Conexos por trayectorias

Frequently, courses of action were discussed by telephone or personally with the Prime Minister. More rarely, but usually in affairs of great moment, full dress Cabinet discussions were held, where submissions were presented by the Minister for External Affairs, by the Minister for Defence, and occasionally other Ministers. However, in Cabinet, the

1 See Encel, op cit., p. 350, Crisp, op cit., p. 323, K. West, Power in the Liberal Party, p. 213, D. Whitington, The Rulers, p. 1. 9

H.B. Gullett, "Parliamentary Government in Australia", in J. Wilkes, Forces in Australian Politics, pp. 90-91.

One example of this was Spender's decision to commit troops to Korea in 1950. See P.C. Spender, Politics and a M a n , pp. 282-4. Menzies' role in the Suez crisis is another, see O. Harries, "Menzies and the Suez Crisis", Politics, Vol. Ill, No. 2, November 1968, p. 193 ff.

weight of Menzies' opinion was usually decisive. As Casey recalled, without the Prime Minister on side on an issue, it was frequently a case

of one against twenty-two, without ever going to the vote.1 2 Also,

Menzies, as Prime Minister, had a different set of priorities from his

Minister for External Affairs. His major continuing preoccupation was

domestic policy, and the domestic repercussions of foreign policy were of more importance to him than to any of the Ministers for External

Affairs. In terms of political status and rank, the Minister for

External Affairs was at a distinct disadvantage in this period in Cabinet,

compared with the Treasurer and the Leader of the Country Party in his

capacity as Minister for Trade, for both these outranked him. One

outcome of this was the downgrading of foreign affairs matters in Cabinet.

Although foreign policy frequently had a personal style, it

eventually had to find support within Cabinet. How expert various

Ministers were in the art of "politicking" had some importance for the degree of support they could muster in Cabinet for their policies.

While Cabinet was, in the final analysis, frequently reduced to rubber stamping foreign policy decisions, the role of Parliament

resolved itself into acquiescence after the event. Some reasons have

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been advanced for the lack of parliamentary influence on policy making, including the centralized nature of foreign policy making, and the lack

of means of participation by Parliament in this process. In some states,

standing committees on foreign affairs are used by legislatures to participate in policy making, but the Australian government's restrict-

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ions on the powers of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the consequent refusal of the Labor Party to take part in it, rendered it a largely ineffectual body.

The relationship between Cabinet and the bureaucracy was of

a different order. The Prime Minister had the advice of his department,

1 Interview with Lord Casey, 2 April 1973. See also R.G. Casey,

Australian Foreign Minister, pp. 172-3.

2

See above, p. 80.

The secrecy of its meetings, its inability to call for papers and summon witnesses except with the permission of the Minister and its

submission of reports to the Minister of External Affairs. See

H.B. Turner, "The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Australian

Parliament", in Australian Outlook, Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1966, p. 25.

which included a section dealing exclusively with Australia's relations with Britain. The Department of External Affairs' role in advising its Minister, largely depended on the degree to which various Ministers

sought and heeded such advice. This has varied considerably over the

period since 1950. Harries has described it as

a situation in which dominating individuals have assumed wide powers in formulating and conducting foreign policy, and in which recourse to the advice of the Department of External Affairs has been regarded as a kind of optional extra, which might or might not be resorted to according to the inclination of the dominant politician, rather than as an indispensable component of the decision-making process. 1

Yet, it does seem that the growth in size, experience and expertise of the Department of External Affairs over the period to 1965 has made for an increasing influence on policy compared to say either the Evatt or

Spender periods of policy making. The Minister for Defence has generally

been more dependent on departmental advice because the nature of strategic and defence problems required specialist advice from the Chiefs of Staff

and other advisers.

The principal bureaucratic committee coordinating defence and foreign policies was the Defence Committee, chaired by the Secretary

of the Defence Department. Other Committee members were the Chairman of

the Chief of Staffs Committee, together with the three chiefs of staff, the Secretary to the Treasury, and the secretaries of External Affairs, the Prime Minister's Department and the Cabinet Office. The function of this Committee was to advise the Minister for Defence on defence policy, through the military and strategic assessments presented by the Chiefs

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of Staff, on coordination of the economic and foreign policy aspects of

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defence and strategic policy and on other matters of policy. Other

committees existed to support this committee.

The aim of this structure was to coordinate the Cabinet

submissions of the Defence Department and of the External Affairs

Department (and occasionally others) before presentation, through their

respective Ministers, to Cabinet. It will be seen from this description

0. Harries, op cit., p. 195.

Based on intelligence assessments by the Joint Intelligence Committee whose secretary was an officer of the Department of External Affairs.

that while the Treasury, the Prime Minister's Department and the

Department of External Affairs had a formalised channel of influencing defence policy through the Defence Committee, the Defence Department had

fewer avenues for influencing the policies of other departments.1 Both

2 3

Beddie and Millar have been critical of the fact of the predominance of civilian bureaucratic heads in the Defence Committee, and have looked to greater Cabinet control of the Committee, perhaps by making the

Minister of Defence its Chairman.

Early in its period in office, the Menzies Cabinet

established a Cabinet committee on Defence Preparations, but it was not

until January 1963, when the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee was established, comprising the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Ministers for External Affairs, Defence, the Treasurer and occasion­ ally others, that active moves were made to coordinate defence and

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