LA CONTINUACIÓN DE UNA GRAN OBRA

Croatia likes to present itself as a neutral mediator regarding BiH, but is rather a strong supporter of the point of view of BiH’s Croats on the internal situation in the country. Croatia’s politicians are vocal supporters of Bosnia

193 _{A detailed chronology of the negotiation can be found here: Not for lack of trying. Chronol-}

ogy of efforts to solve the Sejdic-Finci conundrum, www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20Se- jdic%20Finci%20chronology%20-%20Not%20for%20lack%20of%20trying.pdf

194 _{Bosnia-Herzegovina – EU: Deep disappointment on Sejdić-Finci implementation, http://eu-}

ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-117_en.htm

195 _{E. M. Jukic, UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia, http://www.balkaninsight.com/}

en/article/uk-germany-propose-bosnia-s-renewed-eu-perspective

196 _{See at F. Bieber, Why constitutional reform will not solve the Bosnian blockade, http://flo-}

rianbieber.org/2014/07/28/why-constitutional-reform-will-not-solve-the-bosnian-block- ade/, Lost in the Bosnian labyrinth. Why the Sejdic-Finci case should not block an EU appli- cation, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=143

197 _{K. Bassuener, B. Weber, Croatian and Serbian policy in Bosnia – Herzegovina. Help or hin-}

drance?, democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/pdf/dpc_neighbors_study_final.pdf, p. I.

198 _{In the 90s the authoritarian regimes of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman had active-}

ly supported the separatist aspiration of Serbs and Croats in BiH through financial, political and military means. W. Stanisławski, M.Szpala, op. cit., p. 143.

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territorial integrity, its membership in the EU and the reform of the consti- tutional system of BiH and critics of the ethnopolitical game of the country’s elites. They also are aware that the stability of Bosnia is in the vital interest of Zagreb due to their long common border.199 _{On the other hand, though,}

Zagreb still perceive the non-representation of Croats’ interests as the main problem in BiH and in consequence continue to push for the creation of a third entity as a best solution to the permanent crisis in the country even if it brings no change to the functionality of the state or makes it even worse.200

Moreover, after becoming an EU member in 2013, Croatia also started to use its position as an EU member to impose its own solutions to bilateral prob- lems with Bosnia.

The importance of BiH in Croatia has diminished in the past years. Croatia’s society is less interested in the situation in BiH and the influence of Bosnia’s Croats on Croatian politics decreased due to changes in the electoral law in 2010.201 _{Both Croatia presidents – Stipe Mesić and Ivo Josipović took signifi-}

cant steps towards reconciliation between both nations.202 _{But these pro-}

cesses have not changed the objectives policy which the main parties have towards BiH. Both right-wing HDZ and left-wing SDP promote the idea of a third entity and in case of some tension in BiH they have conducted unoffi- cial consultation with the Croats’ leader to strengthen their position, bypass- ing state authorities in Sarajevo. When an SDP-led coalition took the power in 2011 the first initiative towards BiH of the new Foreign Minister Vesna Pusić was federalisation of the country. Bosnia was to be divided into five entities and the Croats would get one.203 _{Wide support for the Croat entity is espe-}

cially seen in the European Parliament, where all the Croatian MPs from dif- ferent political backgrounds support the idea. What is most important, other problems of BiH are ignored.

199 _{Over 1000 kilometres.}

200 _{It was perfectly seen in the speeches of the representatives of Croatia at a conference organ-}

ised by the European Parliament in Brussels „European future of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 20 years after Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement” in December 2015 https://youtu.be/eE3L- 1BXfpXs

201 _{The Amendments to the Croatian Parliamentary election reduced the number of polling sta-}

tion in BiH and the Parliamentary representation of the diaspora to three members.

202 _{See at M.Szpala, Croatian president has initiated new policy towards Balkans, http://www.}

euractiv.com/enlargement/president-croatia-has-initiated-new-policy-towards-balkans- analysis-494054

203 _{Vesna Pusić’s next initiative in April 2014 was aimed at unblocking the country’s EU inte-}

gration process, but failed to garner enough support. It did, though, become the basis of the German – British initiative for BiH introduced in December 2014.

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Relations between BiH and Croatia are also overshadowed by bilateral prob- lems, which are a legacy of a common state like the demarcation of the common border and the division of Yugoslav property. Due to Croatia’s EU membership, new disputes were added regarding connection between the Dubrovnik pene- enclaves and the Croatia mainland, which are separated by the Bosnian part of the coast (Neum corridor) and renegotiations of the SAA between EU and BiH. To solve the first problem Croatia wants to build a so called Pelješac bridge, which BiH opposes, claiming that it prevents the flow into Bosnia’s only har- bour in Neum. As for the latter Zagreb wants to update the SAA between the EU and Bosnia in order to export all products to BiH without tariffs. The cur- rent agreement guarantees Bosnia protection for 15 products, which, due to ag- ricultural subsidies in the EU, cannot compete with those from the EU.204 _Since

no compromise was reached in this case, in January 2016 the EU suspended trade preferences for BiH. This action is not only especially harmful for Bos- nia’s fragile economy. It is undermining the policy of the EU in BiH. The EU just unblocked the SAA to convince Bosnian political elites to carry out the reform. It is also highly probable that in the future Croatia to force BiH to make conces- sions on contentious issues would block its EU accession.