• No se han encontrado resultados

Costes por uso de la infraestructura: tarifas por utilización de otros servicios

In document Documento Final 3 de Junio de 2011 (página 86-91)

PARTE III: ANÁLISIS DEL TRANSPORTE CARRETERA

TRÁFICOS DE MERCANCÍAS CONTENERIZABLES DE ÁMBITO NACIONAL CAPTABLES POR EL FERROCARRIL

1. Costes por uso de la infraestructura: tarifas por utilización de otros servicios

Specific data collection (SDC) is the most common task associated with SR. The SFOD conducts SDC mission to collect a specified piece or type of information. Normally, an SFOD conducts SDC as the collateral requirements of SR, that is, the requirement to infiltrate, to operate, and to exfiltrate undetected. The most common types of SDC include but are not limited to LOC surveillances, point target surveillance, information collection, and signal intercept.

LOC Surveillance

In this type of operation, the SFOD infiltrates a JSOA and establishes surveil- lance along the specified LOC. The LOC could be a major highway, a rail line, or even a canal, along which significant traffic passes or is expected to pass. The SFOD then collects and reports information concerning activity along the LOC based upon predetermined or specified significant indicators. These indicators are normally pieces of equipment, types of units, or even certain types of activi- ties. The indicators may themselves be innocuous, but their presence or absence along the LOC may provide significant operational or strategic intelligence. Ex- amples of significant indicators are NBC delivery means, chemical decontamina- tion equipment, air defense artillery (ADA) system radars, special purpose troops, large or unusual troop or equipment convoys, refugee movements, spe- cialized unit equipment, security force activities, or heavy construction activities. LOC surveillance units provide the CINC or JTF commander “eyes on” HUMINT of threat operational or strategic intent. SFODs receive this tasking because it is beyond the capability of other means or because the tasking au- thority needs the flexibility that human operators provide.

The success of SFODs conducting this type of surveillance often depends on their ability to avoid compromise. Operational security requirements drive many of the considerations that determine infiltration and/or exfiltration means as well as the surveillance and observation technique and equipment selected to perform the mis- sion. Almost exclusively, these missions will require static observation techniques. Movement equates to compromise! The SFOD must consider METT-T when se- lecting LOC observation sites. Site selection drives the SFOD’s ability to place constant observation on the LOC. Use of visual observation aids (binoculars, scopes, cameras) and thermal or infrared devices increase the SFOD’s stand-off distance and lessens the risk of compromise. Poor weather or heavy vegetation may require the SFOD to use multiple sites to achieve constant observation. Specific Target Surveillance

Specific target surveillance is much like LOC surveillance. For example, an SFOD assigned this mission infiltrates and observes a specific target, location, or activity such as threat strength or activity at a suspected supply base, prisoner-of- war (PW) compound, air base, or missile launch site. Unlike LOC surveillance, the SFOD does not have the same options in selecting its observation site(s). Vantage points may be limited or restricted in terms of how they maybe used to accomplish the mission. SFODs consider all METT-T factors when selecting proposed sites.

SFODs conduct specific target surveillance missions to collect, confirm, or refute intelligence about a target(s). This information, once processed, is used to plan

interdiction missions or to suppcrt DA missions against the target(s) in question. The SFOD tasked with the surveillance mission does not routinely “rollover” and conduct the DA against the target. That mission normally will be tasked to an- other SFOD that will specifically plan DA against the target using the informa- tion provided by the SR element.

JR for these missions are normally worded very precisely. If vaguely presented, the SFOD ensures clarification early in the mission planning cycle. Often, the IR or their associated reporting requirements determine observation site selection or the surveillance technique selected to effect the mission. For example, a large compound can require the use of multiple sites to ensure sufficient coverage. These large targets present command and control problems and heighten the risk of compromise. Multiple sites pose special problems for the SFOD communica- tions capabilities, especially in the numbers and types of radios required. Multi- ple surveillance sites also require the SFOD to determine its internal communications needs whether the element acts independently or in coordina- tion with other elements. The SFOD always balances security considerations against execution techniques.

A key to mission success during SR is the ability to infiltrate the target area, gain all available information, then exfiltrate while the threat remains unaware of the SFOD’s presence.

Information Collection

This term generically addresses those SR missions to obtain information previously unknown or to refute or confirm specific information about a target that does not neatly fall under the category of surveillance. Examples of this type of SR include NBC agent confirmation; soil, water, or air survey and/or sampling; mute reconnais- sance DZ and/or LZ surveys; or any other specific data requirements. Such a mis- sion is almost always limited to the spccific data or indicators required.

Often, these missions require the SFOD to conduct mission-specific skill training or to accept augmentation by non-SF subject matter experts. Augmentation may entail an LB team, topographic or civil engineers, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) soldiers, or scientific specialists such as toxicologists or meteorologists. When augmenters conduct a mission, special premission training is required for both the SFOD and the augmenters. Regardless of the rank of the augmentee, the SFOD is responsible for safe infiltration, security, and exfiltration as well as reaction to contingencies. Specialists focus on their specialty, while the SFOD supports them.

Once the SFOD collects the information, it forwards that information to the FOB. The SFOD must know when there is enough information to warrant a report. Signal Intercept

An SFOD tasked to conduct signal intercept operations requires extensive lan- guage and equipment training. For this reason, a SOT A, found in the battalion military intelligence detachments (MIDs), is attached to an SFOD to conduct sig- nal intercept operations. Signal intercept missions, both voice and code, are closely controlled by the theater intelligence center. The SOT A collects informa- tion that may have tactical, operational, or strategic value. This information al- most always passes from the SOT A and terminates at the SFOB’s or FOB’s sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF).

When a SOT A performs this type of SR in a nonperrnissive environment, it nor- really is attached to an SFOD. This augmentation occurs because the MOS train- ing of the SOT A covers only general soldier skills and its signal collection training. The SFOD conducts joint mission planning and premission training to ensure all participants understand their responsibilities. FM 34-36 provides a de- finitive explanation of SOT A and SOF intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations.

In document Documento Final 3 de Junio de 2011 (página 86-91)