CAPÍTULO III. Regulación en Cuba de los delitos de resultado más grave que el querido.
Artículo 9.4: Si como consecuencia de la acción u omisión, se produce un resultado más grave que el querido, determinante de una sanción más severa, ésta se impone solamente si el agente pudo o debió prever
III.3. Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo relativas a delitos de resultado más grave que el querido.grave que el querido.
M-Pesa, Airtel Money, and Mpamba are all issued based on deposits in a pool account of a bank. There is no requirement for individual customs who hold the m-money accounts to have bank accounts. As the telecommunications network is the carrier of the service, this model is called a telco-led.259 This is
the main factor distinguishing the telco-led model of m-money from the bank- led model where one links their mobile phone to their pre-existing account. For the bank-led model, the mobile phone works as an extension of the bank account, and in many ways, bears similarities to mobile banking offered by banks. Examples of bank-led m-money services are WIZZIT and MTN Mobile Money, both offered in South Africa, discussed below.
The end of apartheid in South Africa saw a positive movement in the number of the banked from 29% to 39% in by 1994.260 At the time the mobile money
revolution began in earnest, more than half of the population in South Africa was still unbanked.261 However, despite South Africa having many people
unbanked, the conditions seeming right and having arguably one of the biggest slums in Africa, Khayelitsha,262 the service seems not to have picked up as
expected. WIZZIT was launched in 2005 with links to Bank of Athens SA.263
The bank provides account holders with access to other e-payments systems including use of ATM machines.264 The opening of WIZZIT accounts was done
258 ibid.
259 Maurer (2011).
260 Alan Gibson (2006) Developing financial services markets for the poor: FinMark in South Africa (Making Markets Work for the Poor: Case Studies Series Schweizerische
Eidgenossenschaft, Bern) p5 <http://www.value-
chains.org/dyn/bds/docs/614/M4P_case_study_FinMark_april2007.pdf>. 19 March 2015. 261 Ibid p11.
262 Tovrov (2011). 263 Porteous (2006) p27.
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remotely through agents called WIZZkids.265 WIZZIT targeted 300,000
accounts in the medium term, 266 but it only attracted 250,000 in more than
four years of operation.267 Apart from using the mobile banking platform, the
service also offers a debit card by MasterCard. 268
WIZZIT adopted a similar but somewhat modified slogan to that of M-Pesa: ‘Send money home to family and friends.’269 Although it is linked to a bank,
WIZZIT is a virtual branchless banking platform and does not require customers to physically visit bank branches.270 WIZZIT has now been
deployed in nine countries271 and boasts of over six million customers through
partner banks.272 However, details of the number of customers that it has in
South Africa could not be obtained. It is also unclear whether these six million customers were recruited by WIZZIT or have become customers by its association with partner banks. WIZZIT is built to operate across networks and not linked to any one operator.273
MTN (Mobile) Money started as a venture between the telecommunications company MTN and Standard Bank in 2005.274 Customers are required to
provide biometric identifiers when opening accounts through an interactive process, which takes place remotely.275 In 2014 MTN launched MTN Mobile
265 ibid.
266 Rabecca Harrison (2005) 'Cell phones plug Africa's poor into mobile banking’ Reuters South Africa (1 November 2005) <https://www.mail-archive.com/telecom-
[email protected]/msg00327.html>. 21 Janaury 2017. 267 Mas and Morawczynski (2009), p77.
268 WIZZIT (2016) 'History’ (WIZZIT) <http://www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/197>. 14 January 2016.
269 WIZZIT (2016b) 'Cellphone Banking’ (WIZZIT) <http://www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/68>. 14 January 2016.
270 WIZZIT (2016c) 'Who We Are’ (WIZZIT International) <http://wizzit- int.com.dedi89.cpt1.host-h.net/who-we-are/>. 14 January 2016.
271 South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Romania, Rwanda, Namibia, Botswana, Honduras, and Nigeria.
272 WIZZIT (2016c). Anon (2014c) ‘WIZZIT CEO: Reflections & Predictionns for The Future of Mobile Money’ (Mondato Insight, Mondato,14 January 2016)
<http://mondato.com/blog/wizzit-founder/>. 14 January 2016. 273 WIZZIT (2016c).
274 An entity called MTN Mobile Money South Africa was formed- Cisco (2012) MTN MobileMoney Service (Mobile Connected Life Experiences, Cisco)
<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns1058/Cisc o_MTN_CS.pdf>. 19 March 2015.
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Money and its catch-phrase is clear in what type of service it is offering: “Mobile money is a safe, secure and affordable way to do your banking, and is available to customers on all cellphone network” (emphasis supplied).276 MTN
says, customers are given Mobile Money Visa Cards, which they can use for “everyday purchases at any point-of-sale machine.”277 The cards can also be
used to withdraw money from any ATM.278 Customers, however, need to
purchase the Visa Card separately.279
Both WIZZIT and MTN Mobile Money are premised on the notion of branchless banking. In Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the greatest challenges faced by banks is the establishment of branches in rural and far-flung areas. In 2007, Brian Richardson, founder of WIZZIT said:
[I]f you talk to any bank anywhere in the world, banking equals branches, and as long as you have that mindset, it becomes expensive to bring affordable banking to the mass market. It is estimated in South African that about 30 million people have a cellphone; about 11 million people have a bank account. So, the option is to utilise technology. The challenge we had, was to have technology that worked on the lowest common denominator, that could work on any phone, any SIM and across all the networks.280
Looking at the bank-led and telco-led models, what comes out clearly is that the two models function on different rails. Since WIZZIT and MTN Money are bank-led, it is only natural that they are subjected to the more stringent prudential regulatory framework for banks. It is submitted this is what may have led to the differences in uptake. The fact that WIZZIT and MTN Money are regarded as banking services may be a hindrance. There is a good reason
276 MTN (2015) 'MTN Mobile Money’ (Mobile Telephone Network, South Africa)
<https://www.mtn.co.za/everyday_services/useful_extras/Banking/Pages/mobile_banking .aspx>. 19 March 2015.
277 MTN (2016) 'Mobile Money’ (Mobile Telephone Network, South Africa)
<https://www.mtn.co.za/everyday_services/useful_extras/Banking/Pages/mobile_banking .aspx>. 20 January 2016.
278 Ibid. 279 Ibid.
280 Anon 'WIZZIT: Banking the Unbanked in South Africa' (World Bank, 2007) (Audio Visual) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SKhCYoF0Lg>. 1 March 2017.
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why the telco-led models are at pains to emphasise that they are not banking services. Bank-led models by their nature are within the clutches of the banking regulator. This leaves them little or no room for innovative manoeuvre unless sanctioned by the regulator, a process that may be laborious. Heeks argues that “tighter regulation” is one of the factors that “has held back the expansion of mobile money services in South Africa.”281 As noted earlier, M- Pesa, which was introduced by Vodacom (South Africa), was withdrawn for failure to gain traction.282 The up-take of m-money in South Africa has
generally stalled over the years.283
Table 12: Comparisons of the Mobile Money Services.284
281 Heeks (2012).
282 Chutel (2016).
283 Rabelani Dagada (2015) ‘Mobile money stalls in SA’ ITWeb in Banking, 10 February 2015 <http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141012>. 19 March 2015.
284 This figure has been adapted from Proteus Table 3 and table 4, Porteous (2006) p27 and 29.
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4.10. Conclusion
In looking at how m-money operates, this chapter undertook a journey of how the telephone developed into the modern day mobile phone and how this has enabled the development of m-money. The analysis of the technical aspects of m-money is fundamental to appreciate the unique regulatory issues that m- money poses. By looking at the Kenyan M-Pesa, the chapter looked at the factors that contributed to its success. A comparison was made of attempts to replicate it in Tanzania and why it failed to achieve the same results. A comparative analysis was also done on the telco-led and bank-led models of m-money. It was found that the bank-led models have not fared well compared to the telco-led model, and one possible reason advanced is a regulatory restriction of the former. Now, because of the inclusiveness of its risk-based KYC requirements, it can be concluded that the telco-led is the most ideal in achieving FI goals.
The main issues that arise in this chapter are how a service like M-Pesa can be successfully replicated and what is the best way of regulating it? It was suggested that future replications of M-Pesa are more likely to follow the Tanzanian model: slow but steady. For Malaŵi, this is a valuable lesson for Airtel Money and Mpamba. It is imperative therefore, that the model is not simply replicated without factoring in some of the unique and distinguishing factors present in Malaŵi. In fact, it begs the question whether the research was first done or the service was introduced in a niche market and has had to be adapted along the way. As has been highlighted, the economic situation in Kenya is very different from that of Malaŵi. For now, both Airtel Money and
Mpamba seem to be gaining traction. The basic m-money ecosystem infrastructure has been laid down and only time will tell how the services grow.
Aker and Mbiti (2010) p20 say despite M-Pesa being touted as targeting the low income and poor and ‘banking the unbanked’, M-Pesa ‘users are wealthier, better educated, urban and already banked.’
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