Criterios de clasificación

1. S.M.H. 14 Oct, 1925, pp.15-16.

was to prevail over constitutional government and the rule 01 law. But theJ could not deny that there was serious industrial conflict in Australia, and it was here that they were on uncertain ground. They had no love for ?/alsh and Johnson, who had often ridiculed the Labour Party, and they made no attempt to justify the strikes of the Australian

seamen, beyond asserting that the shipowners were equally to blame. They had to oppose the Goyernment's legislation aimed at these strikes, but could offer no alternative

suggestions, and found themselves in the uncomfortable position of defending the status quo. The Labour Party's position was f^jrther ?/eakened by the continuance of the British seamen's strike throughout the campaign and by the frequent allegations of violence and lack of police protec- tion in Western Australia and Queensland up to within a few days of the election. Charlton made two specific promises relating to arbitration: a Labour Government would seek the amendment of the Constitution to empower the Government to bring about uniform working hours and would amend the Arbitration Act to abolish cumbersome procedures and to enable a single judge to alter standard hours or wages.^

The 1925 election csjnpaign was a turbulent one, with both sides appealing to basic fears and principles, and both engaging in an unusually high degree of personal

Yilification. The Goverment asked for a mandate to govern rather than a mandate to introduce definite measures. The electorate did not object to the 'vagueness of its promises, for on 14th Ilovember, 1925, the Government parties were

returned with an increased majority, the Labour Party losing eight seats. The Government now had a majority of 25 in the House of Representatives and 22 in the Senate.

Two days after the election the Deportation Board submitted its report on Johnson. The report on Walsh had been received in late October, 1925, but Bruce decided that, as the election position was so satisfactory, it would be a mistake to introduce a new issue, and the Board's recommen-

dation was therefore kept secret until after the election.^ Apparently, 3ru.ee contemplated sending Walsh and Johnson out of the couJitry before they had a chance to appeal, but

decided that such an action could hardly be taken by a Govern- ment which had just been re-elected on a law and order

p

platform. Walsh and Johnson were arrested on 20th November, 1925, BJid on 1st December the High Co"Lirt began hearing their appeal against the Board's decision. On 11th December the Go^art ^jrisTiimously decided that both men should be immediately 1. Bruce to Pearce, 26 Oct. 1925. (A.N.L. US 213/5).

released, although it did not give its reasons until a week later. The Court was not concerned with industrial conflict or with the social consequences of the two men's actions but solely vdth the question of whether the Iminigration Act and the deportation proceedings were a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's immigration power. Its judgements were con- flicting and complex. All the justices except Higgins held that the Act was not ultra vires but all agreed that a person who came to Australia before Federation, as Walsh had, could not be treated by the Commonwealth as an immigrant, Isaacs and Rich agreed that Johnson was an immigrant but the con-

viction was quashed, as the summons had not specified precisely the nature of the charge.^

The High Court's decision came as a shock to Bruce and Garran. Garran's pride as a constitutional authority was hurt and he made caustic references to the justices "sitting up there after the battle". He also resented press and

parliamentary criticism of his Department. Bruce had not overlooked the political advantages of the deportation pro- ceedings but he genuinely believed that Walsh and Johnson exercised great influence over unionists and that their re- moval would cause a lessening of industrial conflict. He

1. 37 C.L.R. 56.

P - ' O ^ w o _p p H - H - C - + - c-H CD m H - cng o o <H- o << CD p CT" CD v o K ) o n

tended to think in terms of panaceas and in the second half of 1925 deportation had replaced deregistration as the cure for strikes. He probably depended too much on the press for his information about the Seamen's Union, and the press

greatly exaggerated the power of Walsh and Johnson and neg- lected officials like Fleming, Casey and J. O'Neill, who were their equals in militancyo But years later, with the advantage of hindsight, Bruce still regretted that he had failed to rid Australia of Walsh and Johnson,^

On the same day as the High Court handed down its judgements it was announced that Sir Littleton Groom had resigned as Attorney-General. The co-incidence naturally gave rise to speculation that he had been made a scapegoat for the Government's failure in the Court, and Groom's

2 references to poor health were treated with scepticism®

Actually, Bruce had summoned Groom from Sydney on 5th December^ a week before the Court gave its decision, and asked for his resignation. In old age Bruce confirmed that the High Court case had no bearing on the matter, and that no particular action by Groom, but rather Bruce's dissatisfaction with his work generally, was the reason for his dismissal.-^ Groom,

1. Edwards, op.cit. p.116.

2. Quick to Groom, 24 Dec. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/3505). 3. Bruce to Edwards, 3 June, 1964. (A.N.L.).

who looked back with nostalgia to the days of Deakinite