h im to request Dingane "to open the port of Sabusse in order
that we ma y buy cattle on account of that which he ZDingane[I7
sends us dying at the arrival, in consequence of the long
journey") (112), and by 1835, when Gardiner met the Swazi
messengers at Mgundgundlovo, they were once again tributary to
the Zulu (113). A few months later the situation took a further
(109) Stuart and Malcolm, D i a r y , 165-6. (110) I b i d , 164.
(111) Lye, ’Ndebele K i n g d o m ’, 91-2; G. Liesegang, 'Dingane’s attack on L o u r e ^ o Marques in 1833', Journal of African H i s t o r y , X,4, (1969), 565-579.
(112) K.C.L., F.P., F y n n ’s letters, Vol. I., A.J. Noble to ..., 10 Oct. 1834, (Noble is a misprint for Nobre’; personal communication, David H e d g e s ) .
63
turn for the worse. Eight years had elapsed since the last Zulu
attack, and these had been put by the Swazi, to almost too good
effect. They had become prosperous and strong, or so it appeared
from outside, and they had done so on the very edge of D i n g a n e !s
domains. They were in a sense, a living reproach, and one which
he could not indefinitely ignore.
Dingane took up the challenge in 1836. His army went off, so
Bryant tells us "with the firm intention of turning Swaziland
into a second Natal", and other sources tell the same tale (114).
"All the strength of the country ... was drawn out to fight
against Sopuza", wrote one American missionary, while Brownlee,
who seems better informed than any other white, saw it as "an
exterminating expedition against the Swazies" (115). D i n g a n e ’s
idea was to catch the Swazi in a trap. Three columns moved off
in three separate directions, with instructions to reach their
respective destinations at a prearranged time. F r o m there they
could converge on the Swazi, separating them from their strong
holds and forcing them to fight. As so often happened with
Dingane, the plan went awry. Ndlela and Dambuza reached their
respective positions at the allotted time, but Mongo was delayed
by swamps and forests along the coast, and arrived three days
(114) Bryant, Olden T i m e s , 321.
(115) D.M. Kotze (ed.), Letters of the American missionaries,
1 8 35-1838, (Cape Town, 1950), 120; C. Brownlee, Reminiscences of kaffir Life and history, and other p a p e r s , (Lovedale,
1896), 86-90. The rest of the account is drawn from Brownlee.
late. Unaware of M o n g o ’s predicament, Ndlela and Dambuza went
ahead, and left a gaping hole on the third side of their trap
through which Sobhuza gratefully slipped. Their quarry gone,
Ndlela and Dambuza engaged in some desultory looting and then
returned home. Mongo meanwhile put in an appearance, and in the
absence of the others found himself under attack. Whatever
happened in this engagement, it was unlikely he was drubbed,
since he returned to Zululand shortly afterwards with six
thousand cattle in tow. Dingane however was not the least bit
appeased. M o n g o ’s column was received in silence (acclamations
being the norm) , and Dingane went on to strip him of his wives
and his property, and to reduce him to the ranks. Dingane had
been humbled,and Mongo had to pay (116).
Once more one of the Mfecane * s great survivors had survived, but
at this point, according to Bryant, he died (117). As usual it
is impossible to determine what B r y a n t ’s sources are, but in this
case it is likely that he drew on Swazi traditions which say that
Sobhuza died in the midst of a major Zulu attack. From histories
I myself have collected this would appear to be correct, but it
(116) Partial corroboration for B r o w n l e e ’s account comes from an entry in C h a m p i o n ’s journal dated 16 September, 1836, in which he refers to the under captains and dependents recently killed for their tardiness in the war against Sobhuza (Missionary H e r a l d , Vol. for 1838), and from a portrait in Gardiner's book which depicts Jojo being tried for his poor leadership in battle, (Gardiner, N a r r a t i v e ,
50). Jojo was M o n g o ’s military name (Brownlee, R e m i n i s c e n c e s , 89). In the text Gardiner claims that this was for poor
leadership against Mzilikazi,(Narrative, 48-9), but the caption that Samuelson gives the same picture is explicitly for poor leadership against the Swazi, R.C. Samuelson, Long, Long ago, (Durban, 1929), 8th illustration between 144-145.
65
seems far more plausible to place S o b huza’s death during the
invasion of 1839, rather than that of 1836 (118). A l l i s o n ’s
account is consistent with this, and the timing of M s w a t i ’s
circumcision supports the later date. Mswati is widely reported
to have been in his teens on the death of his father, and he is
known to have been circumcised in 1845. Since he was at most
seventeen or eighteen at the time of his circumcision, this
would have left hi m an unlikely nine or ten years old if Sobhuza
had died in 1836, or a m uch more probable thirteen if Sobhuza
had died in 1839. (119).
B r y a n t ’s dating of Sobhuza's death has implications for other
parts of his narrative, for among its repercussions he sees a
slackening of central authority, and the raiding of Zulu cattle
by undisciplined border chiefs (120). Raiding of some sort
certainly took place (121), but it is more likely to have been
because of mounting scepticism among the Swazi about the strength
of Zulu arms, and because of the extensive losses of cattle
sustained the previous year. Reprisals soon followed, but did
little to dispel the impression they had formed. The Zulu party
(118) Interview Loncayi Hlophe; interview Ndambi Mkhonta.
Because of the turmoil S o b huza’s body lay at Dlangeni for some considerable time, before being transferred to
Embilaneni (interview Msebenzi G a m a ) . Sokhukhuza
apparently kept the news from the regiments for some while so as not to lower their morale (interview Loncayi H l o p h e ) . (119) Kuper, Aristocracy, 15; Sw.A., R.C.S. 454/40, Seme,
’P e t i t i o n 1, 5; G . P ., File IV B (Swazis), 1158, 1163-4, 1167 and especially 1172.
(120) Bryant, Olden T i m e s , 322.
(121) J. Bird (ed.), The annals of Natal. 1495 to 1 8 4 5 , (2 Vols., Pietermaritzburg, 1888), Vol. I, 377 (Statement respecting Dingaan by William W o o d ) .
charged with the recovery of the cattle proved helpless when the
Swazi took refuge in a mountain, and Dingane had to summon the
support of traders from Natal to get them dislodged. William Wood,
who was a member of this party, leaves an account of what followed.
The Swazi had apparently drawn themselves up on the brow of a
hill immediately over and commanding a natural cavern in which
they had stowed the stolen cattle, and from which they had defied
Dingane's soldiers for several days. The guns of the traders soon
made them change their minds. The Swazi were already aware
from the Portuguese of the damage these could do, and promptly
agreed to surrender all the stock in their possession. The
offer was graciously accepted, and the cattle changed hands,
after which the Zulu and their allies somewhat tamely retired (122).
Sobhuza by this stage could consider himself relatively content.
The Zulu had shown themselves incapable of seriously threatening
Swazi security, and on the evidence of the most recent encounter
a spirit of slackness and irresolution was spreading through
their ranks. Within the year moreover Dingane was to suffer a
shattering defeat at Blood River at the hands of the Boers, which
depleted Zulu manpower and futher sapped their morale. Ironically,
it was precisely this engagement which put the Swazi in their
worst predicament yet. In the past the Zulu kings had made no
attempt to exercise direct political control beyond about eighty
miles of their capitals, after which they either raided and
depopulated, or enforced the payment of tribute. Sobhuza had
67
experienced both these practices, but had been shielded by the
strength of his strongholds, and the short duration of Zulu raids.
The defeat at Blood River now promised to alter all that. In
terms of the peace, Dingane had agreed to withdraw from the
territory south of the Black Mfolozi (123). At the same time,
like the Boers, he regarded it as no more than a temporary lull.
New hostilities would come, or so Dingane thought, and for these
he proposed to abandon southern Zululand and to expand across
the Pongola (124). Consequently, whether it be peace or be war
Dingane*s attention had fastened on the north, and on the final
extinction of Swazi autonomy.
Dingane disguised his intentions in an ingenious way. In an
unpublished clause of the Blood River treaty, Dingane had agreed
to t u n g a , that is, to sew headrings on all his soldiers (125).
The reason for the demand was to disband his standing army,
since the headring conferred the right to marry and settle down.
It was this provision that Dingane turned to unexpected use.
According to Ndukwane, who was one of Stuart's informants,
his secret purpose £Tn t h i £ 7 was to continue to defy the power he pretended formally to have tendered his submission to. Dingane always felt that he had and could ahlula Z^overcomej the Boers. He never really
feared them. What he really wanted was time and opportunity to increase his fighting forces. (126)
(123) G.S. Preller, Voortrekker Wetgewing: notule van die Natalse Volksraad, 1 8 3 9 - 4 5 , (Pretoria^ 1924), 2.
(124) S.P., Mss. Stuart, 1.09, 138-9, 151-2, Evidence of Ndukwana, 15 Sept. 1900.
(125) I b i d , 151.
Elsewhere Ndukwana explained further, recalling that,
D i n g a n e ’s object was to occupy two countries