CONCLUSIONS

The Transcaucasus has been a region of vital strategic interest to Russia since the 7^th century. After two centuries of competition between Persia and Ottoman Turkey for influence in the region, the area was absorbed into the Tsarist Russian Empire in the 19^th century. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the three republics of the Caucasus,

Russia, which dominated the region for nearly 200 years, considers it the most vital part of its national security and calls it the “backyard” of its country.

The interests of Tsarist Russia were originally geopolitical and strategic, i.e.

geopolitically the Caucasus has a unique role as a natural barrier for Russia with its Muslim rivals, and secondly economic, because Baku evolved during the second half of the 19^th century into one of the world’s most important oil resources. These Russian advantages have remained constant and are still relevant today.¹⁵⁴

However, factors such as weak management, security problems, a crisis in the racial-religious groups, economic problems, poverty, joblessness and unsuccessful rivalry with the west have caused vital parts of the Trans-Caucasus to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Only Armenia remains as the last secure bastion in the Caucasus region. This has forced Russia to pay far too much attention to Armenia as a strategic ally and to protect and help the Armenians, especially in the NK conflict.

Unlike in the early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, from 1992 the Moscow authorities made efforts to present a harmonious picture to the West, but it was not long before geopolitical realities put paid to this image. Robert Barlyski’s “From Atlanticist Idealism to Eurasian Realism” found expression inter alia in the shift away from a concentration on relations with the West towards assigning greater importance to Russia’s evolving policy towards Turkey and Iran.¹⁵⁵ Most newly independent states were grouped under the organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for a variety

of reasons but especially because of pressure from Russia. The Russian authorities compared their presence and interests in the neighbouring republics to the role and position of the US in Central America. In fact, they talked about a kind of “Russian Monroe”. According to this, Moscow intends to act as a stabilizer and redresser of the balance between the republics separated from the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁶ Thus, according to the Russians, the separated republics of the Soviet Union were to remain under Russia’s sphere of influence. It should be noted that the Russian Monroe Doctrine is based on the following guidelines:

 To protect Russian minorities beyond the framework defined by

international law, which includes recognizing Russia’s right to support those Russian minorities who live in the independent states of the region;

recognizing equal rights for Russian-speaking residents in the republics;

accepting dual citizenship for them and also the equality of the Russian language and the native languages in the republics.

 To support the traditional economic union as a lever exerting economic pressure to achieve political goals.

 To continue paying the enormous subsidy (despite internal problems) and

even offering sums greater than Russia’s financial aid during the years before 1989, so that while Russia herself would receive just 10 billion dollars from western sources in 1992, the Commonwealth States and the Caucasus would collect a sum of 17 billion dollars credit from Russia.¹⁵⁷

 To protect Russia’s interests in the oil and gas fields by controlling the pipelines and communications and by preventing the creation of parallel transportation routes.

 To use military intervention in the form of peacekeeping forces in the racial and political conflicts of the region.

 To warn foreign countries not to interfere in Russia’s sphere of influence.¹⁵⁸

It is clear that to Russia, the position of the Caucasus is different from that of other parts of the region. It is called “the heart of Russia” because of its geopolitical importance and the special role it fulfils in Russia’s national security as its natural southern border. Thus it is imperative for the Russians to implement their ‘Monroe Doctrine’ with more sensitivity and precision in the Caucasus.

Consequently Russia has designated the Caucasus as part of its domain and announced explicitly that Moscow has vital interests there. Over the last few years the Russians have resorted to using political, economic and military leverage to extend their influence in the region. The Trans-Caucasus has been a zone of vital strategic interest to Russia since the 17^th century.

However, the real reason for Russia’s power and influence must not be attributed entirely to re-establishing its past Empire, but relates to interests and concerns created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite economic and political problems, Russia has a strong interest in maintaining

and developing its influence in the region. A few of the reasons are listed below:

Strategic and Security Considerations

The Caucasus enjoys high strategic priority for Russia, since its concern about the region springs from economic considerations and relates to the protection of its identity. In fact, Russia’s policy in Chechnya showed that it is prepared to resort to military measures to maintain its security and integrity.

Thus the sensitivity towards foreign and neighbouring regions and the recourse to similar actions to preserve its security in the region are predictable. Russia is aware that the Caucasus has a vital role in the perpetuation of the Russian Federation, so any unusual developments there are regarded as tantamount to putting the security and territorial integrity of the state at risk.

As for the importance of the Caucasus, in creating and consolidating its security doctrine Russia has made every effort to take advantage of the crisis in the Caucasus to develop its influence and to strengthen its bases and military presence. Furthermore, through actions such as developing strike forces, organizing frontier guards and establishing new military bases in the Caucasus, it has made its military presence more powerful.¹⁵⁹

Economic Considerations

The Caucasus is also vital for Russia in economic terms and the main issue is “oil”. Russia views its hegemony as essential to allow the exploitation of natural resources such as oil and gas from the Caspian.¹⁶⁰ Oil is important to Russians in three ways: first, the Russian oil structure ties in with this region;

second, the presence of foreign elements during the exploitation and exploration operations; and third, the position of oil exploitation in supplying the international markets.¹⁶¹

The Caucasus Transportation Role for Russia

The Caucasus is a key corridor and transportation route linking Russia to the sea. In some ways this is a strategic advantage. Firstly Russia, unlike the Soviet Union, has a limited shoreline on the Black Sea; secondly, the Black Sea joins the Mediterranean by way of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles;

and thirdly, the Caucasus is the key to Russian relations with the Middle East.

In comparison to the Soviet Union, Russia has less influence and power in the Middle East. However, it has interests there, and the Caucasus provides key access to that area.¹⁶²

Russians’ Racial Ties in the Region

The presence of about 25 million Russians in the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, who occupy sensitive positions, is an important factor in

maintaining Russian influence in the region. Thus supporting Russian citizens and their interests is very important to Russia.¹⁶³

To Fill the Power Vacuum

The collapse of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in the region. It caused the regional and supra-regional states to make extensive efforts to exert influence in the area considered by the Russians to be a vital component of their interests, creating an intolerable situation for Russia. Through political, economic and military means, Russia showed an interest in dominating the region. The remarks of Boris Yeltsin at the beginning of 1994 were an example of this attempt to fill the power vacuum: “Historically and economically we are joined so that in practice we cannot live separately and we all share the same destiny.”¹⁶⁴

It is clear that Russia has had different goals and interests in the region at various times: both in the short- and the long-term, for instance by using economic or political tools to impose its influence on neighbouring Asian countries and states in strategic and economic positions, such as Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Even after the evacuation of their army from the area, the maintenance of a significant military presence must be considered a long-term strategic goal for the Russians.¹⁶⁵

Russia’s relations with the former republics, i.e. the newly independent states during recent years clearly show the constant efforts made by Moscow to

retain an all-out connection and to create and foster a new network of mutual relations. At the same time, by using this effective lever it has always sought to confront the influence of outsiders in the region.¹⁶⁶ Russia’s prevention of Turkey from intervening in the NK conflict and its warning that military intervention in the Caucasus by Turkey might lead to World War III shows that Russia does not tolerate the interference of other states in a region it considers its own domain. For example, Mikhail Demurin, the spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated in 1992 that Russia was responsible for establishing peace and stability in the region, as well as improving the living conditions of the people who lived either in Russia or in the neighbouring states, while preserving their territorial integrity.¹⁶⁷

As for Russia’s leverage, the state uses various forms of enforcement in the region, the most important and effective of which is military pressure.

Considering that Russia possesses the greatest army and military might in the area, and that the newly independent republics lack the necessary power to protect their borders, this is the most significant lever and the main tool for developing Russian foreign policy within the CIS community. While international and regional organizations avoid areas of crisis and conflict, Russia maintains a presence in the region to increase its credit and influence, even though it may suffer losses and casualties.¹⁶⁸ Not only does the Red Army protect the borders of these republics, but it is also deployed in all the sensitive locations inside these states. This military cooperation is based on a mutual agreement signed by Russia and each of the republics in the locality.¹⁶⁹ It is evident that any movement that is in the least contradictory to

Russia’s interests will be severely suppressed. The most obvious examples of Russia’s military intervention in the area include its naked presence in Tajikistan, its military interference in the NK conflict, and its support for Abkhazian separatists in Georgia. In addition, Russia is active in countries which have no intention of joining the CIS Union or fail to follow Russia’s regional policy, and it has used these instruments whenever required.¹⁷⁰

The economic structure and ties with the republics are other significant mechanisms on which Russia relies to keep these republics dependent.

When the economic system of the Soviet Union was united and interdependent and the republics were not able to enter the global market because of monetary problems, they had to create economic links within their former union. Thus all these republics need each other and depend on Russia as the heart of their unity. Under present conditions, the foundation of economic and productive business lies in Russia and the lines of communication - railways, roads and pipelines - end up there. Controlling the economy of the republics is in the hands of the Russians and they use it to augment their influence.

Political policy is another tool that serves Russian diplomacy in the region.

Russia has been successful in creating a political apparatus in these states by supporting Russian-oriented statesmen and the former communist authorities in the republics and helping them to gain positions of power.

Another practice that Russia uses to strengthen its influence in the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus is the threat to break up the territory of the republics that have been separated. Russia has an undeniable presence in the crisis regions that want to withdraw from the republics, such as Abkhazia and Northern Ossetia in the Republic of Georgia. Examples of Russia’s interference in the affairs of regional states are the riots in Dinstain located in the Republic of Moldova, the Crimean trouble in the Ukraine, the NK crisis and the provocation of the tribes and nationalities residing in Azerbaijan like the Talysh, as well as the inhabitants of Khojand (the second largest city of Tajikistan), who have shown separatist and autonomous tendencies. Russia threatens them with the disintegration of their country in order to ensure that they agree with Russia’s regional policies.¹⁷¹

Against this background, we can examine Russia’s role in the NK conflict.

Russia’s Position regarding the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict

During the past decade, the crisis has been an important arena demonstrating Russia’s regional policy. It has provided Russia with a pretext to force the parties in dispute to conform to its interests. Russia thereby prevents regional and supra-regional outsiders from implementing their plans in Azerbaijan and Armenia during the peace process. At the same time, the western outsiders who are aware of this have made every endeavor to wrest this tool from Russia’s hands. Thus the NK conflict has become an important arena in which to analyse the interests of Russia and the West.

The hypothesis that the NK conflict serves Russia’s diplomacy in the region, and for that reason it does not seek to settle the conflict and establish peace and stability there, is widely accepted by analysts. Most analysts believe that despite the many efforts that have apparently been made by the Russians to resolve the NK conflict, Russia herself is an obstacle towards achieving peace between the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, because all the measures carried out by different states and organizations to establish a ceasefire have been aborted by Russia, whose objective in the conflict is to safeguard its own interests in the region.¹⁷²

An analysis of Russia’s policies regarding NK reveals the following:

 Russia refrains officially from accepting either the annexation of NK by

Armenia or its independence. It calls for the keeping of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

 Russia, as one of the three chairmen of the Minsk group, is officially

obliged to act as a neutral peacekeeper in respect of the NK crisis.

Therefore Russia’s backing of Armenia cannot be interpreted as official support for Armenia over the NK crisis, but is due to its desire to establish friendly ties with a member of the CIS in order to promote peace in the region. Besides, Russia does not intend to champion the separation of NK from Azerbaijan by promoting Armenia.

 The Russian authorities are trying to prevent their relations with Azerbaijan from being unnecessarily spoiled because of their granting aid to the Armenians. Otherwise Russia’s presence in the peace process

would be denied and this would mean an arena of no competition for the West.

 At present, Russia may intend to obstruct the NK dispute in order to

confuse the Republic of Azerbaijan into entering a security scheme and to show the regional conditions as critical. In this way Russia can justify its presence in Armenia and also the need to bring back its troops to Azerbaijan to restore security there.

It should be mentioned that the Russian stance on the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia does not follow the same process. In fact the posture adopted by Russia regarding the NK conflict depends upon its interests, internal developments in the region, and the attitudes and perspectives of outsiders. Thus in order to explain Russia’s position precisely, it is necessary to analyze separately its behaviour towards Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Russia’s Position regarding the Republic of Armenia

Throughout history Armenia has played a special role in preparing the ground for Russians expansionism in the Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus. Russia therefore has a historically positive approach towards the Armenians. In all the wars over the Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus involving Russia, Armenia has welcomed it and indeed actively helped it, especially in the war against the Ottomans and Iran. Moreover, Armenians fought side by side with Russian troops on the battlefields of the Crimean war (1768-1774) and their officers showed courage in the mid 19^th century wars in the northern

Caucasus and Dagestan, which led to Russian dominance over those regions.¹⁷³ Because of its historical loyalty towards the Russians, the Republic of Armenia, on independence, strenuously tried to attract Moscow’s attention regarding its role and their old special relationship, while taking into account Russia’s fundamental security and military and economic weaknesses. Of the three Trans-Caucasian Soviet successor states, Armenia has proved the most amenable to building a reasonably harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia within the parameters of the CIS.¹⁷⁴ It was one of the first states to become a member of the union of the CIS and it never intended to reject the Russians or to suspend its dependency on them (Armenia became a member of the CIS on 26 December 1991, and on 15 May 1992, it signed the Tashkent agreement.)¹⁷⁵

For Armenia, in a region where security is a luxury, Russia’s role in ensuring it is critical. This is why Armenia accepts the basing of Russian forces on its soil and the patrolling of its borders with Turkey and Iran.¹⁷⁶ During the past decade the Armenians have tried to increase their cooperation with Russia.

One US commentator has gone so far as to describe this as a patron-client relationship.¹⁷⁷ However, although the two states have become strategically allied, the author believes that Armenia worries about the potential loss of Russian support because of a long-term involvement with Azerbaijan and Turkey. But as mentioned before, for reasons such as military dependency during the conflict with Azerbaijan and a growing distrust of Turkey, and because Armenia was economically heavily dependent on Russia for fuel, raw materials for industry and basic foods, it was inclined to be

pro-Russian.¹⁷⁸ It was when the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted a right-about-face policy towards Russian interests during this period that it inclined to the West and Turkey. The Azeris openly excluded the Russians from their country by entrusting the Caspian Sea resources to Western companies, paving the way for Russia to support Armenia overtly in the NK conflict. This political aid for the Armenians sometimes resulted in Russia’s blatant interference in the NK conflict against the Azeris. It has been claimed, for

pro-Russian.¹⁷⁸ It was when the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted a right-about-face policy towards Russian interests during this period that it inclined to the West and Turkey. The Azeris openly excluded the Russians from their country by entrusting the Caspian Sea resources to Western companies, paving the way for Russia to support Armenia overtly in the NK conflict. This political aid for the Armenians sometimes resulted in Russia’s blatant interference in the NK conflict against the Azeris. It has been claimed, for