SECCION I 2.2. PROCESO DE GLOBALIZACIÓN
2.3.7. Efectos del Cambio Climático
exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another xxx. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
CLASSES OF INJURY INJURY TO PERSONS
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
INJURY TO PROPERTY
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage
to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
INJURY TO RELATIONS
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief;
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Intentional Torts
CONCEPTUnder Article 2176, a person is also held liable for intentional and malicious acts. The liability is
founded on the indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations that when a person, by his act or omission, causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage.
PNB v. CA, 1978: (NCC 21-36) serve as catch all
provisions or dragnet clauses. They cover any imaginable tort action, because these articles were intended to expand the concept of torts in out jurisdiction. It grants adequate legal remedies for the (otherwise) untold number of moral wrongs, which is impossible for human foresight to provide in our statutes.
VIOLATIONS OF A PERSON’S SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INJURIES (NCC 33)
BATTERY (PHYSICAL INJURY)
The actual infliction of any unlawful or unauthorized violence on the person of another, irrespective of its degree.
The least touching of another in anger, or in any manner which amounts to an unlawful setting upon his person,” may subject one to an action for battery. INTERESTS PROTECTED BY LAW:
(1) Interest of the individual in freedom from bodily harm or any impairment whatever of the physical integrity of the body
(2) Interest in freedom from offensive bodily touching although no actual harm is done.
Carandang vs. Santiago and Valenton (1955):
Defamation and fraud (in Art. 33) are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as names of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With these apparent circumstances in mind, it is evident that the term “physical injuries” could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in same article—some in this general and others in its technical sense. In other words, the term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.
ASSAULT (GRAVE THREAT)
An intentional, unlawful offer of physical injury to another by force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under such circumstances as to create a well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt if not prevented.
The wrong is committed when unreasonable fear is inspired in the plaintiff by threatening gestures, especially when these are connected with unlawful, sinister, and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT (ILLEGAL DETENTION)
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention xxx
INTERFERENCE WITH PERSONAL PROPERTY TRESPASS TO LAND
Any intentional use of another’s real property, without authorization and without a privilege by law to do so, is actionable as a trespass without regard to harm. (Prosser and Keeton, p. 70)
Elements An invasion
(1) which interfered with the right of exclusive possession of the land, and
(2) which was a direct result of some act committed by the defendant. (Prosser and Keeton, p. 67) TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
Any direct and immediate intentional interference with a chattel in the possession of another. (Prosser and Keeton, p. 85)
CONVERSION
Major interferences with the chattel, or with the plaintiff’s rights in it, which are so serious, and so important, as to justify the forced judicial sale to the defendant. (Prosser and Keeton, p. 90)
INTENTIONAL NON-PHYSICAL HARMS
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief;
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
The principal rights protected under this provision are the following:
(1) The right to personal dignity (2) The right to personal security (3) The right to family relations (4) The right to social intercourse (5) The right to privacy
(6) The right to peace of mind VIOLATION OF PERSONAL DIGNITY
In order to be actionable it is not necessary that the act constitutes a criminal offense. The remedy afforded by the law is not only the recovery of damages. “Prevention and other relief” is also available. In other words, injunction and other appropriate reliefs may also be obtained by the aggrieved party.
St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. CA (Illustration of a
“similar act”): The acts and omissions of the firm fall under Article 26. Persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed.
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da'wah Council (2003):
Article 26 specifically applies to intentional acts which fall short of being criminal offenses. It itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which "may not constitute criminal offenses." The purpose is precisely to fill a gap or lacuna in the law where a person who suffers injury because of a wrongful act not constituting a crime is left without any redress. Under Article 26, the person responsible for such act becomes liable for "damages, prevention and other relief." In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family and in the community, Article 26 seeks to eliminate cases of damnum absque injuria in human relations.
Consequently, the elements that qualify the same acts as criminal offenses do not apply in determining responsibility for tortious conduct under Article 26.
In intentional infliction of mental distress, the gravamen of the tort is not the injury to plaintiff's reputation, but the harm to plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to plaintiff's reputation. Reputation is the community's opinion of what a person is. In intentional infliction of mental distress, the opinion of the community is immaterial to the existence of the action although the court can consider it in awarding damages. What is material is the disturbance on the mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace of mind.
VIOLATION OF PRIVACY
It is the right to be let alone, or to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned. Reasonableness of Expectation of Privacy (The 2-prong test)
(1) Whether by one’s conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy
(2) Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes and accepts as reasonable
Note:
Coverage of Art. 26 is not limited to those enumerated therein, the enumeration being merely examples of acts violative of a person’s rights to dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Other “similar acts” are also covered within the scope of the article.
Persons who can invoke privacy
General Rule: The right to privacy may only be
invoked by natural persons. Juridical persons cannot invoke this because the basis to this right is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the injured party, and a corporation has none of those
Exception: The right to privacy may be invoked along
with the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
General Rule: The right to privacy is purely personal in
nature:
(1) It can be invoked only by the person actually injured
(2) It is subject to a proper waiver (3) It ceases upon death
Exception: The privilege may be given to the heirs of
a deceased to protect his memory, but this privilege exists for the benefit of the living. It enables the protection of their feelings, and prevents the
violation of their own rights regarding the character and memory of the deceased.
Invasion of Privacy Types:
(1) Publication of embarrassing private facts – The interest here is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, wrongful publicizing of private affairs and activities, as these are outside the ambit of legitimate public concern.
Ayer v. Capulong (1988): Public figures enjoy a limited
right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals. (2) Intrusion upon plaintiff’s private affairs – This is
not limited to situations where the wrongdoer physically trespasses into one’s property.
(a) Generally, there is no invasion of privacy when journalists report something that occurs in the public realm, except when the acts of the journalist are to an extent that it constitutes harassment.
(b) RA 4200: it is illegal for any person not authorized by both parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication.
(c) Limitations to Right to Information v. Right to Privacy:
(i) Must be of public interest (ii) Must not be excluded by law
(3) Publicity which puts one in a false light in the public eye – To protect the interest of one in not being made or forced to appear before the public in an objectionable false light or position.
Tort of putting in false
light Defamation
The embarrassment of a person being portrayed as something he is not
Concerns the reputational harm to a person
Statement should be
actually made in public Publication is satisfied even if communicated to only one specific third person
(4) Commercial appropriation of likeness of image It consists of appropriation, for the defendant’s benefit or advantage (ex. It was used in the defendant’s advertisement), of the plaintiff’s name or likeness (picture or portrait).
DISTURBANCE OF PEACE OF MIND
The disturbance of the mental and emotional tranquility of the plaintiff by the defendant is a legal injury in itself and, therefore, a sufficient cause of action for damages, injunction, and other relief. A person, however, cannot be held liable for damages for the mental or emotional disturbance of the plaintiff which was due to the latter’s susceptibility to such disturbance, where the defendant had no knowledge of such peculiar susceptibility. The tendency of the law is to secure an interest in mental comfort only to the extent of the ordinary sensibilities of men.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases: xxx
(8) Malicious prosecution
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Malicious prosecution is the institution of any action or proceeding either civil or criminal against another, maliciously and without probable cause.
Elements:
(1) That the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement
(2) That the action was finally terminated with an acquittal
(3) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause
(4) That he was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper and sinister motives. (Lao v. CA)
Drilon vs. CA (1997): Malicious Prosecution defined:
An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant herein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury.
Buenaventura vs. Domingo and Ignacio (1958): The
provisions of the Civil Code in taking reference to malicious prosecutions must necessarily imply that the person to be held liable to pay moral damages should have acted deliberately and with knowledge
that his accusation of the person subject to such malicious prosecution, was false and groundless. xxx Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights granted by law; otherwise, there would always be a civil action for damages after every prosecution's failure to prove its cause resulting in the consequent, acquittal of the accused therein.
DEFAMATION, FRAUD AND PHYSICAL INJURIES
Art. 33. In case of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. DEFAMATION
Cojuangco vs. CA (1991): Separate civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action.
MVRS vs. Islamic Da'wah (2003): Defamation is that
which tends to injure reputation or diminish esteem, respect, good will, or confidence of the plaintiff, or excite derogatory feelings about him. It must be personal. (What is definitive is not the level of hurt, but the effect of the statement on the reputation or standing of the person.)
Arafiles vs. Philippine Journalists (2004): In actions for
damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
The article must be construed in its entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.
A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it.
DEFENSES:
(1) Absence of elements (2) Privilege
FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION (FORMERLY DECEIT)
Salta vs. De Veyra (1982): Independent civil actions
are permitted to be filed separately regardless of the result of the criminal action.
Samson vs. Daway (2004): Unfair competition under
the Intellectual Property Code and fraud under Art. 33 are independent actions. Art. 33 does not operate as a prejudicial question to justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
SEDUCTION
Sangco: Seduction is sexual intercourse with an
unmarried woman of chaste character whose consent was obtained through abuse of confidence or through deceit.
Seduction under the RPC (criminal seduction) is different from seduction under the NCC (civil seduction, Art. 21)
(a) In criminal seduction, either qualified or simple, the offended woman must be less than 18 years of age.
(b) In civil seduction, the offended woman may be over 18 years of age.
Tanjanco vs. CA (1966): The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction.
UNJUST DISMISSAL
The employer’s right to dismiss his employee differs from, and should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised. When the manner in which the company exercised its right to dismiss was abusive, oppressive or malicious, it is liable for damages.
Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood (1974):
Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or
backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal.
The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute; it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve an existing employee-employer relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of Presidential Decree No. 21. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor Relations Commission.
Note:
The foregoing decision thus states that where the employee does not seek reinstatement or expressly or impliedly accepts the employer’s right to terminate the contract of employment but questions the manner in which said right was exercised and predicates thereon his claim for moral and exemplary damages, the claim is one for tort under the Civil Code and not one arising from employer-