LEY ORGÁNICA 2/2006, DE 3 DE MAYO, DE EDUCACIÓN

The initial Anglo-German agenda appeared to have a very pragmatic dimen- sion. Instead of pushing for constitutional reforms blocking Bosnia’s path to Europe for over 5 years (primarily the Sejdić and Finci case and the 2009 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights), it sought to address the most pressing issue for Bosnian society – the need for economic reform.

The initial letter co-authored by Hammond and Steinmeier was sufficiently vague to be accepted by Bosnian politicians (as they eventually did in February 2015).236 _{Its basis was the Compact for Growth and Jobs, which later translated into}

a more specific ‘Reform Agenda 2015-18’. And this proved to be more problematic. The Compact for Growth and Jobs was originally published in July 2014. It was a product of the Forum for Prosperity and Jobs held in Sarajevo in May 2014 and of subsequent consultations. It has received support from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the EU and the US Administration.237 _{The Compact iden-}

tified six priority reforms: (1) changes in the existing taxes on jobs, (2) opening up the labour market by removing the existing barriers, (3) improving the busi- ness climate (BiH was ranked 131st _{on the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking),}

(4) strengthening the private sector by restructuring large state-owned enter- prises, (5) dealing with corruption (stronger adherence to the rule of law and public administration reform), and (6) increasing social protection for the citizens of BiH. Initially the compact was endorsed by the political elites, but when it came to implementation (the Reform Agenda), obstacles started to appear. The biggest one has not changed since the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) itself – the do- mestic political dynamics in BiH and the inseparability of the economy from politics strengthened by the 2014 elections.

The October 2014 elections have further cemented the political bases of three major nationalist parties: the Party of Democratic action – SDA (Bosniak), the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH – HDZ BiH (Croat) and the Alliance of Inde- pendent Social-Democrats – SNSD (Serb). The coalition talks on all levels, from

236 _{E. M. Jukić, Bosnian lawmakers unblock path towards EU, http://www.balkaninsight.com/}

en/article/bosnian-leaders-unblock-country-s-eu-path

237 _{Compact for Growth and Jobs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Delegation of the European Union}

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the federal government to the governments in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska have yet again exposed the loopholes in the Dayton agreement. Again it turned out that no one is really in the opposition, which was most vividly seen in the case of RS – the dominant SNSD controls the local parliament and local government, but is in opposition on the federal level, where the Serbian Democratic Party – SDS and the Party of Democratic Progress – PDP (themselves in opposition in RS) are parts of the coalition. The elections and their outcomes have only confirmed what Paddy Ashdown called the permanent dysfunctionality of Bosnian institutions.238

The new ‘strategic approach’ was met by the ‘old politics’. The focus on eco- nomic reforms, although approved in February 2015, was met with fundamen- tal systemic resistance – a system of patronage and business relations based on political power. EU-promoted economic reforms posed a threat to the function- ing of BiH’s system of patronage in both FBiH and RS.

1.1. Resistance in FBiH

The ‘breath of fresh air’ in FBiH was supposed to come with the electoral success of the Democratic Front – DF, a new political party formed by Željko Komšić, a former member of Bosnia’s state presidency. One of its key electoral promises was to address corruption and promote transparency. The post-election arith- metic in FBiH meant that the only realistic governing coalition was SDA (the biggest winner of the election), HDZ BiH and DF. This agreement fell apart rela- tively quickly (spring 2015) over DF’s insistence on public transparency.239 _This

was something neither SDA (in opposition in the past 4 years, eager to regain its influence and access to public funds), nor HDZ BiH (not interested in losing control over various companies) was willing to agree on.

1.2. Defiance in RS

A much bigger (and more direct) blow came from Republika Srpska, where its president – Milorad Dodik refused to accept the ‘Reform Agenda 2015-2018’.240

238 _{Bosnia and Herzegovina – new international thinking (workshop report), South East Euro-}

pean Studies at Oxford, March 2015, p. 17.

239 _{DF traži policijsku istragu javnih preduzeća, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/df-trazi-}

policijsku-istragu-javnih-preduzeca

240 _{Reformska agenda za Bosnu i Herzegovinu za period 2015-2018. godina, http://www.fbihv-}

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The agenda was ‘intended to respond to the call of the Foreign Affairs Council of December 2014 to develop an initial agenda for reforms in line with EU ac- quis’ and it mirrored the priorities set by the Compact for Growth and Jobs, giv- ing them a more specific shape. The document was adopted by the government of FBiH and by the Council of Ministers (Bosnia’s state government) but re- jected by the government in RS, as it was expected that public companies in the energy sector would be privatised.241 _{This was something that would directly}

hit the SNDS system of patronage and the financial (mis)management of state assets. This decision has led to the last minute cancellation of the visit to Sa- rajevo by Johannes Hahn, the EU’s enlargement commissioner. Eventually the RS government approved the agenda in late July 2015, a decision welcomed by Philip Hammond,242 _{Frank-Walter Steinmeier}243 _{and the EU. Rather unsurpris-}

ingly, the privatisation of the energy sector in FBiH or in RS was not directly mentioned in the final document.244

The crisis has temporarily been averted; the ‘new strategic approach’ is (theo- retically) still in place; at least until another part of the agenda is questioned by Banja Luka. Nevertheless, the ‘new strategic approach’ has suffered its first loss with the politico-economical Bosnian system of power. This episode clearly illustrated the inseparability of the political and economic systems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both remain strongly interconnected. Political power gives access to state funds and state enterprises, which in turn provides em- ployment opportunities. Taking into consideration the fact that in a country of 3.28 million, 7,748 people have put their names on electoral lists, which as Jesse Hronesova calculated, means that ‘almost every second family in Bosnia is somehow linked to a political subject through one of its family members’.245

This not only shows why certain parties do not lose their popularity but also that the political and the economical are in fact intrinsically linked in BiH.

241 _{Reformska agenda pred NS RS? http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Reformska-agen-}

da-pred-NS-RS/310345

242 _{Foreign Secretary welcomes BiH adoption of Reform Agenda, https://www.gov.uk/govern-}

ment/news/foreign-secretary-welcomes-bih-adoption-of-reform-agenda

243 _{Foreign Minister Steinmeier welcomes adoption of reform agenda in Bosnia and Herzego-}

vina, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2015/150728_ BosnienHerzegowina.html?nn=479796

244 _{Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015-2018, working translation, Delegation of}

the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://europa.ba/wp-content/up- loads/2015/09/Reform-Agenda-BiH.pdf

245 _{J. Hronesova, Bosnia – Voting for the devil you know, Balkan Insight, http://www.balkan-}

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Nevertheless, the challenges faced by Bosnia and Herzegovina reach beyond domestic politics.