Relación entre las actitudes y el rendimiento académico

This assertion of relative independence was coupled with an inclination to see Australian interests perhaps better served by the United States

than Britain.

Spender was also ambitious and though on good personal terms with Menzies, was frequently in conflict with him over questions of

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policy in Cabinet, and on matters of preferment for office. Spender

believed that he had not achieved the position due to him in terms of his ability, as Deputy Prime Minister, in line for succession as Prime

Minister. Menzies clearly saw him as a rival and was wary of giving Spender preferment. With the return of the Liberal party to power in 1949, Menzies had consolidated his position as leader of the Liberal party. Although there was some dissatisfaction in the party with Menzies'

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leadership, it seemed clear that Menzies would be in the saddle for the

foreseeable future. There was thus no opportunity for an aspiring

successor to unseat Menzies. In Spender's case, while the portfolio of

External Affairs was one which interested him, it had less prestige relative to that of the Treasurer and the Prime Minister, and there was small chance of a change in this situation given Fadden's tenure of the

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Treasury. It was however for health reasons that Spender decided to

retire from politics in April 1951 and on Menzies' suggestion go to Washington as Australian Ambassador to the United States.

One of Spender's first acts as Minister for External Affairs was to go to Colombo for a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in

early January 1950. He took the opportunity, while staying with

President Sukarno in Djakarta on the way to Colombo, to make it clear to Sukarno that Australia was unsympathetic to the Indonesian claim to West

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New Guinea. To give point to his stand, Spender subsequently recalled

Mr J. Hood, the newly appointed Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, to

g

Canberra for consultations. Many Indonesians, who had relied on

1 Ibid, p. 21, 5 October 1938. 2 See ibid, p. 93, p. 227 ff. 2 Ibid, p. 301. 4 Ibid, p. 300 ff. 5 Ibid, p. 287. Ibid, p. 287. 6

Australia's support in the later years of their independence struggle, were taken aback by Spender's opposition."**"

Spender himself at this early stage believed that Sukarno was the prime mover in the claim and expected that the Indonesians would

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eventually abandon it. Spender's view of Sukarno at this time is of some interest because it presaged what was to become a conventional view of Sukarno in Australia. Spender found Sukarno

to be a man of handsome appearance and great personal magnetism: he had, and to a great degree, what journalists (somewhat

tediously) refer to as "charisma". He had other characteristics including a lusty penchant for attractive young women. Withal he was one of the greatest demagogues of this century. He was a most persuasive individual, and to me, very pleasant company, yet he was a supreme adventurer, without scruple. 3

Soon after his visit to Indonesia, Spender wrote to the 4

government of the Netherlands in February 1950. He argued that

Australia's interests in West New Guinea were no less vital than those in East New Guinea and asked for an exchange of views with the Netherlands in view of these interests. He foreshadowed that the Australian govern­ ment might wish to assist the Netherlands in the administration,

development and defence of West New Guinea and further that if the

Netherlands government were so inclined, the Australian government would be prepared to consider even more fundamental proposals on the future of the territory. Spender added that the political and economic stability of the United States of Indonesia was also vital to Australia, but that the inclusion of West New Guinea in the U.S.I. would not add to this, rather it would result in a major weakness in strategic planning.

Australia, he concluded, would have profound misgivings over any transfer to the U.S.I.

In this approach to the Dutch, Spender considered that, if the Dutch were to continue in West New Guinea in the face of Indonesian pressure, the primary benefit would accrue to Australia. Thus Australia

"*" Mackie, op cit., p. 283. 2

Interview 30 March 1973. 3

Spender, Politics and a M an, p. 287. 4

*The letter is contained in the Netherlands Archives: Archief van het ministerie van buitenlandse zaken (Archief B.Z.) 912.3.

Nederland Nieuw Guinea. Australisch standpunt, decl. I 1949-1950. See also L. Metzemaekers, "The West New Guinea Problem", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, June 1951, p. 140, where a similar offer appeared

should support the Dutch. But more than that, the adumbration of even more fundamental proposals for the future of the territory may have meant either trusteeship (either under the Dutch or Australians or jointly) or perhaps transfer to Australia, the former being the more likely. Spender may have been too premature here for the liking of the Dutch who had undertaken negotiations with the Indonesians, but the implication of some future arrangement possibly leading to a united New Guinea cannot be discounted.

This letter to the Dutch clearly shows a continuity between Evatt's views in the 1940s and Spender's in early 1950, even in so far as the reference to defence recalls Evatt's concern to include the Netherlands in any regional defence arrangement.1 The Dutch apparently did not pursue Spender's suggestions at this time, perhaps because of the delicate diplomatic situation in regard to Indonesia, but also because

their policy position was not yet resolved. The significance of the letter lies in Spender's taking the initiative on co-operation in New Guinea which later was to become one of the recurring themes in Dutch- Australian diplomacy.

This initiative was predominantly Spender's, as apparently no departmental advice was sought nor Cabinet approval obtained, although

it is likely that the Prime Minister was consulted. Spender has referred in his recent book to a body of opinion in the Department of External Affairs "that thought that Australia's policy should be directed

exclusively to the maintenance and preservation of friendly relations between Australia and Indonesia: that the West New Guinea dispute was

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no concern of ours" . Spender further noted that this view was still asserting itself in the years to 1957 when he was at Washington. This conflict of views within his Department did not unduly worry Spender, for his predilictions were towards following his own course in making

decisions. In any case, he had on his hands a much more serious conflict with Dr John Burton, Secretary to the Department, over the whole direct­ ion of Australian foreign policy in which Burton was opposing Spender's

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attempts to achieve a defence pact with the United States. Yet by mid- 1950, Burton was no longer Secretary of the Department, having gone on

George, op cit., 1973, p. 305. Spender, op cit., p. 298.

See P.C. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 27 ff, see also Burton, The Alternative, p. 73.

leave prior to his appointment as High Commissioner to Ceylon. His place was taken by Mr Alan Watt, whose views on policy Spender found much more congenial.1

In the early months of 1950, Spender was under considerable pressure both in Parliament and by the press to state publicly

Australia's position on the issue. While he had been active diplomat­ ically, it seemed that a definitive statement of Australia's position would have to await the outcome of negotiations then under way between

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