as a simple majority was achieved to place the issue on the agenda of the Political Committee, Casey then opposed a proposed resolution on
resumption of talks because the only objective of these would be a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia and this was indefensible on one major ground that it would deny the people of West New Guinea a voice in
3
their own political future. The question of how it would affect Australia's security was not mentioned by Casey, but Spender, not
surprisingly, was less reticent and stressed the security motive with some emotion.^
Casey and other Australian officials had lobbied intensely in the United Nations over this issue and, whether or not this was
effective, it happened that the Indonesian resolution failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Australia opposed the inscription of the issue again in 1955, 1956 and 1957 on
essentially similar grounds: the lack of competence of the United Nations not only to hear the claim, but also to judge it; the legal faults in the claim; the emphasis on self-determination, together with, for
W.J. Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations, p. 5.
2
C.N., Vol. 25, No. 9, 1954, p. 648. As Hudson points out, the
domestic jurisdiction clause was often invoked by Australia because of fears of attack on its administration of New Guinea.
3
Ibid, No. 11, 1954, pp. 792-4. (The Indonesian representative, Dr Sudjarwo, expressed surprise at the "violent" tone of Casey's statement.)
^ Ibid, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1955, p. 45ff. 5
See C.N., Vol. 25, No. 11, 1954. The Department of External Affairs "has already been most active in putting these views to represent atives of other member countries of the U.N.", and also Casey, op cit., 13 December 1955, p. 227, in which Casey describes an
innocuous resolution in 1955 at the U.N. as "the culmination of a great deal of effort on our part over the last month", see also 30 October (p. 286) and 5 November 1957 (p. 288), for successful lobbying of Cambodia, and uncertainty about Malaysia's position. See also Haupt, p. 140 for Spender's lobbying in South America in 1955.
Spender, the emphasis on the "cardinal" importance to Australia's security
1
of New Guinea.
If the object of Australian opposition to United Nations intervention was to delay settlement of the issue, it achieved its
purpose for four years. But if the aim was not to exacerbate an already
difficult situation between the Dutch and Indonesians, it failed and the Indonesians sought recourse to other means. As to its effect on
j
Indonesia's relations with Australia, Indonesian (and other Asian) delegates frequently expressed surprise at the strength of Australia's
opposition; and the increasing emphasis on self-determination in
Australian speeches was in part a sensitivity to criticism that
Australia's defence interests were pressed too hard. After the failure of the 1957 attempt at the United Nations, Subandrio spelled out what he
saw as Australia's priorities:
Towards our closest neighbour Australia, I should like to say
this. Our security in many fields is interlocked with each
other. In this context the Indonesian people do not understand
why the Australian government harbours aspirations towards West
Irian. Either in terms of defence or economics, Indonesia as a
whole is far more important for Australia than the territory of West Irian alone. 2
Casey's other diplomatic labors from 1951 to 1957 were directed towards the United Kingdom and the United States. The Dutch also consistently approached the United Kingdom where they gained some support, but their approaches to the United States were less successful, for while they received a sympathetic hearing, the United States assumed a studiously neutral position in public. The Dutch case for United States
support was based on the strategic importance of West New Guinea to the 3
Western alliance, and on its status as a N.A.T.O. power. Yet the
Indonesians argued to the United States in 1951 that Indonesian control
of West New Guinea was essential to their political stability and this 4
was accepted by the United States at least in part. There were divided
counsels within the State Department,123*5 but for the United States, West
New Guinea was a minor, irritating problem, and United States involvement would only occur to restrain the adversaries from escalating the quarrel.
1 C.N., Vol. 28, No. 3, 1957, p. 245. 2 Ibid, No. 11, November 1957, p. 912.
3 Fifield, op cit., p. 354.
Casey, op cit., p. 56. Fifield, op cit., p. 354.
Australia's diplomatic efforts to gain great power support on her own and on behalf of the Dutch were a minor theme in the major
diplomatic concourse. In November 1951, in a conversation with an
American diplomat in Amsterdam, Casey was informed that the State Department was unwilling to back the Dutch because of a belief that "unless the present Indonesian government can 'get' West Irian, they may be replaced by a more radical and leftist government".^ Casey commented that this did not ring true to him, and perhaps American commercial
2
considerations, particularly in oil, may have been more important.
In spite of considerable efforts in the next few years, the
Americans remained publicly neutral,*23 456 consistently abstaining from votes
on the issue in the United Nations. This stance worked to the benefit of
the Dutch by preserving the status quo. Even in the Commonwealth, Casey
could only count on the public support of the "old" members, the newer countries either being partisans for Indonesia or unwilling to publicly oppose what
4
Pakistan's Foreign Minister called Indonesia's "oriental imperailism". As
a matter of tactics, Casey was thus unable to point in his public statements
to any strong degree of diplomatic support for Australia's position. Only
5