The second signs of a new Indonesian policy came in aggressive newspaper stance on the East Timor issue in the Indonesian press. One of the strongest expressions of this was to be found in the Indonesian Times in
132
October 197 4 . “ In general terms it stated that an independent East Timor would endanger the stability and security of the South East Asian region. At the same time an* army newspaper Berita Yudha repor ted the growth
133
of ’communist activities’ in East Timor. These arguments are interlinked and became important as the government’s policy developed. They are analysed in the next section.
In early 1975 , an editorial in the New7 Standard developed an argument for Indonesia’s claims to East Timor along geographic and ethnic l i n e s . T h i s
statement was reported to have been an accurate reflection °f the views of Lt. General Ali Mur tope, then deputy
chief of Indonesian intelligence (BAKIN) and special 130
131 an. 132 133
S^traits Times , 4 December 1974 .
Dunn, op.cit., p.28. This has been confirmed from alternative source.
For example Indonesian Times, 23 October 1974. Sydney Mo rn ing Her aft d , 17 Oc tober 19 74.
134
eacrer to devise a w a y to make E a s t Tirrtor Indo n e s i a ' s 27th P r o v i n c e .
It was n o t e w o r t h y that the views of the Indo n e s i a n Times and the N e w S t a n dard w e r e n o t u n i v e r s a l l y held in Indonesia. That K o m p a s was p r e p a r e d to urge that Indonesia should not i n t e r f e r e in E a s t Tim o r indicated strong mil i t a r y b a c k i n g for an a l t e r n a t i v e position. Some m i litary a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w e r e aware that the relatively u n d e r d e v e l o p e d E a s t Tim o r w o u l d pose new burdens for the Republic, and w e r e not c o n v i n c e d of the dangers that an i n d e p e n d e n t state wTould pose.
The anti i n d e p e n d e n c e line was f i r m l y e n t r e n c h e d by action s u p p l e m e n t a r y to m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y a s s o c i a t e d with the invasion scare of late F e b r u a r y 1975. F r o m 2 M a r c h all journ a l i s t s w e r e b a r r e d f r o m In d o n e s i a n Timor because of the ’sen s i t i v e s i t u a t i o n ’ , and ail
138
reports were c h a n n e l l e d t h r o u g h Ant a r a . This
information b l a c k o u t w a s u sed to safeguard I n donesian options. After the i m m e d i a t e p r o s p e c t of an i nvasion had subsided P e l i ta r e p o r t e d M a l i k as aga i n suggesting that while the g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d r e s p e c t w n a t e v e r d e c i s i o n
the people of E a s t T i m o r made in an act of self d e t e r m ination, should something h a p p e n w h i c h d i r e c t l y d i s t u r b e d Indonesia's 135
Sydney M o rning__ H e r a 1 d , 25 F e b r u a r y 1975,
1 5 ' Michael R i c h ardson, in the A g e , 2 9 ^October 1974. Murtopo was o t h e r w i s e b e s t k n o w n tor his i n v o l v e m e n t
in the 1969 W e s t Irian A c t of F r e e C h o i c e or M u s a j a w a r a h , and m o r e rec e n t l y for his h a n d in the Jakarta riots^
of January 1974, w h i c h w e r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h tne v i s i c of the Japanese P.M. T a n a k a (see E. Utrecht, ’R ecent Conflicts Inside the I n d o n e s i a n A r m y ’ , J o u r n a l of Contemoorary Asia, V o 1.4, No . 3 , 19 74 , pp. 3 24-3 5) . It was "during r he” a f t e r m a t h of the J a n u a r y riots that Murtopo fell t e m p o r a r i l y from grace. The E a s t Timor
issue was re c o g n i z e d at an e a r l y stage as a means, apparently successful, of r e s t o r i n g his position. 137
Canberra Times, 29 S e p t e m b e r 1974. 138
security, it w e n t w i t hout saying that Indonesia wou l d 139
p a r t i c i p a t e in responsibility. This was a thinly
d i s guised w a r n i n g intimating d i r e c t Indonesian invo l v e m e n t if Indonesian interests were n e t adequately safeguarded.
II
I n d o n e s i a ’s Timor po l i c y r e c e i v e d more d e f i n i t i o n w h e n in September 1975 P r e s i d e n t Soeharto outlined the salient features of I n d o n e s i a ’s foreign po l i c y as it related to E a s t Timor. He d r e w attention to the importance of an i n d e p e n d e n t foreign po l i c y
serving national interests, to the importance of r egional stability (and in this context the role of ASEAN)
and thirdly to I n d o n e s i a ’s o b l i a a t i o n to assist n a t i o n s 140
seeking their independence. This can be seen as a bro a d framev;ork wi t h i n w h i c h the Indonesian stance on E a s t Timor can be discussed.
A t the outset attention n e e d s to be focused
on the concept of n a t ional r e s i l i e n c e . To quote Whitlam: * This embodies and a r t i c u l a t e s the
experi e n c e of the I n d o n e s i a n struggle for i n d ependence and of subsequent efforts to d efend the i n t e g r i t y of the Indone s i a n R e public f rom internal and external t h r e a t .141
The concept embodies eco n o m i c and cultural, as well as m i l i t a r y e lements and is d e s i g n e d to improve d e f e n c e and security. To the t r a d i t i o n a l e xperiences S o e h a r t o added and d e v e l o p e d a fervent anti communist ideology. The concept of n a t i o n a l r e s i 1 ience b r i n g s together these elements. It is the fra m e w o r k w h i c h supports
and, through the m a c h i n e r y of government, seeks to m a i n t a i n the unity of the Indone s i a n state. A l t h o u g h its a p p l i c a b i l i t y 139
Pe'lita, 19 M a r c h 1975. 140
K o m p a s , 11 Sep tember 19 7 5.
A u s t ralia's F o r e i g n Policy: N e w Directions, N e w p £ f i n i t i o n s , cp.cit., p.ll.
is first and foremost to Indonesia, Indonesia believes that the concept can be developed to have broader
regional appeal(manifested through Indonesian support for ASEAN). Ultimately, in the area of security, it seeks regional solutions to regional problems. With this background the East Timor problem can be discussed more directly.
By the end or 1974 reasons for Indonesian opposition to an independent East Timor had solidified into two
broad areas:
(i) How would a small independent state affect regional stability? Would it induce big powers (and in particular communist powers such as PRC and USSR) into the area?
(ii) How would a small independent state affect internal stability? What affect would it
have on provincial separatism within Indonesia? Underlying both these themes was, inter alia, the
fear of communism - the fear of the resurgence of
communism in Indonesia, and the infiltration of communism into the ASEAN region. Both themes need examination. The proposition that an independent East Timor would increase regional instability is examined first.
A major Indonesian fear was that an independent East Timor would create a power vacuum, with the potential outcome being big power involvement.^^ Hypothetically,one could imagine the establishment of a 'puppet’ state, or at least a hostile military base in East Timor. The relevant question is whether the tnreat was more than hypothetical. An answer requires a brief examination of both Soviet and Chinese relations "rth Indonesia.^ ^
142
See Michael Richardson in the Sydney Morning Herald, March 1975 and 26 August 1975.
143
Despite Indonesia’s non aligned position no fear has ~ v7&r been expressed about possible US involvement in East
This slant indicates that- it is communist big powers, - -ner than big powers per se that are the problem.
Relations between the USSR and Indonesia while' being cordial are far from close; this reflects
Indonesian reserve towards the Soviet Union resulting from the Soviet attitude to the Soeharto regime during the 1960s, and Indonesia's attitude to communism.
The USSR, however, has shown no interest in alienating itself any further from such an important member of
the non aligned community. Late in 1975 it actually
agreea to help build several hydroelectric power plants and to continue several aid projects which were abandoned half completed when the Soviet Union withdrew its
technicians in 1965.144 Soviet relations have now been put back onto a R ealpolitik basis. It is worth briefly
examining w h e m e r the USSR had any strategic interest in East Timor.
xhe first point that needs to be made is that if tne Soviet Union was interested, it wouldhave attempted to ferment trouble long ago. The fact of the matter is, and the Soviet's lack of interest in the Timor
debate at the UN attests to this, that the USSR has
little direct interest in the region. The Soviet N a v y ’s Indian Ocean and Pacific fleets have adequate access to ports more immediately accessible to the major Soviet areas of interest.
The second point is that East Timor has no suitable harbour facilities or ports which could be upgraded
to meet the requirements of the Soviet Navy, if they inceed had any interest in East T i m o r . 4
It would not have been characteristic of Soviet
~ -'** p o l i c y , given Indonesia's close, interests j n
Timor'to have risked an important and improving b ^ a t e r a l tie for influence in a new state whose future
Politics were anything but predictable. The prospect Soviet involvement in East Timor was then, slight.
pp.l9il]_92Stern Economic Review, A sia. Yearbook, 1977 ,
145
Discussions with J.S. Dunn.
China had, in the past, o f f e r e d b o t h r h e t o r i c a l and material s u p port for n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t s However in the case of E a s t Timor two factors c o unter- bala n c e d this threat.
Firstly, there were c o n s i d e r a t i o n s con n e c t e d w i t h S i n o -Soviet r i v alry in the region. C h i n a ’s r e l a t i o n s with Indonesia w e r e little b e t t e r t h a n being in a
state of deep freeze; C h i n a w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e l u c t a n t to risk a complete bre a k d o w n of its r e l a t i o n s w i t h Indonesia, fearing that S oviet i n f l u e n c e m i g h t g r o w d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y .
S e c o n d l y , w h i l e speaking f o r t h r i g h t l y of its u nderstanding and support for the F R E T I L I N m o v e m e n t it has never o f f e r e d m a t e r i e l support. C h i n a regards the E ast Timorese wa r of l i b e r a t i o n as a p e o p l e ' s struggle and as such is b e s t c o n d u c t e d from within, and n o t w i t h outside s u p p o r t . 146
As a corollary to the above a r g u m e n t s which, indicate vn,v tne likelihood of any bic power i n v o l v e m e n t in
East Timor a ppeared remote, one can argue that the prospect of a proxy; i n v o l v e m e n t u s i n g a third party, as in Angola, is also remote. There are no int e r e s t s to protect m East Timor as there w e r e in Africa. The overriding con s i d e r a t i o n in East T i m o r was m a i n t a i n i n g relations w i t h Indonesia at a w o r k a b l e level.
The second fear r e l a t e d no t to b i g p o w e r i n v o l v e m e n t P ~r S e ' but to ties a left win<d g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t have
" XGl f° reign s t a t e s * N o t o nly did I n d o n e s i a see F R E T I L I N ' S
,Gft V'lng links w i t h L l £ b°n to be a p o t e n t i a l problem,
Xt * lso regarded the C h i n e s e m i n o r i t y in E a s t T i mor
* lth SOirie trepidation. In d o n e s i a e n v i s a g e d a left w i n g