v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 J. Del Castillo
The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus making them unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporation’s building, cannot be upheld especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus considered parties-in-interest in the present case.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Injunction and Damages with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/TRO against respondents as owners of ALDO Development and Resources, Inc., alleging that they are the registered owners of the parcel of land upon which a building was constructed upon by the latter. It was also alleged that sometime earlier, a case was filed by the respondents against petitioners for Injunction and Damages for the latter allegedly was constructing a fence without a permit and which would destroy the wall of the former’s building which was however denied by the court. In order to gather evidence for such case, the respondents installed on their building surveillance cameras facing the petitioner’s property, and also took pictures of the construction without the consent of the latter. The petitioners on the main pray that the respondents be ordered to remove the cameras and to be enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance for being violative of the petitioner’s right to privacy.
In their defense, the respondents asserted that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, and that they are but merely stockholders of ALDO and not owners thereof.
The RTC, in its decision, ruled in favor of petitioner and granted their application for TRO. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents was denied by the RTC, thus prompting them to file a petition or certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Such was granted by the CA, declaring that the respondents are not the proper parties to the suit, since they are not the owners of the building but mere stockholders of ALDO.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit. RULING:
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former."
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras. And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred. Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M. CODERIAS v. ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG
G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013 J. Del Castillo
Respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription.
FACTS:
The deceased respondent Cidoco owned a 4-hectare farm in Nueva Ecija wherein petitioner was a tiller. As such, respondent was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer. However, petitioner and his family left the farm under threat of death by people connected with
respondent. Upon learning of respondent’s death, the petitioner and his family re-established themselves on the farm, and thereafter filed a with the DARAB a petition against respondent’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected and that a leasehold contract between them be executed. Respondent on the other hand moved to dismiss the petition, contending that the petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed under Sec.38 of RA 3844, as amended, since the alleged dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond the statutory three-year period for filing such claims. On September 10, 1996, the PARAD issued a decision dismissing the petition on the groung of prescription.
Upon petitioner’s appeal to the DARAB, the PARAD decision was set aside, ordering the respondent to respect and maintain the petitioner in his peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject landholding. The motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent was denied by the DARAB. Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA, insisting that petitioner’s cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. The CA held that although there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, the former’s action has prescribed. Petitioner then filed a manifestation with motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed. RULING:
The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x." None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two years after, or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued." In this case, we deem it proper to reckon petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated above, include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.
Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the will, and so long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of his free will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to them, and harvest them. He could not file an agrarian case against Chioco, for that meant having to return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case anywhere else; any other agrarian tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise jurisdiction.
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. In Catorce v. Court of Appeals, this Court succinctly held:
Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in question. Not only did respondent fail to controvert this fact, but he even impliedly admitted the same in his Answer to petitioner’s Complaint when he raised, as one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary surrender of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court should have taken this fact into consideration for tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory judgment, which is not so in the case at bar.
At any rate, respondent cannot legally invoke the strict application of the rules on prescription because the failure of petitioner to immediately file the Petition was due to its own maneuvers. This Court should not allow respondent to profit from its threats and intimidation. Besides, if we subscribe to respondent’s ratiocination that petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a tenant who was unlawfully deprived of his landholding would be barred from pursuing his rightful claim against the transgressor.
Petitioner’s tenure on the farm should be deemed uninterrupted since he could not set foot thereon. And if he could not make the required payments to Chioco or the Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner should not be faulted. And, since his tenure is deemed uninterrupted, any benefit or advantage from the land should accrue to him as well.
Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to ensure the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills which would certainly not be possible where the former owner is allowed to reacquire the land at any time following the award – in contravention of the government’s objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.