Etapa de Juicio Oral

O ur task in the present chapter is to analyse K ant's best anti-scep­ tical attem p t by following his argum ent th at the perception of a perm a­ n en t in space outside us is indispensable for our perceiving ourselves in time. We shall show th at this argum ent, found in the R efutation, is in­ consistent w ith transcendental idealism an d therefore, th a t K ant is, at bottom , unable to give a p ro p er answ er to the sceptic. It should be n o ­ ticed that, since our intent here is to follow the line of reasoning begun in the preceding chapter - namely, the view according to w hich alleged anti-sceptical argum ents in the Critique are doom ed to failure -, m any is­ sues regarding the Refutation will either be sketched sim ply or just set aside. This m eans th at we shall not provide an exhaustive and thorough investigation of the Refutation. Instead, we shall focus on som e issues th at play a vital p a rt in o u r attem p t to d iscred it the v iew th at the Refutation is successful in defeating the sceptic.

T hat being so, m section 1 we shall initially reconstruct the m ain th ru st of K ant's argum ent for the perm anent, w hich is found in the First A nalogy. A fterw ard s, w e shall follow th e rem ain in g step s of the Refutation. We shall characterise K ant as denying the privileged status of inner experience w ith respect to o u ter experience, in th o ro u g h opposi­ tion to Descartes' introspective Cogito. In section 2, w e shall list the vari­ ous candidates which can play the role of the perm anent required for aU tim e determ inations. We shall conclude th at the only possible notion w hich is com patible w ith transcendental idealism is th at of m atter. In section 3, we shall claim th at K ant can n o t p u t the R efutation to w ork w ithout clashing w ith some of the m ain doctrines of his ow n idealism. In section 4, we shall argue th at one of the alternatives to fleeing from the

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im passe just m entioned is to revise transcendental idealism . H ow ever, none of the attem pts m ade either by K ant or by som e K ant com m enta­ tors is satisfactory, because they invariably drive us into tran scen d en tal

realism . In section 5, we shaU examine the proposal according to w hich

the R efutation can be p u t to w ork ap art from transcendental idealism. We shall argue th at this proposal is also unsatisfactory, because it com ­ prom ises the transcendental idealist foundations of the Refutation.

1. T he N otion of the Perm anent

In order to examine K ant's argum ent in the Refutation, w e have to take account of the m ain points he struggles to establish after the First Analogy; in particular, the notion of the perm anent. We shall see th at this notion, in K ant's view, is m eant to play a vital role against the scep­ tic. R oughly put, Kant's argum ent can be divided into tw o steps. First, the p erm an en t is show n to be the precondition for the thought of tem po­ ral ordering and the representation of change. Second, as tem poral or­ dering m u st be conceived of as a unity, the p erm an en t is show n to be sem piternal, or perceptually available at all (instants of) times.

The first step can be presented th ro u g h an example. C onsider a play again, this tim e a fam ous one, for example, M acbeth. Im agine that, in one scene, the m ain character shows u p properly dressed and speaking Enghsh w ith a Scottish accent. In another scene, he appears dressed as a tw entieth-century m an speaking English w ith a foreign accent. In yet an­ other scene, he behaves m ore like Romeo th an M acbeth, for exam ple, calling Juliet beneath the balcony. Now, if the character keeps changing all the time, M acbeth^ and M acbeth^ do n o t hang together. W hy exactly is this so? Sim ply put, character^ does n o t display a single elem ent in com m on w ith character^. In the absence of com m on elements, there is no w ay by w hich I can possibly acknowledge them to be bound u p together.

This suggests th at I cannot say th at character^ - i.e., the character w hich show s u p in scene^ - is the same as character^. They are indeed two distinct characters in the play. I can only reidentify M acbeth if I ac-

M acbeth^. This is tantam ount to saying th at the reidentification process is d e p en d e n t u p o n the determ ination th at M acbeth^ and M acbeth^ are one an d the same, i.e., that they are identical. But I can only do so by de­ tecting a com m on fram e of elements th at can be found in both of them. A p art from the fleeting character of the sequence of scenes, I have to pre­ suppose th at som e elem ents in these tw o characters en d u re from one scene to another. In view of this, it seems plausible to say that the reiden­ tification of M acbeth can only be carried o u t u n d er the assum ption th at som e elem ents rem ain unchanged in the course of the play. Taking all these points on board, we are entitled to say that, in the absence of re­ m aining elem ents, it is impossible even to consider M acbeth^ as com ing

after M acbeth^. W ithout a set of abiding items, I can only say th at a char­

acter appeared in scene one and another character appeared in scene two. Suppose now th at nothing at all in the play persists, so th at all other characters and places and dialogues and things show up changing. In th at event, the scenes them selves will n o t hang together. Each scene can be easily cut aw ay from the others. If this is so, no character can be accounted for as preceding or succeeding another, w hich is to say, w e cannot acknow ledge the play as being a sequence of scenes. W hat makes this sequence a sequence is th at the scenes are acknow ledged as coming one after another. But in the absence of a set of en d u rin g elem ents, i.e., elem ents w hich last from one scene to another, the perception of this or­ der of succession and precedence cannot take place. Accordingly, we can­ n o t say th a t M acbeth, or any o th er character, or place, o r dialogue, change. Before, we knew th at M acbeth was behaving strangely because,

based upon w h at did not change, we could perceive his variations. N ow

every single elem ent varies, so th at the g ro u n d on w hich w e could ac­ count for the changes in the sequence of scenes is missing. But if this is so, the very perception of change in the play cannot be properly charac­ terised. C hange can only be acknow ledged in the sequence of scenes, i.e., u n d e r the assum ption that the scenes come one after another bearing cer­ tain elem ents n o t found in the preceding scene. Thus, a set of enduring item s is also required to characterise any change in the play.

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C onsider now our experience in general. Just as in the case of the play, our experience is successive. It presents us w ith item s preceding, succeeding or being sim ultaneous w ith one another. As show n in chapter 2, any sequence is prim arily acknow ledged as tem porally ordered. In this way, w e m ay say that a set of abiding elem ents, or in K ant's term i­ nology, "the p erm an en t",1 m ust be presu p p o sed to ren d er tem poral o r­ dering possible. "W ithout the p erm an en t", K ant says, "th ere is ... no tim e -r e la tio n " .- In the sam e way, w e are allow ed to hold th at only th ro u g h the p erm an en t can we set u p p attern s of com parison betw een changing an d unchanging elements. "AU... change in tim e", K ant states, has "to be view ed as sim ply a m ode of the existence of th at w hich re­ m ains and persists".^ Change is nothing b u t the encounter, in the consec­ utive m om ent, of certain elem ents n o t found at the previous m om ent. These elem ents, how ever, are only said to v ary against a background of abiding or unchanging elements. Hence, the very conception of change w o u ld be lacking if there w ere no abiding elem ents on the basis of which change takes place.

W hat K ant claims to have established so far is th at a set of en d u r­ ing elem ents, or the perm anent, is an indispensable req u irem en t for us to account for tem poral ordering and to perceive change. W ithout this set, no tem poral ordering and no change can ever be acknow ledged. This is equivalent to saying that, in o rd er th at the arg u m en t for the perm a­ nent be successful, this perm anent has to be perceivable a t all tim es.^ If it lasted only w ithin a certain length of time, it w ould have to be thought of as undergoing destruction, or im provem ent, or even reco n stru ctio n into another perm anent. But if this were so, this p erm an en t w ould also change and could not play the p a rt of the precondition of change.

K ant is weU aw are of this conundrum . T hat is w hy he cautiously introduces a fu rth er step into his overall argum ent. We have to be as-

I cf. B 224. - B 226. 3 B 227. 4 cf. B 228.

quired for the constitution of tem poral ordering is sem piternal and not ephem eral. In K ant's terms, the perm anent is defined as the "ev er-ab id ­ ing existence, in the appearances, of the subject proper".^ K ant's arg u ­ m ent for the ever-lasting character of the perm an en t can be sum m arised as follows. Suppose that the perm anent is ephem eral. This m eans th at it com es into being an d that it ceases to be. N ow , the p ercep tio n of the perm anent, according to w hat has just been argued for by Kant, renders tem poral ordering possible. In fact, "this perm anent is w h at alone m akes possible the representation of the transition from one state to another, and from not-being to being".^ Besides, w hatever the p erm an en t is, it has to be capable of being reidentified, w hich m eans th at it has to dis­ p lay a certain id en tity th ro u g h time, alth o u g h it is liable to u n d erg o change. As K ant says, "the identity of the substratum " is th a t "w herein all change has thoroughgoing unity".^ WeU, the idea th at the perm anent comes into being at a certain m om ent brings w ith it the idea that, before this m om ent, the perm an en t did not exist. The sam e can be said about the ceasing to be. It requires us to think of a m om ent in tim e "in w hich an appearance no longer exists".^ But a m om ent in tim e w hen nothing perm anent is found can never be perceived. In Kant's term s, "a preceding [or succeeding] em pty time is not an object of perception".^ Now, since it has already been show n th at tem poral ordering m u st be th o u g h t of as bro u g h t about by the perception of the perm anent, the idea of a m om ent void of perm anence cannot be held consistently because it requires us to think of a m om ent of time taking place outside time. O n th at score, th e thought of em pty time is said by Kant to be an absurd.

One could suggest th at it is plausible to conceive of a m om ent of time outside tim e if we suppose two distinct tem poral orderings w hich

5 B 228. 231. B 229. 8 cf. B 231. ^ B 231. 10 cf. B 232.

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"w ould flow in two parallel s t r e a r n s " . M o r e exactly, we could suppose one tem p o ral o rdering w herein the p erm an en t can be found, and an­ other, w herein it cannot. H ow ever, w e have long established that, ac­ cording to Kant, tem poral ordering has to be th o u g h t of as u n i ta r y . Recall that, in chapter 3, we presented Kant's intuitivity thesis for time and contended that, in order to think of any finite tem poral succession, we have to think of it as p art of a one and all-em bracing time. In view of this, the idea of tw o distinct tem poral orderings w o u ld d isru p t such a unity and w ith it, the unity of experience itself.^^ Conclusively, accord­ ing to Kant, if time is to be thought of as a unity, the perm an en t has to be th o u g h t of as being present in perception all the tim e, w hich is to say, the perm an en t has to be thought of as sem piternal and not ephem eral.

For the sake of reinforcing this K antian point, let us appeal to an­ other exam ple. C onsider a kaleidoscope. There is a m ultitude of chang­ ing images. G reen triangles tu rn all of a su d d en into yeUow squares, and these squares tu rn into brow n ellipses, and these ellipses tu rn into blue circles, and so forth. A pparently, no abiding set of elem ents is found. But if this w ere so, it m ight seem that is possible to think of change w ithout a changeless background. A nd if we th o u g h t of o u r experience in this kaleidoscope-Hke way, we m ight say th at only a set of changing ele­ m ents is encountered in our experience. How ever, granted th at our expe­ rience occurs in time, and granted also th at time, as already show n, re­ quires a perm anent, experience itself w ould collapse if this p erm an en t w ere rem oved.

In this way, although we can suppose th at all the images are vary­ ing incessantly, w e cannot suppose th at these images cease to be images. I can only refer to an image in an instant t i and an im age in t2 by p re ­ sup p o sin g th at both have certain elem ents in com m on, on the basis of w hich I am allow ed to call them 'im ag es'. In this way, w h a t indeed varies is their position in the m irror, their size, their configuration, etc. This suggests that, although there is alteration, such an alteration does

cf. B 231-2.

ure, i.e., w ith a spatial configuration. From this it follows that, even if w e suppose o u r experience to be kaleidoscope-like, we have to ad m it that the s tu ff of w hat is experienced is preserved from one m om ent of time to another. As Walsh correctly points out, "w e have to assum e th at there is a single underlying stuff w hose configurations are constantly altering b u t w hich rem ains unchanged in quantity th ro u g h o u t its various m eta­ m orphoses".^^

A considerable num ber of Kant com m entators have claim ed th at the fu rth er step in the argum ent for the req u irem en t of the perm anent deals w ith a conception of absolute perm anence, w hile the previous step deals w ith a conception of relative permanence.^^ Such a line of criticism has led them to conclude th at K a n fs argum ent suffers from a fatal oscil­