Descripción petrográfica de las etapas de la mineralización

replied that there had been no breaches of peace at these ports and the Government would maintain law and order with- out help from the Commonwealth Government.^ In many Queens- land ports there were threats of violence throughout October, 1925, as farmers and canegrowers left their farms to work

on the wharves, either protecting the waterside workers or loading their produce on to the ships themselves. Graziers were attacked at Gladstone, at Townsville strikers damaged a ship and pelted its crew with coal and at Bowen seamen

p

emptied railway trucks of coal. There were very few

clashes between strikers and farmers, but the press created an atmosphere of incipient violence which was attributed to the inaction of the State Labour Government.

The role of the Commonwealth Government in the British seamen's strike was therefore a very limited one. But it provided the pretext for the Government to take two measures aimed at dealing ruthlessly with the leadership of

the Australian seamen, the power of the Communists in the unions, the long succession of industrial stoppages and the alleged inability of State Labour Governments to cope

effectively with the growing problem of law and order.

1. Bruce to W. McCormack, 22 Oct. 1925, McCormack to Bruce, 23 Oct. 1925. (A458 S502/2).

2. S.M.H. 26 Oct. 1925, p.11, 28 Oct. 1925, p.15, 2 Nov. 1925, p.9.

The British seamen's strike began on 21st August, 1925, and the press gave much publicity to the fact that Walsh and Johnson had addressed the strikers in Sydney. On 24th August the Overseas Shipping Representatives Association told Bruce that it was the extremist leaders of the Seamen's Union of Australia who had instigated the strike and demanded

that the Government take immediate action against these fomenters of industrial strife.^ On the same day Bruce said that extremists such as Walsh and Johnson were under- mining the authority of the properly constituted leaders of the British union, and contrasted the industrial peace brought about by Havelock Wilson with the constant strikes and un-

employment of the Australian seajnen. On the next day Cabinet discussed the strike and after an hour had decided on its course of action. The Governor-General immediately issued a proclamation that there existed a serious industrial disturbance. That evening Garran left for Sydney and on

27th August Bruce announced the names of the members of the Deportation Board. On 51st August Walsh and Johnson were each issued with suimnons to show cause why they should not be deported.

When Garran went to Sydney he saw Lang and asked for permission to offer the Chairmanship of the Board to 1. Johnson to Bruce, 24 Aug. 1925. (A458 S502/2).

the New South Wales Chief Justice. Lang told him that he had no desire to block the Commonwealth but he did not want

the State brought into the dispute at all.^ He subsequently made his views public, remarking that he was prepared to see

that the laws of the Commonwealth were observed, but he

could not allow his State or his Party to be identified with a Nationalist attempt to deport its political and industrial opponents, Bruce condemned Lang's failure to guarantee that the necessary police would be provided if any deporta- tions were ordered and immediately introduced a Peace

Officers Bill. The Bill, which passed through Parliament in three days, simply empowered the Attorney-General to

appoint Commonwealth peace officers with the powers of police constables and officers. It is difficult to avoid the con- clusion that Lang was approached because Bruce knew he could not co-operate and it was a good opportunity to publicize

the partisanship that he felt Labour Goverrunents were exercising in the enforcement of Commonwealth laws. The members of the Deportation Board (a barrister, an accountant and a former police magistrate) were easily depicted as the willing agents of the Government because they were not

widely known. But if Bruce had really wanted a chairman

1. Garran to Bruce, 26 Aug. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 0502/2); Garran to Groom, 26 Aug. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 256/2/5142). 2. S.M.H. 28 Aug. 1925, p.11.

with the prestige of a Supreme Court Judge it would have been a simple matter for him to havt requested the co- operation of the Victorian Nationalist Government.

Garran spent much of the next three months in

Sydney attending the deportation proceedings. Groom remained in Melbourne and although Garran reported to him regularly it.was Garran and Bruce who marshalled the attack on Walsh and Johnson. Garran and two of his staff worked long nights

collecting and collating the evidence of pressmen, ship- owners and others, and Garran set out their objective in terms v/hich showed his personal enthusiasm for the task: "Our object is to get a compact, strong and complete case which will not only impress the Board but impress the public as to the shocking nature of these men's past performances and the disastrous consequences if they are allowed to con- tinue. Prosecutions, fines, imprisoiunent have all proved useless; the only course for the community, for self-

protection, is to expel them from the community I think the case will be so overwhelming there should be no

doubt of the recommendation. After that there may be trouble and the Government ought to be prepared for any eventualities." The Board began its hearings on 3rd September, 1925, and they continued, with an extensive daily press coverage, until

10th November. The Commonwealth's case was not merely based

on the events that led up to the British seamen's strike, but went back to the 1919 seamen's strike and referred to awards and undertakings made in the Arbitration Court from 1921 to 1925, the deregistration proceedings, the big strikes of 1924 and 1925 and the editorials written by Walsh in the Australian Seamen's Journal. The main argument of the

defence counsel was that the British seamen were determined to strike and the speeches by Walsh and Johnson did not

influence them one way or the other. Every possible delay- ing tactic was used but eventually the Board refused to

hear any more evidence. The Board reported to the Government that T/alsh and Johnson had both encouraged the British

seamen's strike even if they had nothing to do with its inception. This, together with their past record of hos- tility to conciliation and arbitration, showed that their continued presence in Australia would be injurious to the public welfare. As neither man was born in Australia, the Board recommended that they should be deported.^

l^lfhile the deportation case was proceeding Bruce had taken another unexpected decision. On 18th September he announced that a general election would be held to decide whether the people wanted to be governed by Parliament or by outside agitators. He went on to say that the Labour Party and trade union leaders had consistently championed

1. A.S. Canning, F.J. Kindon, N.H. Rowland to Pearce, 16 Nov. 1925. (C.A.O. A4b7/12).

the advocates of revolution, State Govermients had refused to co-operate to enforce the law, and the time had come to appeal for a mandate to authorize the Government to take any action necessary to maintain the supremacy of Parliament and laYi and order,^ Bruce's policy speech on 5th October had the same theme. The Government would defeat all groups and influences seeking to exacerbate class struggles, and would eradicate both Communist and reactionary attempts to revo- lutionize Australia's political and economic system. He sought approval for the steps the Government h^d taken to deport Walsh and Johnson. Turning specifically to arbit- ration, Bruce said that the Arbitration Act would be ajnended

to extend the use of the secret ballot, thereby reducing the power of union officials, and to give the President and

Deputy Presidents judicial tenure, so that they could police the arbitration system.

Throughout the election campaign Ministers con- centrated on the disastrous effects of industrial conflict, but paid little attention to the arbitration system which was supposed to prevent such conflict. Page asked whether

chaos and industrial unrest were to rule at the will of a

1. S.M.H. 19 Sept. 1925, p.15.

2. Bruce. 1925 general election policy speech. (A.N.L. MS 1009/26).

few foreign extremists, with a consequent diminution in

production and a decline of living standards.^ The Country Party Ministers tended to be more practical in their approach to industrial unrest, describing its effects on national

finance, production and exports, while Nationalist Ministers made heavy use of vague abstrations, such as "insidious

doctrines", "the social fabric" and "national ideals". The Government appealed to patriotism or xenophobia: Bruce re- ferred to industrial extremists as "puppets of men overseas" and said that no "dirty, greasy foreigner" should interfere

o

with Australia's industrial system. For the first time Communism was a major issue in an election. Ministers

declared that there was no room in Australia for class hatred, class consciousness or class legislation. Garden's boast

that the Communists controlled almost all the unions in Australia was frequently quoted, usually with the qualifica- tion that of course the actual number of Communists was very small and ninety per cent of Australian workmen were "sane, intelligent and honest men". Government candidates pointed to Communist support of the Labour Party as evidence that the aims of the two parties were basically the same. They also claimed that the holdup of customs and quarantine

officers in Fremantle and of mails in Rockhampton, together

1. S.M.H. 21 Sept. 1925, p.ll. 2. Argus. 8 Sept. 1925, p.ll.

with Lang's refusal to assist the deportation proceedings,