and how it may be embodied, experienced and understood by women, I chose to merge phenomenology and feminist theory. Designed to explore how FGC directly impacts or shapes women’s experiences and understanding of FGC, and the wider influence of
community members and social concepts. However, there are some important reflections to be made on the appropriateness of drawing insights from both approaches. Thus, I have summarised below the works of other authors that have explored the theoretical and methodological compatibility and concerns of both approaches.
It has been noted that there are some hesitations in combining the two approaches, as they can appear to hold different world views. Fisher (2000), for example, highlights that feminism is concerned with phenomenology as it is both essentialist and masculinist in nature, therefore failing to recognise the difference in experiences due to sex and gender. Fisher describes the history of feminist interactions with traditional disciplines, and how this often represented a greater participation of women in such discourses. It has been highlighted that historically they were used separately with phenomenology largely used as a means of male philosophical observation, and feminism as a means of changing the system as opposed to interpreting it (Studlar, 1990 and Reinharz, 1992 cited in Baird and Mitchell, 2014). Furthermore, phenomenology can be abstract and its analysis theory- bound, and unconcerned with socio-political discourse unlike feminist theory (Fisher, 2000). Similarly, Sullivan (2000) points out that feminists who choose to engage with phenomenology and in particular Merleau-Ponty should consider critically the concept of projective intentionality, which he describes as a projection of intentions, meaning, and values, from the self out to the world, objects and other beings. This position of intentionality, he claims, does not allow room for a two-way constructive interaction between the world and self, whereas feminist theory would (Sullivan, 2000).
For example, intentionality would assume that FGC is something that is projected by affected communities into the world, it would not take into account the history or social
structures in place which support this practice. Despite this, Sullivan highlights that Merleau-Ponty’s ideas around embodiment and situation do allow us to place emphasis on shared meaning and embodiment and suggests that we join a world with a shared meaning therefore not made up of just one’s intentions. This is important to feminist principles and theory as it does not exclude the effect of power structures and existing knowledge on our experiences. It would therefore take into account the role of existing shared meaning on FGC and how this would influence the continuation of the practice. Another issue that Sullivan raises is that Merleau-Ponty does not distinguish the difference between bodies but assumes that bodies which are structured the same will be the same. Sullivan (2000) therefore claims that feminists should only engage with phenomenology which can allow for the interpretation of how people experience their world differently.
Despite these concerns and words of caution both, Fisher (2000) and Sullivan (2000), highlight that there could be a fruitful relationship between both feminism and phenomenology. Fisher (2000) argues that these concerns are overcome by the compatibilities and shared perspectives and claims numerous possibilities for a relationship between the two. In her paper ‘Feminist Phenomenological Voices’, Fisher (2010), uses feminist principles to understand the role of voice and narrative in identity, agency and the creation of meaning, in particular she applied this to vocals, opera and disability. Whilst using phenomenology to explore lived experiences and gain deeper insight and understanding, this combination has generated new disciplinary strands like feminist ethics, feminist epistemology, and feminist phenomenology. Fisher argues that the voice of feminist phenomenology has been soft-spoken but is increasing. This could be due to phenomenology being spoke of less in comparison to larger philosophical
conversation, but more so due to the small number of women working with phenomenology. Feminist phenomenology contributes importantly to both feminist and phenomenological conversations, she recommends that those adopting this approach need to speak more “feminist” pushing phenomenology more on social, political and gender issues (Fisher, 2010).
It is argued that the combination of the two approaches strengthens the overall philosophical foundation by gaining a deeper understanding of the lived experiences. It allows a critical meaning to be applied but more importantly, allows the experiences of women to be explored in their own voice (Fisher, 2010). She suggests that this combination can be operationalised in practice by ‘doing’ phenomenological description, analysis, and philosophising about and from women’s lived experience and centralising direct examples. Whilst employing feminist theory to provide a deep analysis of the lived experience, collected via the phenomenological investigation to better understand the importance of this within a social, cultural and political context (Fisher, 2010). For example, phenomenological investigation may be in the form of interview questions which ask the participant to describe lived experiences, and then analysed via feminist theory; this is described more below by Garko (1999).
Several feminist authors such as Butler, 1988; Garko, 1999; Allen-Collinson, 2011; Baird and Mitchell, 2014 demonstrated the compatibility of feminism and phenomenology and encouraged their combination. In order to research domestic violence during pregnancy, Baird and Mitchell (2014) employed a feminist phenomenological approach to both access and interpret women’s lived experiences, whilst empowering women by allowing scope for them to convey their feelings. They highlight that interpretative phenomenology
encourages us to understand that the basis of understanding of the world comes from our experience and existence which we are not detached from. They further suggest, interpretative phenomenology allows identification of both common and unique experiences, as well as space for interpretations; for example, all the women in the study shared a common experience of being pregnant and domestic violence, however some of the women also had unique experiences such as the perpetrator threatening their children with forms of violence. Alongside phenomenology, they adopted a postmodern feminist lens which encouraged them to focus on women’s voice and representation so that the research was led by them. They also applied intersectionality to consider the factors which shaped their lived experiences and to underpin them with a framework that considers intersections of vulnerabilities and victimisation.
Similarly, Allen-Collinson (2011) writes about the strengths of combining feminism and phenomenology and applied this in particular to female sporting embodiment. Allen- Collinson applied phenomenology in a sociological sense as opposed to a philosophical one, to allow for a deeper analysis of social structures and the impact these had on lived experience. This meant taking a particular focus on the social construction of knowledge and ‘reality’, as well as social interaction. This involved collecting descriptions of phenomena from ‘insiders’, impressionistic readings, and in-depth re-reading. She further argues that a powerful analysis can be made of female embodiment and lived-body experiences through feminist phenomenology.
Garko (1999) illustrates the theoretical and methodological compatibility of existential phenomenology and feminist values and principles through five main points that both approaches share, although existential phenomenology has less of a direct and explicit
focus on women’s experiences. These include: 1) Holding women’s lived experiences central to the research and exploring the meaning of phenomena in everyday life; 2) Overcoming the misinterpretation and concealment of women’s experiences by being open, providing description and committing to understanding; 3) Acknowledging the importance of a ‘Feminist Consciousness’ when thinking about how women make sense of the world and how meaning is assigned to phenomena; 4) The belief that the relationship between that of the researcher and researched is a mutual exchange of knowledge and co-creation of knowledge and understanding; 5) Suspending your own beliefs in order to describe and understand women’s from their own viewpoint, known as bracketing in phenomenology.
As the aforementioned demonstrates, combining phenomenology and feminist theory can create a more effective and rounded conceptual framework. Judith Butler (1988) published a paper titled “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory” which sought to illustrate ways in which gender
might be understood and constituted as an identity which is performed through repeated acts and “compelled by social sanction and taboo” (Butler, 1988, p520). Drawing specifically on Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir and feminist theory, Butler explores the ways in which sex and gender can be understood when viewed through a feminist phenomenological lens. This essay by Butler is important to my research as I consider embodiment and cultural gendered performance as concepts that can add understanding to the phenomena of FGC. Butler expresses how feminist theory is critical of the naturalistic assumption that the meaning of women's social existence is based on their physiology. Equally phenomenological theories on embodiment are concerned with the physiological and biological processes which structure bodied existence, and later play a
role in understanding embodied and lived experiences; this demonstrating their compatibility. Both Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir acknowledge the existence of natural dimensions to the body but make the distinction of the process of the body bearing cultural meaning. Instead the body is seen as an active part in embodying cultural and historical possibilities. Butler suggests that gender is a performance which acts as a survival strategy and comes with consequences for “those who fail to do their gender
right” (Butler, 1988, p522). This is a crucial point when considering FGC as initiation
into womanhood, embodiment and cultural identity and will be reconsidered further in this chapter and again in the Discussion chapter.
In conclusion, drawing insights from both existential phenomenology and feminist theory is a viable theoretical approach which has previously been demonstrated in a number of areas of research including sensitive research, such as that of Baird and Mitchell (2014) on domestic violence during pregnancy. Furthermore, it is compatible with my research as the motivation stems from wanting to understand the lived experiences of women with FGC from their own viewpoint, and to do so in a way that allows women to set more of the agenda to promote co-creation of knowledge and women’s consciousness.