Consideraciones generales acerca de la ecología de B thuringiensis en el filoplano

The conceptualist approach to linguistic meaning adopted by the CL framework is of course not uncontroversial and – as the language-world approach and the language-internal approach presented at the beginning of this chapter – is subject to various criticisms. Two major points of criticism need to be addressed here since the feasibility of a cognitive account of verbal communication and hence of a cognitive account of (scientific and technical) translation hinges on the ability of cognitive linguistics to convincingly counter these criticisms.12

The first major criticism often raised against the conceptualist approach is that we do not have access to the content of other people’s minds and cannot make any intersubjective, let alone theoretically sound, statements about it.

Both criticisms (and especially the second one) touch upon a fundamental issue in translation and human communication in general, namely that of the stability of meaning (see the discussions in 2.4.2, 3.1.2 and 5.4.2). Since the possibility of stable meaning is one of the central tenets of scientific and technical translation, cognitive linguistics’ defence against these criticisms becomes all the more important in the context of the present thesis.

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12 _{For a more comprehensive discussion of the various objections raised by standard linguistic theory against}

a conceptualist approach to meaning see Taylor (2002:61 ff.). For a spirited defence of cognitive semantics against “its cultured despisers” see also Busse (2012:788 ff.).

If, as cognitive linguistics claims, linguistic meaning is conceptual in nature and if concepts are mental entities which are located in people’s minds, it follows that a linguistic analysis that would satisfy any intersubjective or scientific criteria is not possible (Taylor 2002:62; Busse 2012:789). This anti-mentalist stance is taken, for example, by the later Ludwig Wittgenstein (3_{1978), who}

famously claimed that the meaning of a word is not a concept in the mind of a language user but rather the rules for the use of the word14

The second criticism, which is more immediately relevant to the epistemological commitments of the present thesis, is related to the anti-mentalist critique just outlined and raises the difficult question of how cognitive linguistics explains the perceived stability of human communication (Taylor 2002:65 ff.). This communication is taken to be based on signs or linguistic units, the meanings of which are, according to cognitive linguistics, conceptual in nature. However, since concepts are not available for public investigation (see the first criticism above), we cannot be sure that different speakers associate the same concepts with the same forms or, in other words, that they share the same linguistic code. Firstly, cognitive linguistics rejects the idea that human communication requires a fixed code that is stored in identical form in the minds of all language users. In this context, Taylor (ibid.:65-66) points out that, for example, adults and young children, native speakers of a language and foreign learners will certainly not share an identical sign system but are still able to communicate with each other. According to Langacker (1987:376), the (Taylor 2002:63; Busse 2012:791). The advantage of equating the meaning of a word with the rules for its use seems obvious. The use of a word is publicly observable and hence open to objective or intersubjective investigation, the inherently subjective mental representation that a word evokes is not. Taylor (2002:64) objects that although words have a correct (and publicly observable) use, this does not render a conceptualist approach to meaning unnecessary since we still need to answer the question of what the criteria for judging the correct usage of a word are and how speakers of a language come to acquire these criteria (ibid.). More specifically, cognitive linguistics claims that while the use of a word is a publicly observable phenomenon, the rules of its use are normally no more public than the much-criticized concepts. For cognitive linguistics, it follows that these rules of use are also located in people’s minds, i.e., when evaluating the use of a word as a publicly observable phenomenon, we make use of knowledge that is normally not publicly observable but is rather entertained at the mental level. As Taylor (ibid.:64) puts it, “[t]o eliminate concepts in the head [from the characterization of linguistic meaning] does not remove the need to describe the mental structures that condition the use of a word”.

14 _{Quine (1987:130) basically takes the same position as Wittgenstein when he claims that “there is no more}

to the meaning of an expression than the overt use that we make of the expression” (see also Taylor 2002:63).

differences in the sign systems of different speakers “[do] not preclude effective communication since this requires little more than substantial overlap from one speaker to the next”.15

The theory of mind is a vast field that cannot be properly traced here in detail. Still, considering its relevance to the stability of communication and meaning in the cognitive linguistic framework (and ultimately in accounts of translation based on this framework), I will give a brief sketch of the two major (sub-)theories. In the literature on the theory of mind, two major approaches are contrasted with each other: The theory theory of mind basically states that humans have a naive psychological theory (or a “folk” psychological theory) based on which they assign mental states to others (Goldman 2006:4). On the other hand, the simulation theory of mind denies that humans possess such a veritable theory that guides the assignment of mental states. Alternatively, simulation theory holds that humans represent the mental states of others by mentally simulating these states, i.e. by generating comparable mental states in themselves or by “putting oneself in the other’s place” (Gordon 1999:766).

Also, from the generally accepted idea of linguistic underdeterminacy and the commitment made by CL to an encyclopaedic approach to meaning, it follows that a linguistic code is only one factor (albeit a very important one) in successful communication. Secondly, while we cannot know for certain what goes on in another person’s mind, cognitive linguistics claims that we have a theory of mind (Gordon 1999:838) based on which we can assume that other people’s mental experience is similar to our own (Taylor 2002:67) and which gives us the ability to attribute certain beliefs, intentions, knowledge, etc. to them.

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An essential aspect of cognition is our awareness of other people and our recognition that they, too, are cognitive agents. We are quite adept at reading their intentions, as well as imagining the nature of their mental experience. Thus cognition, far from being isulated[sic!] from the world and the other people in it, is our primary means of engaging them.

For the purpose of this thesis, we can remain agnostic as to the different fine-grained arguments in favour of or against the two (sub-)theories and appeal to the idea of theory of mind in general as an important device for the stabilization of human communication. As Langacker (2008:500) puts it in the context of cognitive linguistics:

15 _{A similar point from a translational perspective is made by Albrecht (2005:272).}

The theory of mind therefore seems to constitute an important theoretical tool for invalidating the general anti-mentalist criticism raised against cognitive linguistics. For, if both the production and the reception of utterances are guided by a theory of mind17, there seems to be a powerful coordination device at work that provides substantial stability at the conceptual level, possibly enough stability to make it open for intersubjective debate and to serve as the basis for a sound theory of the stability of linguistic meaning. Of course, the conceptual content we associate with a word may vary from one person to the next. This is licensed by the cognitive linguistic claim that words provide points of access for a vast pool of encyclopaedic knowledge, which may or may not be relevant in specific usage events. However, when we communicate on the basis of our concepts in the public domain, a theory-of-mind driven adjustment process takes place which ensures that we coordinate the conceptual knowledge that we intend to evoke using our utterances with the conceptual knowledge that we can reasonably assume our interlocutors to have.18

The concept of theory of mind is also implicit in the different communicative configurations in scientific and technical discourse discussed in 2.7.1.2, where the expert initiator of the communication will make specific assumptions about the mental states of his/her intended (expert, semi-expert or layperson) audience and will select both the content to be communicated and its form according to these assumptions (see 4.5.2 and 5.1.1). It may also inform explicitation or implicitation decisions made by a translator who will have to make informed assumptions about the mental states of the intended target text audience (see 5.1.2 and the discussion of results in chapter 8).

17 _{This means that we usually tailor our verbalization of an utterance to the mental state we attribute to our}

interlocutors, so that they can optimally work out the conceptualization we have in mind; in turn, these interlocutors interpret this verbalization by taking into consideration the mental state they attribute to us (by trying to work out the conceptualization that they think we had in mind).

18 _{Wierzbicka (1985:115) illustrates this fact with an easily comprehensible example: A bicycle mechanic}

will know much more about bicycles than a layperson, because s/he has acquired expert knowledge about bicycles and therefore certainly entertains a much richer concept of bicycles (i.e., s/he possesses much more encyclopaedic information about bicycles). If this expert talks to a layperson, s/he will use the term bicycle

not based on his/her specialist concept but on the concept that s/he attributes to the layperson interlocutor. This is basically the communicative principle underlying expert-to-layperson communication discussed in 2.7.1.2.