CAPÍTULO II. LOS DELITOS PRETERINTECIONALES: DOCTRINA Y LEGISLACIÓN
II.1. Conceptualización y criterios doctrinales de los delitos preterintencionales
The success of M-Pesa in Kenya seems not to have yielded the same results when the model has been replicated.142 As Joseph put it: “there have been
about 200 of these experiments around the world, and maybe only four or five have been successful.”143 There is nothing extraordinary in the concept of M- Pesa itself. Tarrant adds that the concept of “sending money via a mobile
platform is not particularly difficult”.144 Therefore, there must be other factors
that make the service successful in Kenya as compared to other markets.
M-Pesa has been replicated in India, Afghanistan, South Africa, and Tanzania but in all these markets it has not achieved the same level of success as in Kenya.145 The problems in India and South Africa have largely been regulatory
in nature.146 The central banks in these countries see M-Pesa as part of the
banking sector and therefore attempt to regulate it as such.147 This section
looks at why M-Pesa has not succeeded in Tanzania, which shares a common language, border, and population size with Kenya.
Tanzania was perceived as a market ready for the picking because while as in Kenya domestic remittances were at 17% at the start of the M-Pesa launch, the comparable rate in Tanzania was 28%.148 Camner and Sjöblom say,
Tanzania had far fewer banks and branches meaning that it had a “greater need for a financial service such as M-Pesa.”149 However, when the service
142 IFC (2011) p19.
143 James Crabtree (2012) ‘M-Pesa’s cautious start in India’ Financial Times, (New York, 27 December 2012 <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a09c0f68-4a9a-11e2-9650-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3UGBgLWPj>. 15 December 2016. 144 Tarrant (2011).
145 Crabtree (2012). Wang (2012). 146 Oyebode (2014).
James Crabtree (2012) ‘M-Pesa’s cautious start in India’ Financial Times <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a09c0f68-4a9a-11e2-9650-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3UGBgLWPj>. 15 December 2016. 147 ibid.
148 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p3. 149 ibid p4.
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was launched, the market take-up was lukewarm and nowhere to the speed of growth in Kenya.150 So why was a product based on the same killer slogan,
‘Send money home’ and launched by a Vodafone affiliate not as successful? What were some of the factors that may have been ignored by simply transplanting the Kenya’s M-Pesa model into the Tanzanian market?
4.7.1. Economic, political, and social factors
Although Tanzania and Kenya have a similar population, Kenya boasts a stronger economy with twice the gross domestic product (GDP) of Tanzania.151 At independence, Kenya embraced a capitalist agenda and
encouraged urban economic growth while Tanzania, led by Julius Nyerere pursued a socialist agenda.152 Nyerere’s socialist vision was embodied in what
became known as the Arusha Declaration where he conceived the concept of
Ujamaa.153 Camner and Sjöblom describe Ujamaa as a “programme of
villagization” which moved “peasant families into cooperative villages where they [could] expressly work together more productively.”154 By the early 1970s,
80% of the population were living in registered Ujamaa villages.155
Because of this, the population in Tanzania is more evenly distributed than that in Kenya leading to a reduced general density.156 By 2006, Kenya had
achieved 41% urban population while Tanzania was at 30%, although the mobile penetration was comparable, at 34% and 30% respectively.157
Therefore, although Swahili is spoken in both countries, the Swahili slogan
Send money home did not communicate quite the same message in
150 ibid.
151 Emil Sjöblom Gunnar Camner, Caroline Pulver (2009) What Makes a Successful Mobile Money Implementation? Learnings from M-PESA in Kenya and Tanzania (GSMA) p4 <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/What-makes- a-successful-mobile-money-implementation.pdf>. 1 March 2017.
152 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p7.
153 Julius Nyerere (1967) 'The Arusha Declaration' (Tanganyika African National Union) <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1967/arusha-declaration.htm>. 15 December 2016.
154 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p7. 155 ibid p7.
156 ibid p2.
Population density of 66.2 per square km for Kenya and 43.9 for Tanzania - Gunnar Camner (2009) p4.
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Tanzania.158 It also meant that unlike Safaricom, which could concentrate in
the pockets with high population density, Vodacom, the local Vodafone affiliate, had logistical and marketing challenges to cover Tanzania.159
Safaricom also had another advantage in that although both it and Vodacom are dominant players in both countries, Safaricom has almost twice the size of market share with three times as much revenue.160This meant that Safaricom
had more funds available for its market budget as compared to Vodacom.161
Added to this is that Tanzania is twice the size of Kenya.162
As already noted above, most Kenyans treat Safaricom as a Kenyan company. On the other hand, 65% of Vodacom’s stake is Vodacom (South Africa), which is itself 65% owned, by Vodafone UK.163 It is, therefore, understandable that
although Vodacom was one of the first mobile operators in Tanzania, it is not treated as a home-grown company in the same way Safaricom is. Vodacom also suffered from a trust issue in that its products and services were viewed as somewhat expensive, leading to further reduction in its market share.164 It
however remains the largest company in Tanzania.165
The even population distribution in Tanzania may also have played a role in how the message of Send money home was perceived in Tanzania. Camner says, unlike Kenya where the bulk of remittance are urban-to-rural, in Tanzania, there are other corridors of money transfer such as “urban–rural, rural–urban, urban–urban and rural–rural.”166 Therefore, while to the urban-to-
rural corridor, the slogan was a hit, it was a dud to the other corridors.167
158 ibid p2. 159 ibid. 160 ibid. 161 ibid p4. 162 Gunnar Camner (2009) p4. 163 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p4. 164 ibid.
165 ibid.
166 Gunnar Camner (2009) p4. 167 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p7.
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While Safaricom built up a large base of agents, Vodacom was unable to achieve the same success. For example, as opposed to 1,000 super dealers for airtime for Safaricom, Vodacom only had six.168 While Safaricom boasted
of some 40,000 agents, Vodacom only had 1,000 in 2009.169 Agents not only
facilitate cash deposits and withdrawals, but they also register customers, conduct CDD and customer education, especially to new users.170 It must be
pointed out, as the table below illustrates, Vodacom has over the years increased the number of agents considerably. After a year of operation, Vodacom’s M-Pesa had only 280,000 users,171 compared to 2.5 million for
Safaricom after the same timeline, and only reached 4.5 million by the end of 2008.172
Although M-Pesa uses its own payment platform, it still requires the availability of cash to convert m-money. The presence of bank branches is, therefore, crucial. In 2006, Kenya had 1.38 branches per 10,000 people compared to 0.57 in Tanzania.173 Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has no national ID for its
citizens.174 This presents a problem to people who want to register on M-Pesa.
To overcome this, voter registration cards are accepted instead.175 Generally,
the numbers of mobile phone and M-Pesa users in Kenya still trump those in Tanzania. The table below provides a comparison of the different mobile phone statistics in the two countries in 2016. From the table below, the dominance of Safaricom over Vodacom becomes evident. Safaricom has twice the number of subscribers with almost 95% of these as M-Pesa users. It may also be pointed that Kenya now has almost double the mobile penetration rate than Tanzania.
168 ibid p2.
169 ibid p3.
170 Gunnar Camner (2009) p7. 171 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p3. 172 AFI (2010) p1.
173 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p2. 174 Gunnar Camner (2009) p7. 175 ibid.
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Table 7: Contrasting mobile phone statistics in Kenya and Tanzania176
Camner and Sjöblom have cautioned that although M-Pesa is capable of being replicated, future models of m-money services “are more likely to resemble the development of M-Pesa in Tanzania” with “things happening more slowly but
still moving in the right direction and picking up pace over time.”177 In 2016,
Vodacom announced that it would discontinue its South African M-Pesa
service.178 The service launched in 2010, targeted ten million users but after
six years only managed one million users, out of which a mere 76,000 were active users.179
The pricing of M-Pesa in Tanzania is similar to that of Kenya M-Pesa. It costs more to send money to an unregistered user.180 The rationale it would seem
is the same: to encourage the circulation of m-money within the M-Pesa
ecosystem.
176 Table compiled from data from:
Safaricom (2016) SAFARICOM LIMITED Annual Report 2016 (Nairobi)
<https://www.safaricom.co.ke/annualreport_2016/downloads/Safaricom%20Annual%20R eport%202016.pdf>. 10 January 2017.
Vodacom (2016) Vodacom Integrated Report for the year ended 31 March 2016
(<http://www.vodacom-reports.co.za/integrated-reports/ir-2016/pdf/full-integrated.pdf>. 10 January 2017.
Lara Gilman (2016) The impact of mobile money interoperability in Tanzania (<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/2016_GSMA_The-impact-of-mobile-money-interoperability-in- Tanzania.pdf>. 10 January 2016.
Philemon Matoi (2016) M-Pesa in Tanzania: The journey so far (Vodacom, Mlimani) <https://www.udbs.udsm.ac.tz/images/ICAESB2016/M-Pesa_in_Tanzania.pdf>. 10 January 2017.
177 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p9.
178 Lynsey Chutel (2016) 'Vodacom has given up on revolutionary mobile money service M- Pesa, in South Africa’ Quartz Africa Weekly Brief (9 may 2016)
<https://qz.com/679059/vodacom-has-given-up-on-revolutionary-mobile-money-service- m-pesa-in-south-africa/>. 10 Janaury 2017.
179 ibid.
180 Vodacom (2016) 'Ada za M-Pesa’ (Vodacom Tanzania PLC)
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