2.5 Hermenéutica narrativa
2.6.1 Contexto conceptual
and, if so, for designing appropriate safeguards? There are three principal options:
•
the airport operator;•
the coordinator; or
44 See Paul Klemperer, “What Really Matters in Auction Design”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002.
•
the national competition authority (NCA) or other relevant regulatory body.It is not the case that these various bodies would all have similar objectives in terms of designing an auction process to protect and promote competition in downstream air transport service markets.
The airport operator may be a natural
281. candidate to be responsible for
not be relevant if either the airport were
fit consumers. With economic regulation in it earns on its ould need to be reduced to
revenues. Given this, it might want to simplify an auction to s on its management time. 282.
operator would incur the costs associated with a competition assessment
283.
for all airlines, as it currently administrates the slot allocation in a non- discriminatory manner and this has long been part of its function. However, the coordinator (in the UK) is ultimately owned by a number of airlines who
which maximised downstream competition. designing and implementing an auction, particularly if the airport operator is considered to own the slots to be allocated. There are various possible incentives that the airport operator might have in this process:
•
The airport operator may have an incentive to maximise the revenue generated by the auction which, if there are competition concerns, it would do by not trying to promote competition amongst airlines. Rather, the airport operator would be content with ineffective competition in downstream markets for air transport services provided that it could capture some of the rents through competition amongst airlines for slots. This wouldwell-regulated or if there were competition amongst airports. Although major UK airports are subject to economic regulation, this is not necessarily true of other EU airports with strong positions.
•
Even if an airport is well-regulated and would not have an incentive to earn revenues from an auction, it might still be neutral about competition that would beneplace, auction revenues would count towards the returns assets, so other charges the airport sets w
avoid excess returns. This leaves the airport broadly agnostic about auction
minimise implementation costs or demand
Therefore, regardless of whether the airport operator has an incentive to maximise revenues or not, it does not have a clear incentive to ensure competition in downstream markets. Therefore, it is doubtful that an airport
and design of appropriate measures to increase the competitiveness of auction outcomes if this task was delegated to it.
Another option is that the coordinator takes responsibility for designing and implementing the auction. The revenue from an auction would not fall to the coordinator so, unlike the airport operator, the coordinator does not have a potential incentive to maximise revenues. The coordinator may be well placed to design an auction format that promotes equal access to slots
operate from congested airports so the coordinator may not have an incentive to design a mechanism
284.
CAs already have some powers to do this. In the UK, the OFT can conduct a market study and make market investigation references to
e Competition Commission under existing competition laws where existing features of the market appear to be preventing, restricting or distorting competition. However, market studies or investigations are time consuming and the process would have to be timed such that the findings were available to feed into the auction design. A similar proactive market study is not possible in all European jurisdictions.
285. A legal basis for assessment and intervention on competition grounds could be introduced in a revised set of Slot Regulations. This does not need to be onerous on the coordinator, airports or NCAs. For example, new Slot Regulations could require proposals for slot auctions to be notified to NCAs a certain time in advance of implementation. NCAs would then have the power to request changes to the rules on competition grounds. There could be a presumption of permission, so that if the NCA had not raised objections within some time limit, the auction could go ahead. The details of how such an approach might apply would need to be explored further ahead of any revisions to the Slot Regulations.
286. Such an approach would mesh well with taking a broader approach to defining the objectives for slot allocation. At present, the Slot Regulations are very detailed about the mechanics of slot allocation and yet do not clearly establish a set of public policy objectives for slot allocation. Drawing on parallels with other sectors where scarce rights are allocated45, three broad objectives are important:
•
promotion of economically efficient usage;•
protection and promotion of competition in services derived from slots; and•
non-discriminatory treatment of airlines.Whether or not these principles had been applied would be the relevant question for NCAs. Establishing such principles would also provide a much clearer basis for private parties to complain about slot allocation procedures. 287. In the event that a Government body was directly responsible for the design of the process for allocating new capacity, many of the concerns expressed above would drop away, as the choice of award process would presumably be driven by public interest criteria. However, it would be important to establish what the relevant objectives were and to provide some safeguard in case a Member State did not pursue appropriate objectives (for example
This leaves an obvious role for NCAs to oversee the process in some manner. N
th
45 See, for example, the Authorisation Directive for radio spectrum licensing and the Licensing Directive that preceded it.
to favour a flag carrier). By enshrining these objectives in revised Slot the potential for complaint to the European Commission if a Member State took an approach contradictory to these
bjectives.
Regulations, there would be
9 Nature of usage rights
Su mary m
•
Indefinite duration usage rights are more likely to stimulate secondary trading and provide a stable investment environment for airlines.•
Only serious competition failures in downstream markets may warrant time limited slots.•
Whether restrictions on use of slots such as “use-it-or-lose-it” should apply is a carefully balanced argument and depends on the extent of secondary market frictions.•
There is no case for restricting who can bid for slots, as this prevents slots from being used as collateral to against loans and discourages entry.In this section we consider the definition of usage rights that might be appropriate for allocating new capacity and
288.
touch briefly on who can bid for such usage rights in an auction. We are concerned here with the slot usage
289. The main issues we need to consider are:
hts
290. Our main concerns arise because the definition of usage rights may affect the efficiency of secondary markets. Conversely, there may also be some frictions in the secondary market that justify certain restrictions on usage rights. In addition, certain restrictions on trade or use may be necessary if right ultimately granted to airlines, as opposed to any ‘scheduling right’ allocated as an intermediate step in the overall allocation process for slots. We have assumed that usage rights to new capacity, once awarded in an auction, will operate in the same manner as the effectively indefinite usage rights tied to existing capacity. However many of the arguments presented would apply equally in the case of reform of the current system.
•
the duration of usage rights, in particular whether they should be finite or indefinite;•
whether there should be any restrictions on transfer of the usage rig in the secondary market; and•
whether there should be ‘use it or lose it’ restrictions on usage of the rights.9.1 D
291. We argue that usage rights to new capacity should have indefinite duration
of limited duration usage rights on the liquidity of the secondary market;
umbents are challenged to win back slots on a regular basis; and
9.1.1
292. raft need
to be purchased or leased. An aircraft can be deployed on a different route, a particular slot or the duration of usage rights. Investment in fungible assets is little
293.
, routes and networks of routes need to be developed and marketed to customers. These
294.
9.1.2 Secondary trading of usage rights with limited duration
295.