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Iannaccone (1990) is a champion of applying an economic approach to religion and in his critique of rational choice theory he examines the concepts of household

production and human capital, and relates these ideas to show how religious practice can be based upon these concepts. Iannaccone (1990, p.298) explains how this

‘household production approach, sometimes called “the new home economics,” was pioneered by Gary Becker in the early 1960s’. Iannaccone (1990, p.299) examines how inputs to religious production can be measured and can include goods that are bought such as religious attire. He also explains that a variety of activities including praying, meditating, and reading scriptures can be measured as inputs. Iannaccone (1990, p.299) points out that participants of a religion ‘invoke their own skills and experience to produce religious satisfaction’ and do not always rely upon the religious leader for advice and information. These skills that the faith members exhibit are listed as: religious knowledge; familiarity with (church) ritual and doctrine; and friendships with other worshippers. He continues to explain this in more detail to show that these skills and experiences that he calls ‘religious human capital’ are connected with a person’s enjoyment and continuation of their faith. The more worshippers invest in relationships with other faith members and learn the doctrines, rituals and traditions associated with the faith the more satisfaction they will receive as participants. Iannaccone (1990, p.300) continues his approach to show that the economic model can be tested by examining four important issues: denominational mobility; conversion; religious intermarriage and religious participation.

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Bruce (1993, p.193) in his critique of economic explanations of religious behaviour is clearly against the idea of ‘applying a rational choice model to religious behavior [sic]’ and sets out to discuss the idea that Iannaccone’s (1990) theories would still hold true without being attached to economic theories. Bruce (1993, p.194) states that

‘by ignoring culture, the economic approach produces such a distorted view of religious behavior [sic] that the only context in which it could be viable is a thoroughly secular society’. Bruce (1993) lays out his views on using economic theories to explain religious behaviour before examining each of Iannaccone’s (1990) theories in turn. Bruce (1993, p.197) claims that Iannaccone (1990) has chosen ‘a selection of those indices of religious behavior [sic] that best fit the propositions’.

In terms of denominational mobility, according to Iannaccone (1990, p.300) ‘religious training, … is received directly from parents and from the religious institutions they support’. From an economic viewpoint, people will remain within the religion they grew up in or stay close to it as they have already invested time and effort into learning the finer points of that religion, and that to move away from the religion would incur costs in both time and effort that had already been spent. The sociological view, explains Bruce (1993, p.198) is that how a person grows up will ‘shape our receptivity to future alternatives’ and therefore the religious education and exposure that we receive as we grow up influences how we see things as adults. Therefore, Iannaccone (1990) may be correct, but Bruce (1993) believes we can explain this without ‘economic metaphors’.

Using the economic model, Iannaccone (1990, p.301) believes that conversion takes place at an early age ‘as people search for the best match between their skills and the context in which they produce religious commodities’, with the assumption being that as time goes by the rewards of moving to another religion would diminish. Bruce (1993, p.199) however, does not believe that this ‘offers a severe test of the theory’, since the same data could show that it is more to do with who you interact with and how an individual would see ‘the world and one’s place in it’.

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In relation to religious intermarriage and participation, in Iannaccone’s (1990, p.303) view ‘Partners of the same religion can produce religious commodities more

efficiently’. This simplifies the running costs of belonging to a religion as

transportation is shared, money is given to one organisation and there is no doubt as to which religion the children will belong. Iannaccone (1990, p.303) also found evidence that there were higher rates of church attendance amongst same faith marriages.

Bruce (1993, p.199) agrees with the data that shows that people tend to marry others of the same faith, but believes that it is not to do with economics and can be given a much simpler explanation in that ‘churches provide an excellent venue for meeting young people who are similar not only in religion but also in social class, culture and ethnic background’.

In conclusion Iannaccone (1990, p.312) states that although the economic concepts do not tell us what ‘religion “really” is’ they do show us a great deal about ‘religious participation’. The economic model backed by empirical research identifies that people born into a particular religion will often stay within that religion and make choices that fit with the human capital that has already been expended. Within this Iannaccone (1990, p.313) states that ‘Religious upbringing, probably the most

important source of religious human capital, is a major determinant of religious belief and behavior [sic]’.

Bruce (1993, p.201) adds that the economic approach shows little understanding of the behaviour that it is trying to explain and what might be a ‘reward’ for one person may be an ‘unbearable cost’ for another. He expands this by saying that the only way of ‘identifying cost or reward’ is from those who make the choices, but it is ‘those choices that we wish to explain’. It is the claim that the economic model is useful for understanding religious belief and behaviour that Bruce (1993, p.203) takes issue with. In his view ‘economic or rational choice models of behavior [sic] depend on us knowing what the rational choice is’.

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In response to the critiques of his previous work Iannaccone (1995) has reviewed the rational choice approach to religion and in his work makes reference to Bruce’s criticisms. According to Iannaccone (1995, p.77) in any given situation people will work out their costs and benefit and will act in a way that will ‘maximize their net benefits’. In the same way people will ‘… choose what religion, if any, they will accept and how extensively they will participate in it’. Iannaccone (1995, p.78) voices the view of a number of scholars who bemoan the fact that ‘little theorizing about religion’ is taking place and that:

Rational choice seeks to fill this gap by integrating numerous predictions within a single conceptual framework and providing theoretical explanations for observed empirical regularities. (Iannaccone, 1995, p.78) In particular Iannaccone makes reference to the costs and benefits of belonging to a religion and believes that you cannot examine these issues without asking about the money that people spend on their religion. Iannaccone (1995, p.80) also believes that the amount of time spent on religion has been neglected in the past and that rational choice needs to know about time and money spent and the consequences. ‘The value of cost-benefit models will remain hard to assess (but impossible to dismiss) until we begin asking people what they have sacrificed for the sake of their faith’.

Scholars have looked at religion from every angle, according to Iannaccone (1995, p.86), including: ‘socialization, indoctrination, neurosis, cognitive dissonance, tradition, deviance, deprivation, functionalism, the role of emotions, the impact of culture, and more’. However, Iannaccone (1995, p.86) believes that rational choice offers a ‘high rate of return’ as it gives the chance to look at religion as a ‘product of cost-benefit decisions’ and will ‘benefit those seeking to build and test models of religious behavior [sic]’.

Chaves (1995), a specialist in the sociology of religion, looks at Iannaccone’s (1990, 1995) work and dissects his theories to come to his own conclusions. Chaves (1995, p.99) sets out to argue ‘… that individuals engage in cost-benefit analysis so as to maximize their benefits – is in fact a very weak assumption.’ He also sets out to show that when examining the rational choice approach ‘it is better to evaluate particular instances of it’ instead of looking for reasons to ‘endorse or abandon’ the whole approach. By approaching religion from a cost-benefit assumption, Chaves (1995,

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p.99, italics in original) believes that this really tells you ‘nothing about actual empirical religious phenomena or behavior [sic]’. Chaves (1995, p.99) notes that the rational choice argument can only offer predictions if other assumptions about the world are made. This approach does not help us to ‘predict’ the choices that an individual will make and to help us achieve this we would need to know ‘the context in which he or she is making choices’.

Looking at Iannaccone’s (1990) example of denominational mobility and his

‘religious capital argument’, according to Chaves:

If only very small investments in religious capital were needed to maximize satisfaction, then the relationship between past religious practice and present choices could not plausibly be interpreted as working via a human capital

mechanism…’. (Chaves, 1995, p.100)

The deductive theory originally put forward by Stark and Bainbridge (1987)

according to Chaves (1995, p.102) is not in fact ‘a deductive theory’ at all. In Chaves’

(1995) opinion the way that Stark and Bainbridge (1987) talk of axioms, definitions and propositions is a way of achieving clarification when arguing and writing, but does not in itself provide a logical deduction. Also according to Chaves (1995, p.103)

‘The microlevel assumptions’ that Iannaccone uses in his ‘analysis of religious human capital’ are, ‘different than the microlevel assumptions’ that he uses when looking at issues of ‘church and sect’. Chaves (1995, p.104) concludes that some rational choice explanations may be true but it would be better to compare a ‘rational choice

explanation of X to other explanations of X’ to distinguish between those claims that are true and those that are not.