1. CAPÍTULO PRIMERO
1.3. Dimensiones para el estudio de las concepciones
1.3.2 Modernidad periférica y heterogeneidad cultural
In its current form, the new entrant rule stands
capacity had to be allocated at a congested airport. It may create a restriction of competition in downstream markets to the detriment of consumers.
the new entrant rule is common to all the alternativ for allocating a significant amount of ne
on the administrative system as there are more choices to be made about who gets what.
199. U e e process, airlines apply for specific slot
times and the coordinator assesses aggregated demand against capacity on an hour-by-hour and day-by-day basis. With a significant amount of
c a centive to apply for slots
ces strong incentives for speculative applications. With the new entrant rule gone, the field of candidates for every slot could be wide.
6.2 Revising the allocation criteria
200. The vary curre
First e, which seem
a e
•
•
•
•
S o to co•
201. 202.with a number of objective criteria for prioritising
nd r the current administrativ
ap city becoming available, applicants have an in
within every hour of every day because that would improve chances of being rewarded with slots, which could potentially be sold through the secondary market. The opportunity for windfall gains presented by the secondary market produ
criteria for prioritising slot applications within the current system may from airport to airport and between Member States. The criteria
ntly used at fully coordinated airports in the UK27 divide into two types. , a number of criteria of a practical, operational natur
im d at maximising usage of the available capacity:
effective period of operation; frequency of operation;
world-wide scheduling constraints e.g. curfews; and local guidelines.
ec ndly, criteria which seem designed to encourage the airport coordinator nsider broader issues such as competition and economic efficiency:
size and type of market;
•
competition; and•
requirements of the travelling public.The current criteria aimed at promoting efficiency and competition are not criteria that can be applied objectively by the coordinator. They are not tests that can be applied in a mechanical manner to resolve competing demands for slots. Rather, it might be more appropriate to describe the current secondary ‘criteria’ as broad objectives.
Many stakeholders pointed to the desirability of maintaining an administrative system
applications. Although stakeholders agreed that it would be a challenge to
agree a set of revised criteria, there were different views as to whether this would be feasible. One option for the Slot Regulations would be to set broad principles for slot allocation, such as:
•
economically efficient use;•
promotion of competition;•
transparency and non-discriminatory access.Member States could then be left to implement these principles as considered appropriate. Ultimately these principles would need to be turned into simple rules that could be applied in an objective manner by the coordinator.
203. There are a number of challenges a revision of the secondary criteria would need to overcome:
•
First, to define an appropriate set of stakeholders to include in the process of revising the criteria. The airport operator, the Scheduling Committee for the airport in question and the OFT or the CAA are natural candidates but there may be a number of additional stakeholders and interest groups wanting to participate.•
Second, to agree on the overall objectives for allocation. Different stakeholders will inevitably have different interests, which in turn may lead to strong incentives for lobbying. A broad objective of economic efficiency would seem in the public interest, but this is difficult to implement in administrative processes with limited information about the value that airlines place on slots. In practice, we might well end up with multiple objectives and the need to weight these appropriately.•
Third, the agreed objectives would need to be translated into criteria based on observable factors such as long-haul vs. short-haul routes, aircraft-size and frequency of operation etc. This would allow the coordinator to take a rule-based approach to allocation.204. A stakeholder proposed that prioritisation of objectives could be agreed by pair-wise comparison of different objectives for slot allocation. The process would first identify all relevant objectives and then assess the relative importance of each objective against every other objective to create an overall ranking. For each objective, specific criteria that represented the objective would then have to be agreed so that each competing request could be tested against the objectives. Once the criteria were agreed, the process would be implemented by inputting the data resulting from the evaluation of each competing request against the criteria in to specialist software to create an overall ranking of applications in line with the prioritised objectives.
205. It was suggested by a stakeholder within the Industry Forum that UK industry stakeholders take the initiative to develop a set of workable criteria for a revised administrative system at London Heathrow to illustrate that
that a group of UK industry stakeholders have been examining the potential ia for administrative allocation and intend to report progress on this work to the UK Government
ter this year.
for developing and agreeing a set of revised criter
7 Two-stage hybrid allocation process
Summary
•
We have developed the two-stage hybrid approach further in response to industry feedback on its feasibility.•
Scheduling rights could be defined by one-hour time windows for departure or arrival.•
This approach makes the auction format slightly more complex than a system with broader timer windows, but reduces risk for airlines and the complexity for the coordinator.•
The two-stage hybrid approach integrates well with the current IATA deadlines for scheduling and does not present significant challenges for coordination with the other end of the route compared with an administrative system.•
Whilst the two-stage hybrid approach is relevant to different airport situations, the precise details can only be finalised in the context of a specific capacity scenario.206. As discussed in Section 5, the two-stage hybrid allocation process emerged from the first stage of this project as the leading contender for a market based approach. Our discussions with airlines, airport operators and the coordinator about the feasibility of the various alternative allocation mechanisms did not reveal any issues suggesting that a two-stage allocation process would be unworkable. Whilst a number of industry stakeholders did not agree with the use of auctions as a general principle, they nonetheless agreed that a two-stage process was a feasible approach to explore further. Our initial version of the first stage auction, as discussed with industry stakeholders and reported in
207.
the interim report, presented a clock auction of so-called ‘scheduling rights’. It was put to us that 3-4 hour time windows defining lots we proposed were too broad for airlines to value them and that lots would have to distinguish between arrivals and departures for the airport operator to be able to state capacity with a reasonable degree of accuracy. In this section we address how these points could be addressed and the practical implication this would have on the overall mechanism.
7.1 D
208.
arly a difference between peak and less valuable off- peak slots. On the other hand, slots that are close in time are likely to be
7.1.1
209. Our initial proposal was to group available slots into five broad groupings of rights throughout the day defined by 3-4 hour time windows, for example as depicted in Table 5 below: