Consecuencias que acarrea la declaración de la contumacia y la

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experience n o t objects but representations, some of w hich we believe to be representations of objects. To this a C artesian sceptic could reply that the argum ent has only proved the necessity of outer representations and K ant is w ell aw are of such an im propriety. "To this proof", K ant says a b o u t th e R efutation, "it will p robably be objected, th at I am im ­ m ed iately conscious only... of m y re p resen ta tio n of outer things and consequently th at it m u st still rem ain u n certain w h eth er o u tsid e me there is anything corresponding to it, or not".^3 But K ant know s that, ow ing to th e n atu re of inner sense, all representations are fleeting, so that they cannot provide the perm an en t necessary for inner experience. C onsequently, according to Stroud, K ant w o u ld never agree th a t th e Refutation show s m erely the need for certain beliefs.

I hold th at S troud is entirely correct in claim ing th a t K ant ac­ know ledges his conclusion to be the necessary presupposition of objects in space. O therw ise the sceptic could indeed com ply w ith the inevitabil­ ity of a com m itm ent to such and such beliefs about the external w orld, and yet still d oubt th at objects in space are actually to be found in our experience. By accepting a conclusion concerning m erely the concept of objectivity - w hich m u st be taken as referring to a m in d -in d ep e n d e n t w orld - Straw son has ad o p ted an austere in terp retatio n of K ant's doc­ trine th a t cannot perform an effective justification of our em pirical be-

hefs.-'^

For th at reason, it is n o t surprising to see Stroud advocating th at K ant's general argum ent against scepticism, i.e., the Refutation, depends fundam entally u p o n transcendental idealism . It is K ant's m ajor task to d e m o n stra te th a t w e have a n im m e d ia te p e rc e p tio n a n d d irec t know ledge of things around us in space. Stroud then writes:

^ B X n. ; cf. chapter 5 above.

In a more recent work, Strawson ends up agreeing with Stroud’s criticism o f transcendental arguments (cf. Strawson 1985, p. 21).

knowledge o f things around us is possible, we must view ‘all our perceptions, whether we call them inner or outer, as a consciousness only of what is dependent on our sensibility’... And to adopt that view is to adopt a form of idealism. It says that the objects we per­ ceive around us in space are dependent on our sensibility and our un­ derstanding. It is only because that is true that we can perceive those objects directly and therefore can be noninferentially certain of their reaJitv’’.-^

Stroud u nderstands very well K ant's position vis-à -vis the sceptic. The sceptic wiU never be refuted until it is show n th at our know ledge of objects in space is im m ediate an d direct. A nything different from this will allow him to contend th at our know ledge of objects is inferred and then to raise doubts about the justification of this know ledge. A tran ­ scendental realist has no choice but to assum e th at know ledge of objects is inferred. This is one of the reasons w hy K ant claims th at transcenden­ tal realism leads to scepticism.^^ As we have seen in chapter 5, any proof from the effects to their causes countenances the adm ittance th at other causes m ight be b ro u g h t into play in o rd e r to p roduce the available effects (representations).

From these considerations it follows, on the one hand, th at o u r view of S traw son's tran scen d en tal argum ents seem s to be in keeping w ith S troud's and W alker's. Straw son is lim ited to saying th at certain experiences "m ust be taken" to be experiences of objects in space outside us and n o t th at these experiences are of objects in space outside us. In other w ords, he can only argue for the necessity of concepts and beliefs and not for the necessity of an objective w orld. O n the other hand, we are closer to Stroud th an to W alker w ith respect to K ant's intentions in the Refutation. As arg u ed for in chapter 5, K ant intends to estabUsh th at m ind in d ep en d en t objects are the pre-condition of self-knowledge, and n o t th at certain beliefs about the w orld are som ehow connected w ith certain beliefs about ourselves. There K ant argues for actual objects in

in Stroud 1983, pp. 419-20. cf. A 369.

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space because, according to transcendental idealism , we have im m ediate an d direct access to such objects in our experience. Once aw are of these observations, it seem s inevitable to assert th a t Straw son cannot defuse sceptical doubts unless he assum es from the very beginning w h at he repudiates most, namely, transcendental idealism . Therefore, Straw son's p ro p o sa l of strip p in g tra n sc e n d e n ta l id ealism aw ay fro m K a n t's theoretical philosophy cannot be held convincingly.

2 P u tn am 's Brains in a Vat

The conclusion just reached can be reinforced if w e consider an­ other recent, well know n exam ple of a transcendental a rg u m en t a p a rt from Strawson's. O ur tactic will be basically the same as the one adopted in the last section. In other w ords, we shall show th at P u tn am leaves u n to u ch ed the possibility for the sceptic to appeal to a transcendental realist picture of the external w orld and thereby carry on doubting about the justification of ou r know ledge claims.

The v at hypothesis can be sketched as follows. It is possible to im agine a w orld in w hich the sentient creatures w ho inhabit it, and who have ever existed, are brains residing in a v a t of nutrients, perhaps con­ trolled by a sophisticated com puter created an d m anaged by an evil sci­ entist. W hat these brains observe, or feel, or hear, or touch, is in fact the resu lt of com puter-controlled electronic im pulses. The experiences for each brain provided by the autom atic ap p aratu s duplicate in detail the experiences of actu al h u m an beings an d o th er sen tie n t c re a tu r e s . Keeping this in m ind the sceptic suggests, as it is predictable, that such a th o u g h t experim ent might, for all we know, be n o t m ere fantasy b u t our

actual situation. H ow can we possibly know th at we are n o t in the kind of situation just described?

The vat sceptic claims in the same w ay as the sceptic to w hich Kant opposes, th at we have no rational guarantee th at w hat we take to be our present situation and, concom itantly, our overall view about the w orld, is in fact the case. It is preferable to describe the v a t hypothesis in this

scendental argum ent is addressed to an ontological sceptic, i.e., one who doubts the existence of an external world. It seems th at the sceptical chal­ lenge persists even if the sceptic complies w ith the fact th at there are objects, com puters, brains and vats. Besides, the sceptic is not concerned w ith w hether or not I exist. Putnam says th at it is self-defeating to think 'I do n o t exist' "if th o u g h t by me... (as Descartes argued)".^^ Thus, the sceptic th at he has in m ind is m uch m ore resourceful than the Cartesian sceptic of the First M editation. By the sam e token, it seems th at the as­ su m p tio n th at P utnam w ould be addressing his p roof to the so called C artesian sceptic is not completely a c c u r a t e .T h e C artesian sceptic is at­ tacking a ll our behefs, even the m ost fundam ental of them, namely, that "I am, I exist". P u tn am 's sceptic does n o t w aste tim e asking w hether there are objects, or w hether he exists; he m ight be willing to g ran t that it is ridiculous to suppose otherwise. He m ight even raise his hands and say, like M oore, th at there are tw o objects in front of him. W hat he re­ quires us to prove, how ever, is our claim th at propositions ab o u t the w orld of tables an d chairs, even this one about M oore's hands, correctly state w h at the w orld is really like. In other w ords, w h at the v at sceptic seem s to be d e m a n d in g from us is a ratio n al ju stificatio n of ou r know ledge claims. H e requires us to show how it is possible to be an em pirical realist, i.e., to hold th at our em pirical beliefs are indeed behefs about a w orld distinct from our thoughts th at Hes in space outside us.

P utnam proposes a w ay of underm ining the v at hypothesis that m atches our general description of transcendental argum ents. This hy­ pothesis is, according to him, self-defeating. R oughly speaking, he fo­ cuses his account on the possibiHty of our being able to refer to objects in a v a t situation. If w e w ere a b rain in a vat, th en term s Hke "table", "chair", "elephant", as used by me w ould refer not to actual tables, chairs and elephants, b u t to w hatever images the com puter or the m ad scientist behind the com puter causes m e to have. Likewise, the term s "brain" and "vat" w ould not refer to actual brains and vats b u t to those images, and

Putnam 1981, p. 8.

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the proposition "I am a brain in a vat" could not be true. Putnam claims that, if the hypothesis is true, then it is false. If it is indeed the case th at 1 am an envatted brain, then, w hen 1 utter "I am a brain in a vat", 1 am not referring to "real" brains or vats, so th at the prop o sitio n is to be re­ g ard ed as false. In this way, as any other user of transcendental a rg u ­ m ents, Putnam tries to reduce the vat hypothesis to an absurdity. We can only suppose th at w e are brains in a v at because we are not brains in a vat.

Better put, Putnam 's argum ent resorts to the semantics of the sen­ tence "1 am a brain in a vat". If this sentence is uttered by a brain in a vat, then it can n o t be true. The reason, according to Putnam , is th at non e n v atted brains refer to things in a very different w ay from the way envatted brains do. Vat term s are devoid of referents in the "real" world, for there are, according to the vat hypothesis, no objects in the v at world - except brains, vats, a co m p u ter and p erhaps a m ad neuro-scientist. In this way, w hile the term "Mac", w hen pronounced or thought by a n on envatted brain, refers to a Mac, w hen pronounced or thought by an en­ vatted brain, it refers to "M ac-image". Thus, the v at utterance "m y Mac is now in fro n t of me" w ould be true if an d only if the envatted utterer w ere having the experience of a no n v at Mac. But since, according to the vat hypothesis, brains in a v at cannot have such experiences, the u tter­ ance is, Putnam contends, necessarily false. Now, the same observations can be m ade if we substitute for the vat sentence "M y Mac is now in front of m e" the v at sentence "I am a brain in a vat". T hat is the very heart of P utnam 's strategy. If I am a brain in a vat, the sentence "1 am a brain in a vat" is fa ls e . Therefore, the sentence "I am a brain in a vat" is self-de­ feating, for if it is true - i.e., if 1 am an envatted brain - then it is false, i.e., then I am n o t an envatted brain.

As 1 see it, though, there is a facet in this approach th at Putnam seems to have overlooked. If, by being in a v at condition, w e cannot judge in a d e te rm in a te w ay a n y th in g ab o u t th e w o rld o r a b o u t ourselves, this m eans that we are incapable of establishing once and for

h y p o th etical vat condition, the proposition "1 am a brain in a vat", as th o u g h t of by me, cannot be said to be false, m uch less true. As Coppock com m ents on, if we are brains in a vat, then "w e speak vat-English, not E nglish". Hence, the tru th value of 'w e are brains in a v at', "in vat- EngUsh is neither here or there, as far as the argum ent is concerned" If w e stick to the vat hypothesis, i.e., if we assum e th at zve are in a v a t condition, then anything that w e can possibly state can m ake sense to us

or to other envatted brains, but can not m ake sense to no n envatted ones. This is the trick of the vat sceptic. In ord er to strengthen his suspicions, he introduces a view point or a perspective of the external w orld th at is im m une to the hallucinations caused by the evil neuroscientist. Just Hke the transcendental realist, he appeals to the idea of a (description of the) w orld constituted independent of us. The core of the m atter is th a t,/ro w

a non v a t standpoint, our utterance could well be no m ore th an f la tu s

vocis, i.e., a m ere g ru n t or a set of m eaningless sounds.^ ^ So, the problem

here is that, if we are brains in a vat, "w e do not really u tte r w ords and sentences, b u t only seem to do so. Now , a seem ing u tteran ce is no utterance (exactly as a fake R em brandt is no Rem brandt)".

It seem s then, th at Putnam decides to face the sceptic w ithin the sceptic's ow n territory, nam ely transcendental realism. P utnam is only entitled to state that the sentence "1 am a brain in a vat" is false, and then to conclude th at it is self-defeating, by taking fo r granted in advance, as the sceptic does w hen he form ulates his doubt, th at he is n o t a brain in a vat. P u tn a m envisages a w ay o u t of v a t scepticism by assum ing in a d v e rte n tly a perspective of the w orld that, he beHeves, can n o t be questioned by the sceptic. This assum ption alone w ould aUow us to re­ gard the proposition '1 am brain in a v at' as tru e or false. But this is ex­ actly w hat is at stake: w hat makes us so sure th at our aUeged non vat sit­ uation is not "actuaUy" a vat one?

cf. Coppock 1987, p. 19. cf. ibid., p. 22 ff.

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N ow , once the sceptic introduces the thought of a reality in itself, or, in P u tn am 's term s, of a reality view ed from the G od's eye p o in t of view,^3 into the debate, he is able to shift the b urden of proof back to his challenger an d d o u b t that, from th at divine point of view , w e are not brains in a vat. It will be then up for the sceptic's challenger to prove that no t only from our p o in t of view, b u t also from the G od's eye po in t of