Most of the Western scholars have described jihad as a ‘holy war’ to convert non-Muslims and to expand the territory of Islam.219 This description of jihad has been the subject of huge controversy between the scholars from the West and from Muslim majority states. The scholars from inside the Muslim communities claim that the wrong description of jihad by the Western scholars is due to their lack of understanding of the religion and hostile attitude towards Islam.220 An outsider from the West tends to interpret and judge the religion of others through the historical, religious, and cultural experience that have formed his/her own intellect.221 Furthermore, the complexity is doubled in the case of the study of the law of war in the religion
213 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Introduction’ in Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad
Hashim Kamali (eds), War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (MABDA 2013) XVI.
214 Al-Qur’an 34:27, Abu Yusuf translation. “We have sent thee not, except to mankind entire, good tidings to
bear, and warning; but most men do not know it.”
215 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1955) 56.
216 Ardalan Rezamand, ‘Use of Religious Doctrine and Symbolism in the Iraq-Iran War’ (2010) 9 Journal of the
Centre for Studies in Religion and Society 83.
217 Said Mahmoudi, ‘The Islamic Perception of the Use of Force in the Contemporary World’ (The International
Law and the Islamic World: Towards a Multipolar International Legal System, organised by Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Public Law, Heidelberg and the Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran, Iran, 3-5 April 2004, page 7).
218 Ibid.
219 Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East (London: Alcov Press 1973); see
also Ruven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (OUP 1999); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of
Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996).
220 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft (Harper Collins 2007) 226; see also John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed,
Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press 2007) 75.
96
of others because outsiders may find themselves to be the enemy according to the law of war they are studying.222
‘Jihad’ is translated in the Western media and scholarly writings as ‘holy war’ would in Arabic be equivalent to al-harb al-muqaddasah, which is totally unfamiliar and unknown to Arabic speakers.223 The term ‘holy war’ is relatively used lately in the West and it does not directly translate any of the regularly used Muslim terms, including central term jihad.224 For example, Sir Ian Brownlie has stated that jihad is ‘holy war’ which means ‘a war against the unfaithful’.225
Ruven Firestone claims that jihad in Islam is a ‘holy war’ and he supports his claim by proposing that “it was the Prophet but not the Meccan idolaters who initiated aggression against the later by berating their God’s and insulting their ancestors who died as unbelievers.226 He also claims that the wars fought by the Prophet in his lifetime had developed into the total declaration of war against all groups who did not accept the truth of the hegemony of Islam.227 Jurists attempting to explain and legitimise these expansionist conquests divided the world into two parts: the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and the dar al-harb (abode of war). Increasing the former and subduing the latter was deemed to be the collective duty of the Muslim State.228 It was on this basis that jihad became synonymous with the notion of Holy War – a religious war aimed at the subjugation of neighbouring states with the intention of bringing them the true faith and if necessary forcing that faith upon them.229
These claims suggest that Western jurists approached Islam with a tendency to study and interpret it through the historical and religious experiences of Judaism and Christianity.230 This is not the right approach as it does not take into account the history and Qur’anic texts that address the circumstances when armed jihad was permitted. The right approach has been adopted by Bruce Lawrence who maintains that “the war Muhammad waged against Mecca
222 Ibid.
223 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Introduction’ in Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad
Hashim Kamali (eds), War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (MABDA 2013) XII.
224 James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Pennsylvania State University
Press 1997) 25.
225 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (OUP 1963) 6. 226 Ruven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (OUP 1999) 106. 227 Ibid 134.
228 Major T.R. Copinger-Symes, ‘Is Osama bin Laden’s ‘Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans’ dated 23
February 1998 Justified by Islamic Law?’ (2003) 3 Defence Studies 44, 51.
229 Ibid.
230 Rudolph Peters, ‘Review of Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam’ cited in Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic
97
was not a struggle for prestige or wealth but for the survival of God’s Word and his own person.”231
The Constitution of Medina, recorded in Ibn Ishaq’s (d. 151 AH/768 CE) Sirat Rasul Allah (The Biography of the Messenger of God), the most important historical account of the life of the Prophet, indicates that jihad was for any community willing to fight alongside the Muslims (with the exception of polytheists). Ibn Ishaq prefaces his account of the Constitution by saying: The Prophet Muhammad composed a writing between the Emigrants and the Ansa’r,232 in which he made a treaty and covenant with the Jews, confirmed their religion and possessions, and gave them certain rights and duties. The text of the treaty then follows- In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.
This is a writing of Muhammad the prophet between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib233 and those who follow them and are attached to them and who crusade (ja’hada) along with them. They are a single community distinct from other people…. Whosoever of the Jews follows us has the (same) help and support…, so long as they are not wronged [by him] and he does not help [others] against them.234
The inclusion of the Jews in this new ummah state and the affirmation that the Jews have the right to practice their religion and the Muslims have theirs indicate that the ummah state is no longer a religious community.235
In the very early period of jihad, Christian Arabs from tribes such as the Banu Tayyi’ of Najd, the Banu al-Namir ibn Qasiu of the upper Euphrates river valley, and the Banu Lakhm participated in the jihad with the Muslim armies.236 In the battle of Badr, Uhud, and Hunayn and al-Taif both Jews and idolators fought with the Prophet.237 These examples mitigate against the idea that these were wars fought for the spread of a certain religion.238 Historically, jihad was directed against those who stood in opposition to the political authority of the Muslim
231 Bruce Lawrence, The Qur’an: A Biography (London: Atlantic Books 2006) 42.
232 It refers to those people of Medina who accepted the Islamic message and invited the Prophet and the emigrants
to the city, giving them refuge from their situation of persecution in Mecca. For this reason, these residents of Medina were given the title of ansa’r of helpers, due to the fact that they gave safe haven to the Prophet and the emigrants.
233 This is the earlier name of Medina.
234 Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina (OUP: Karachi 1988) 221. 235 Ibid 241.
236 Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princetown: Princetown University Press 1981) 200.
237 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 39. 238 Ibid.
98
state.239 It was not directed against a people simply because they professed a faith other than Islam. 240 Moreover, contemporary Muslim scholars strongly advocated the Islamic permissibility of seeking the support of the non-Muslim forces for the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 to February 1991.241
In addition to describing jihad as an Islamic legal term mandating forced conversion to Islam, the Western scholars have also misinterpreted it by claiming that it denotes territorial expansion by use of force.242 David Cook, for example, thinks that the Prophet launched campaigns during the last nine years of his life in order to conquer territories. He concludes that the aim in the battles of Badr, Uhud, the Ditch, Meccan, and Hunayn was to dominate Medina, Mecca, and al-Taif.243
Firestone has invoked the phrase fi sabil Allah (in the path of God) to qualify jihad as furthering or promoting God’s kingdom on earth.244 However, there is no Qur’anic text which corroborates this claim made by Firestone.245 The phrase fi sabil Allah in the Qur’an indicates “the way of truth and justice, including all the teachings it gives on the justifications of war.”246 Most of the Western scholars247 and few Muslim scholars claim that use of force in jihad is based on the religious belief of the non-Muslims. That means, any non-Muslims and their territories are subject to use of force by Muslims solely on the ground that they are non- Muslims. This claim is not consistent with the Qur’anic provisions because all the monotheists religion except Islam, which are Jews, Christians, Sabaeans, and Zoroastrians are referred in the Qur’an as ahl al-kitab (People of the Book) and accordingly are not treated as other
239 David Dakake, ‘The Myth of Militant Islam’ in Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad
Hashim Kamali (eds), War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad (MABDA 2013) 125.
240 Ibid.
241 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ‘Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The Islamist Perspective’ in Bhyllis Bennis
and Michel Moushabeck (eds), Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader (Oliver Branch Press: New York 1991) 251.
242 David Cook, Understanding Jihad (University of California Press: Los Angeles 2005) 6. 243 Ibid.
244 Ruven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (OUP 1999) 17.
245 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 57. 246 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style (London: Tauris 1999) 62. 247 Richard C. Martin, ‘The Religious Foundations of War, Peace, and Statecraft in Islam’ in John Kelsay and
James Turner Johnson (eds), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in
99
religions but as itself.248 The only requirement that the People of the Book is bound to follow in an abode of Islam is to pay poll tax (Jizyah).249
There is not a single verse in the Qur’an that justifies war to bring about conversion to Islam, otherwise jizyah would not have been accepted from non-Muslims.250 Moreover, jizyah was accepted from non-Arab idolators but not from Arab idolators and this distinction proves that the justification of use of force in jihad is aggression, not the religious belief per se.251
It is not the unbelievers, as such, who are the object of force but unbelievers who demonstrate their hostility and persecution to Islam.252 There is no provision in the Shari‘a for using force against unbelievers and this is because the Muslims were not allowed to do the same thing, such as persecution, to other religion and their followers which they were subjected to. Moreover, war and coercion are not means by which religion may be propagated because belief in a religion is only a matter of the conviction of the heart.253 Even the classical scholar Ibn
Taymiyya had confirmed that difference in religion is not itself a justification for fighting.254
The study of jihad in most of the Western literature has been limited to distorted reading of the Qur’anic texts and the sayings of the Prophet, which creates a totally different impression according to which Muslims are transformed from fighters in just and defensive war into initiators of offensive holy war.255
The closing of Ijtihad was also amounting to closing of expansion of Islam. Had the Islamic international law meant jihad as ‘holy war’ in the sense of expansion of the religion by extraterritorial use of force then they would not have closed the gate of Ijtihad. This is because
248 Ismail R. al-Faruqi, ‘Islam and Other Faiths: The World’s Need for Humane Universalism’ in Altaf Gauhar
(ed), The Challenge of Islam (Islamic Council of Europe: London 1978) 108; see also C.G. Weeramantry, Islamic
Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan 1988) 86; Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
85.
249 Al-Qur’an 9:29, Abu Yusuf translation.
250 Mahmud Shaltut, ‘Al-Islam wa al-Alaqat al-Dawliyyah’ cited in Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of
War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 68.
251 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 68;
see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-defense to Revolutionary and Regime- Change Political Violence’ (2007) 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 119, 121.
252 Mahmoud Shaltut, Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam (Rudolph Peters tr, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1977) 44; see
also Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, ‘The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History’, in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western
and Islamic Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) 43.
253 Al-Qur’an 2:256; 10:99; 16:93; 18:29 (Abu Yusuf translation) cited in Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law
of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 78.
254 Ibn Taymiyya, ‘Siyasat al-Shar’iyaa’, cited in John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Harvard University
Press 2009) 120.
100
the influx of foreign systems and methods of interpretation of the Shari‘a by leaving the gate of Ijtihad open could have stimulated the propagation of Islam to non-Muslims.