For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the controversy arises not from the findings made by Hammonia and Dorchester’s physicians which contradict the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians.
FACTS:
Petitioners Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc., in behalf of its principal, Dorchester Marine Ltd., hired respondent Eulogio V. Dumadag for four months as Able Bodied Seaman for the vessel Al Hamra after being declared fit for work. However, while on board Dumadag complained of difficulty in sleeping but was adjudged twice to be fit for work. When his contract ended, he was not rehired despite the findings that he was fit to work. After four consultations finding him unfit for work at sea, Dumadag filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and attorney’s fees against Hammonia and Dorchester. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Dumadag which was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition should be dismissed for raising only questions of fact and not of law in violation of the rules.
RULING:
Petition denied.
The Court finds Hammonia and Dorchester’s position untenable. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. In the present case, the controversy arises not from the findings made by Hammonia and Dorchester’s physicians which contradict the fit-to- work certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians. The Court thus finds no procedural obstacle in its review of the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DATU NOT ABDUL G.R. No. 186137, June 26, 2013
Abdul was convicted despite the evidentiary gaps in the testimonies of the police officers. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene. Two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage – from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated.
It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established.
FACTS:
Respondent Datu Not Abdul was apprehended during a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Daniel Akia of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency acting as the poseur-buyer together with P S/Insp John Mencio, SPO4 Marquez Madlon, and PO2 Erwin Garcia. The police officers brought him to the PDEA office, where the operation was documented and the arrest report and the Affidavits of the arresting officers were prepared. Also, an inventory of the item seized from Adbul was made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media, and the barangay council. PO2 Akia allegedly marked the plastic sachet with the initials "MKM, DEA, EMG" and Exhibit "A." The plastic sachet was then forwarded to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Cordillera Administrative Region for analysis. The forensic analyst, PO2 Juliet Valentin Albon issued a chemistry report which found that the plastic sachet contained 1.85 grams of a white crystalline substance; and that a qualitative examination gave a positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The RTC convicted Abdul which was affirmed by the CA. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Abdul cited inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers and that the buy-bust operation team failed to follow the guidelines for drug operations, as SPO4 Madlon testified that he did not place any markings on the plastic sachet of shabu at the place where the arrest took place, but only marked it at the office. Also, the testimonies of PO2 Akia and PO2 Garcia were silent as to when and where the marking of the shabu took place.
ISSUES:
1. Whether an issue raised for the first on appeal may be reviewed by the Supreme Court 2. Whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-of-custody rule
RULING:
Petition granted.
1. This case falls under this exception because the CA, in appreciating the facts, erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that there was compliance with the rule on the chain of custody.
Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments should be brought to the attention of the trial court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule arises when there is plain error. An instance of plain error is overlooking, misapprehending, or misapplying facts of weight and substance that, if properly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion. This case falls under this exception because the CA, in appreciating the facts, erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that there was compliance with the rule on the chain of custody.
2. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established.
The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene. This rule, when applied to drug cases, requires a more stringent application, because the corpus delicti – the narcotic substance is not readily identifiable and must be subjected to scientific analysis to determine its composition and nature.
Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering, alteration or substitution. However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard. Nonetheless, two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage – from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated.
All the foregoing facts show that there were substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the plastic sachet. Hence, these facts put into question the reliability and evidentiary value of the contents of the alleged confiscated plastic sachet from appellant – if indeed it was the same as the one brought to the laboratory for examination, found positive for shabu, and then presented before the RTC. It was a grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established. It is of no moment either that Abdul stipulated the existence of Chemistry Report No. D-057-05, as this report did not amount to an admission of the identity of the contents of the plastic sachet. Instead, it merely proved the existence and authenticity of the request for a laboratory examination, and its result had no bearing on the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of the plastic sachet.
J PLUS ASIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. UTILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION G.R. No. 199650, June 26, 2013
J. Villarama, Jr.
The CIAC rendered an arbitral award that was appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasijudicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law.
FACTS:
Petitioner J Plus Asia Development Corporation and Martin Mabuhay entered into a Construction Agreement where Mabuhay would construct J Plus Asia’s condominium/hotel building. After it was found that only 31.39% of the project was completed, J Plus terminated the contract and sent letters of demand that were unheeded. J Plus filed a request for arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) and prayed that Mabuhay and his surety, respondent Utility Assurance, pay liquidated damages and overpayment. The CIAC ruled in favor of J Plus. The CA reversed the CIAC’s ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act and the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution stripped the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to review arbitral awards.
2. Whether the CA erred in reversing the arbitral award on an issue that was not raised in the answer, not identified in the terms of reference, not assigned as an error, and not argued in any of the pleadings filed before the court.
RULING:
1. The Court finds no merit in J Plus’ contention that with the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the CA was divested of jurisdiction to review the decisions or awards of the CIAC.
On the procedural issues raised, the Court finds no merit in J Plus’ contention that with the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the CA was divested of jurisdiction to review the decisions or awards of the CIAC. J Plus erroneously relied on the provision in said law allowing any party to a domestic arbitration to file in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition either to confirm, correct or vacate a domestic arbitral award.
The Court holds that R.A. No. 9285 did not confer on Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction to review awards or decisions of the CIAC in construction disputes. On the contrary, Section 40 thereof expressly declares that confirmation by the RTC is not required.
Executive Order (EO) No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. By express provision of Section 19 thereof, the arbitral award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which are appealable to the Supreme Court. With the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7902 and promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CIAC was included in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or awards may be appealed to the CA in a petition for review under Rule 43. Such review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law.
J Plus misread the provisions of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC (Special ADR Rules) promulgated by this Court and which took effect on October 30, 2009. Since R.A. No. 9285 explicitly excluded CIAC awards from domestic arbitration awards that need to be confirmed to be executory, said awards are therefore not covered by Rule 11 of the Special ADR Rules, as they continue to be governed by EO No. 1008, as amended and the rules of procedure of the CIAC. The CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provide for the manner and mode of appeal from CIAC decisions or awards in Section 18 thereof which states that a petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 2. As to the alleged error committed by the CA in deciding the case upon an issue not raised or litigated before the CIAC, this assertion has no basis.
As to the alleged error committed by the CA in deciding the case upon an issue not raised or litigated before the CIAC, this assertion has no basis. Whether or not Mabunay had incurred delay in the performance of his obligations under the Construction Agreement was the very first issue stipulated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), which is distinct from the issue of the extent of Utility Assurance’s liability under the Performance Bond.
Indeed, resolution of the issue of delay was crucial upon which depends J Plus’ right to the liquidated damages pursuant to the Construction Agreement. Contrary to the CIAC’s findings, the CA opined that delay should be reckoned only after the lapse of the one-year contract period, and consequently Mabuhay’s liability for liquidated damages arises only upon the happening of such condition.
POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v. TITO R. TAMALA, FELIPE S. SAURIN, JR. ARTEMIO A. BO-OC and JOEL S. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 186475, June 26, 2013