In the following passage, Gutmann and Thompson state what sets their theory apart from others, including Rawls’s:
Deliberative democracy, in contrast, admits reasons and principles that are suitable for actual societies, which all still suffer from dis- crimination and other kinds of injustice. Actual deliberation has
an important advantage over hypothetical agreement: it encour- ages citizens to face up to their actual problems by listening to one another’s moral claims rather than concluding (on the basis of only a thought experiment) that their fellow citizens would agree with them on all matters of justice if they were all living in an ideal society.(Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 16)
Recall that in §2.2, the objection was raised that Rawls’s idealizations com- promised the applicability of his theory to actual societies. Because Gutmann and Thompson’s theory is grounded in actual discourse in actual societies, it avoids this problem.
Two other epistemic advantages result from Gutmann and Thompson’s insistence on actual public discourse about political issues. First, engaging in actual public discourse may correct people’s beliefs that their positions on political issues are uncontroversial. As discussed in the previous chapter, unless people engage in dialogue with others, and discuss their values and beliefs with others, they may mistakenly believe that few if any others disagree with them. Discussing political issues with others, then, may show people that there are those who object to their views.
The other epistemic advantage of actual public discourse is that the objec- tions others have may bring to people’s attention mistakes or problems in their reasoning. In other words, they may realize that others disagree for reasons that change a person’s own view about the issue at hand. These mistakes may be errors in their reasoning process, such as making a bad inference that does not follow from the facts that they believe are true. Or actual discourse may strengthen people’s positions by exposing the uncertainty or falsity of beliefs that underlie their positions.
Gutmann and Thompson argue that beliefs about citizens’ acceptance of po- litical decisions is only justified once that belief has been tested in a process that fulfils their deliberative democratic principles. Imagining oneself with interlocutors will not do as a substitute for actual dialogue with others, to determine whether citizens are satisfied with current institutions. For, all too often, people wrongly assume that others think as they do about things, and they fail to see the errors in their reasoning that discourse with others could bring to light.
Deliberative democracy is committed to making political decisions through deliberative public discussion wherever possible. However, because their the- ory rests most fundamentally on public deliberation to make and justify polit- ical decisions, they acknowledge that they face the following question: “How is it possible for a theory to propose substantive principles to assess laws while regarding citizens as the final moral judges of the laws they make?”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 111) That is, their commitment to public deliberation to make and justify laws raises the question: how should we settle disagree- ment between citizens about the principles of deliberation, their implications for institutional design, or a particular political decision that results from a deliberative democratic process?
Gutmann and Thompson respond that the principles of deliberative democ- racy “are morally and politically provisional in ways that leave them open to challenge, and therefore more amenable to democratic discretion.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 111) They recognize that there will be disagreement about what the principles of deliberative democracy mean in theory and in practice. But the point of their theory is to bring all such disagreement to
the fore, and to emphasize that citizens deserve an opportunity to voice their deliberative views about all levels of politics. Not only should they be able to voice their views on particular issues, such as abortion or public health insur- ance, they should also have a say in how citizens should participate in politics and how institutions should be structured.
Gutmann and Thompson describe their account as a “second-order the- ory,” as opposed to a first-order theory. First-order theories, according to Gutmann and Thompson (2004, 126), are those that “seek to resolve moral disagreement by rejecting alternative theories or principles with which they conflict.” The principles of a first-order theory are meant to resolve political conflict by showing that it is better than any of the other alternatives. A first-order theory may be judged as better or worse according to how well it resolves the particular problem with which we are grappling, as well as how well it is able to generalize over a variety of cases, or to be extended to other issues we may face.
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, on the other hand, is a second-order theory. As they describe it, their theory “can be held consistently without rejecting any of a wide range of moral principles expressed by first-order the- ories.”(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004, 126) Their theory is meant to provide a framework for evaluating reasons that people have for holding particular views about political issues, even though individuals may disagree about their commitments at the first-order level.
Deliberative democracy thereby respects the depths to which citizens may disagree based on their moral differences. A political theory that is suitable for a liberal democracy should not reject the principles that some people may
hold as right for resolving political issues. Deliberative democracy respects this pluralism since people may bring their disagreements about this – i.e., disagreement about first-order theories – to political discussions. Deliberative democracy seems to have the advantage over Rawls’s theory as it was out- lined in the last chapter then. Critics, including Gutmann and Thompson, charged Rawls’s theory with unjustifiedly excluding or imposing certain ways of decision-making, such as self-interested reasoning, or reasoning based on the common good. According to Gutmann and Thompson, all of this is open for deliberative discussion among citizens who are to be treated as equals.
As a result of the room that deliberative democracy leaves for disagreement about first-order theories, determining what deliberative democracy implies for any particular case will not be a matter of straightforward application of the principles. The principles of deliberative democracy (which follow in the next section) are not meant to provide an algorithm for resolving issues. Deliberative democracy is meant to be fundamentally flexible, and based on what best meets the demands of the particular society.
Which principles should be used or emphasized is to be determined by those who are significantly involved and affected by the decision (who I will refer to as “stakeholders”). In some cases, they may rely more heavily on some principles, and not draw on others much if at all. In each case, the parties involved are to engage in the reason-giving process with others, and to evaluate each reason without rejecting any of them out of hand. In the remainder of this chapter, I will present the principles that are fundamentally essential to deliberative democracy, according to Gutmann and Thompson.