. Dacara (2005): Proximate cause is

determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy or precedent.

DIFFERENTIATED FROM: REMOTE CAUSE

Manila Electric v. Remonquillo: A prior and remote

cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. Concurrent Cause – Several causes producing the injury, and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. The injury is attributed to any or all the causes, and recovery may be had against any or all of those responsible.

Far Eastern Shipping v. CA: Where the concurrent or

successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage.

INTERVENING CAUSE

Phoenix Construction v. IAC: If the intervening cause

is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances. The defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it.

There is an intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce the result, and the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.

Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence.

EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE

Teague vs. Fernandez (1973): The test is not in the

number of intervening causes, but in their character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. TESTS TO DETERMINE PROXIMATE CAUSE CAUSE IN FACT: The first step is to determine whether the defendant’s conduct, in point of fact, was a factor in causing plaintiff’s damage.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CAUSE; “BUT FOR” RULE: whether such negligent conduct is a cause without which the injury would not have taken place (sine qua non rule) or is the efficient cause which set in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury. (Bataclan v.

Medina)

SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST: If the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresees nor should have foreseen the harm or the manner in which it occurred, does not prevent him from being liable.

(Philippine Rabit v. IAC)

FORESEEABILITY TEST: Anticipation of consequence is a necessary element in determining not only whether a particular act or omission was negligent, but also whether the injury complained of was proximately caused by such act or omission.

NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE TEST: A natural consequence of an act is the consequence which ordinarily follows it. A probable consequence is one that is more likely to follow than fail to follow its supposed cause but it need not be one which necessarily follows such cause.

ORDINARY AND NATURAL OR DIRECT CONSEQUENCE TEST: If negligence is a cause in fact of the injury, the liability of the wrongdoer extends to all the injurious consequences.

HINDSIGHT TEST: A party guilty of negligence or omission of duty is responsible for all the consequences which a prudent and experienced party, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact exist, whether they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence, or not, would have thought at the time of the negligent act as reasonably possible to follow, if they had been suggested to his mind.

ORBIT OF THE RISK TEST: If the foreseeable risk to plaintiff created a duty which the defendant breached, liability is imposed for any resulting injury within the orbit or scope of such injury. It is not the

unusual nature of the act resulting in injury to plaintiff that is the test of foreseeability, but whether the result of the act is within the ambit of the hazards covered by the duty imposed upon the defendant.

CAUSE V. CONDITION

Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active “cause” of the harm and the existing “conditions” upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive, static condition which made the damage possible, he is said not to be liable.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC (1987): The distinction

between cause and condition has already been almost entirely discredited. Prosser and Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which could have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. (NOTE: active force is the cause while the passive situation is the condition)

It is not the distinction which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

LEGAL CAUSE

NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

A natural consequence of an act is the consequence which ordinarily follows it. A probable consequence is one that is more likely to follow than fail to follow its supposed cause but it need not be one which necessarily follows such cause.

FORESEEABILITY

Anticipation of consequence is a necessary element in determining not only whether a particular act or omission was negligent, but also whether the injury complained of was proximately caused by such act or omission.

Jarencio: Where the particular harm sustained was

reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof.

Foreseeability is the fundamental basis of the law of negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were reasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Also known as: "doctrine of discovered peril” or

“doctrine of supervening negligence” or “humanitarian doctrine”

The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s (own) negligence. (Sangco, Torts and Damages.)

Consolidated Bank v. CA: The doctrine of last clear

chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Picart v. Smith: If both parties are found to be

negligent; but, their negligence are not contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. ELEMENTS:

(1) Plaintiff’s own negligence puts himself in a dangerous situation;

(2) Defendant saw or discovered, by exercising reasonable care, the perilous position of plaintiff; (3) In due time to avoid injuring him

(4) Despite notice and imminent peril, defendant failed to employ care to avoid injury; and

(5) Injury of plaintiff resulted.

COVERS SUCCESSIVE ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE

Primary negligence of the defendant  contributory negligence of the plaintiff  subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to avoid the injury to the plaintiff

INAPPLICABLE TO JOINT TORTFEASORS

However, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent.

Note:

(a) If plaintiff is the proximate cause: NO RECOVERY can be made.

(b) If plaintiff is NOT the proximate cause: Recovery can be made but such will be mitigated.

(c) If negligence of parties is equal in degree, then each bears his own loss.)

Pantranco vs. Baesa (1989): Last clear chance applies

only if the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it.

Ong vs. Metropolitan (1958): Last clear chance does

not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

Bustamante vs. CA (1991): The doctrine of last clear

chance, as enunciated in Anuran v. Buno, applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. It will be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

Phoenix vs. IAC (1987): Doctrine of last clear chance

does not seem to have a role to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in 2179 of CC.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Valenzuela v. CA: Conduct on the part of the injured

party, which contributed as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.

MH Rakes v. Atlantic: Contributory negligence – does

not defeat an action if it can be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. Petitioner’s negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the principal occurrence — it was merely an element to the damage caused upon him.

WHEN IS IT A BAR TO RECOVERY?

Only when the proximate cause is on the part of the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.