Localmente conexos

Introduction

The first part of this study has been concerned with the description and analysis of the attitudes and opinions of those groups and individuals in the community who were not directly responsible for the making of policy. This aggregate of opinions forms the domestic setting for the policy makers. In this part of the thesis, attention will be focussed on three main factors in policy making on these issues:

the policy makers' perceptions and evaluations of domestic opinion

(including those of Cabinet and the bureaucracy); their perceptions and evaluations of the international setting, in particular their attitudes towards Indonesian, Dutch and United States policies; and finally, the policy makers' objectives'*" in making particular decisions.

In dealing with policy making, one is handicapped by the fact 2

that official documents and papers remain under government embargo. This restraint is mitigated by two factors. First, both the West New Guinea and confrontation issues are regarded as history now, due in part to the passage of time and in part to the comparative placidity of present Australian-Indonesian relations, and this has led to most of the major participants, none of whom is any longer involved in party politics, being willing to frankly explain attitudes and decisions on a non-

attributable basis. While time can render recollections suspect, it has been possible in most cases to cross-check participants with each other and other available sources both public and private. Second, partly because of the circumstances mentioned above, some departmental advisers and diplomats have been able to offer comment on their own roles.

In what follows, the personal perceptions, attitudes and actions of the policy makers will be given more prominence than the 1 A distinction is drawn here between values, or the state of affairs

the policy maker may desire to bring about, and concrete objectives or goals which are capable of achievement, subject to the constraints and opportunities of both the domestic and international environments. See J. Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, 1963, p. 112 ff.

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While the present government's tendency is towards a more "open" type of government, it continues to observe (within the 30-year rule) the convention that official documents generally, and those particularly pertaining to Cabinet decisions, will only be released eventually on the basis of consent of the previous government.

interplay of diplomatic events. It will be argued that the personal

views of policy makers were very important for policy at various stages, and

that policy would have differed in significant respects had some other

Minister been involved. It will also be argued that, while the

constraints and opportunities of Australia's strategic, military and diplomatic position were important in limiting policy, it was the way in which these limits were perceived by differing actors at particular times

that was significant.

In the case of the West New Guinea issue, four Ministers for

External Affairs were involved: Mr Percy Spender, 1950 to April 1951;

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Mr Richard Casey, 1951 to January 1960; Mr Robert Menzies, who was

concurrently Prime Minister, January 1960 to December 1961; Sir Garfield

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Barwick, December 1961 to April 1964; and Mr Paul Hasluck, April 1964

to 1965. In the case of the confrontation issue, Sir Garfield Barwick

was Minister until April 1964 when Mr Hasluck succeeded him. The story

proceeds in chronological form and as far as possible as seen through the

eyes of these men. But first the general notions in Australia of how

foreign policy should be made and how it usually is, are of some

importance. Also the working relationships between the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, between Cabinet and Parliament, and between

Ministers and their departments, are of interest in setting the scene for

these particular issues.

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Contemporary observers, in discussing the institution of

Cabinet, have agreed on two major points: that Cabinet is the supreme

decision making body in Australia but "at all events many of the most

important issues are in fact decided by the Prime Minister". The

divergence between what ought to be -decisions made by a group -and what is -decisions frequently made outside Cabinet and only brought there for

assent -is explained by Encel in terms of the way the notion of

collective responsibility has operated in Australia. Whereas Cabinet is

supposed collectively to discuss and make decisions and be collectively

Later, Sir Percy Spender. Later, Lord Casey.

Later, Sir Robert Menzies.

Later, Sir Paul Hasluck.

For example, S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia, p. 4, and L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, p. 323.

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responsible for these, in many important cases, Cabinet is presented with a virtual fait accompli by the Prime Minister and/or senior Minister

(who have agreed on a decision in advance) and is obliged to agree and to take collective responsibility for this decision. Simply, the reason a Liberal Prime Minister has been able to do this (since 1949) is

because he has the power to select his cabinet so that the power of

decision making, whether seen as effective choice or effective veto, lies ultimately with the Prime Minister.

This Prime Ministerial power of decision making, potentially more important in a Liberal coalition cabinet than in a Labor one

(because of the role of Caucus and the Federal Conference), was reinforced in the period 1950 to 1965 by the particular use of this power by Prime Minister Menzies. Most observers were agreed that Menzies dominated his Cabinet,1 but it is H.B. Gullett, whose aspirations to Cabinet rank were

frustrated by Menzies, who explains this most pointedly:

This great privilege of selection to Cabinet and to much-desired posts abroad gives the Prime Minister enormous ascendancy over his party and over Cabinet and correspondingly weakens the authority of the party over the Cabinet and Government. It is in fact a breakdown of the system of responsibility. When to this is added, as in the case of Prime Minister Menzies, the fact that he exceeds in brilliance and experience and seniority all his colleagues, it is difficult to set limits to his

personal influence. Finally, it must be said that he is one of the most persuasive men alive...It follows therefore that the Menzies government is ninety per cent Menzies.2

Here these judgements should be qualified to a degree in respect of decisions made in foreign policy. Many decisions, both minor and of a far reaching nature, were made by the Prime Minister or Minister

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