The previous section set the basis to explore whether ideal theory truly faces a paradox. Following Valentini’s formulation of the paradox, presumably, principles that are designed in ideal conditions are incapable of guiding action in non-ideal circumstances. Given that the capacity of guidance is considered to be an important feature of any normative theory, the ‘guidance critique’ poses a serious threat to liberal egalitarian theories (Farrelly 2007, Sen 2009 are among those who believe this objection undermines ideal theory).
I have used Swift’s definition of action guidance until now: ‘knowing what options are feasible, over what time scale, with what probabilities, given where we are now’ (Swift 2008: 374). This definition implies that a theory capable of guiding action is a theory capable of understanding and, to a certain extent, addressing the relevant non- ideal circumstances that affect the realisation of justice, for these non-ideal circumstances are what allow determining what is feasible, and to what extent it is feasible. It tells us what to do to progress towards more just social settings.
This brings us to a central point. It is important to distinguish between normative and non-normative supplementations that could be required to make a theory of justice action-guiding. Non-ideal theorising will provide elements that count as normative thought and as social scientific input. Swift’s description seems to describe it as it would be a purely social scientific work. In the following chapters, I will provide an account of action guidance that clearly integrates normative and non-normative components.
In this section, I will distinguish between different ways to interpret the guidance critique of the ideal theory paradox.42 There are different ways to understand the
42 This expands from Valentini (2009).
impossibility of ‘bridging the gap’ between ideal and non-ideal theory. I will label them G1, G2 and G3.
Firstly, one may claim that failing to bridge the gap means being incapable of implementing principles in the real world. In other words, – this is what I will refer to as G1 – ideal principles would not be applicable today. We will see that in this first interpretation, the objection cannot be rightly levelled against ideal theory.
This interpretation of the ideal theory paradox is that ideal theory cannot induce compliance: a theory of justice cannot be considered action guiding if people do not follow it (Geuss 2005, Geuss 2008). Ideal theory lacks the capacity of guidance because it fails to motivate agents. In practice, it does not work. Yet, one may claim that a theory of justice is meant to provide a conceptual framework to judge people who do not comply. If it is reasonable to expect compliance, actual non-compliance does not say anything about the theory (Goodin 1995a, Goodin 1995b, Valentini 2009: 340). Indeed, G1 models an objection that demands too much of ideal theory. It is not reasonable to require of ideal theory to provide a blueprint of potential actions for people to follow its precepts. Ideal theory can very well provide valid reasons for action and people may still not follow it. That is because motivating action depends on non-ideal structures that influence individual capacity to comply with a reason one may have been initially motivated to follow.43 That is, ideal theory does not need to motivate action. A non-ideal
theory associated with this ideal theory could do it. Therefore, this formulation of the objection is not compelling.
A second way (G2) to understand the critique concerns feasibility: it is to say that ideal theory lacks the capacity of guidance because is not immediately applicable in political decisions here and now. Although ideal theory leaves question unanswered, Valentini says this is not an objection because it puts unreasonable expectations on what ideal theory can offer.44 She quotes Kant: ‘No matter how complete a theory may be, a
middle ground term is required between theory and practice, providing a link and a
43 This response I offered is slightly different from Valentini’s (2009).
44 As I will show below, the question is not only about the supplementation of ideal theory by facts or social sciences, but about the normative incompleteness of ideal theory.
transition to one another’ (Kant 1970: 61). We must not expect from ideal theory to give a manual for reforms that we should undertake here and now. In other words, this formulation of the critique misunderstands the role of ideal theory. By understanding ‘not guiding action’ as ‘not being applicable’, the paradox would not really challenge ideal theory.
Instead, we could formulate the feasibility critique such that not including certain facts could render the theory unfeasible, not only here and now, but always. We would be targeting the more specific idea of fact-sensitivity and, by extension, general idea of feasibility. This brings back the idea that the appropriate choice of facts is crucial to the practical value of ideal theories. The abstraction from certain facts can limit a theory’s practical significance. But it does not necessarily do so, as discussed above with the contrast between the considerations of facts in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and in his Law of Peoples. We have seen that some kinds of abstractions are valid and some are not. Again, this objection is not an insurmountable challenge for ideal theory.
A third interpretation of the paradox of ideal theory has already been discussed briefly, in the critique of ideal theory ‘as target’. In sum, it says ideal theory can be morally destructive. This is what I will refer to as G3. We may formulate this objection in various ways. A first formulation is that we must be careful when applying ideal principles in non-ideal circumstances not to obtain morally counterintuitive results (Gajevic Sayegh 2016). A second is that ideal theory distracts us from addressing real- world problems (Phillips 1985, Mills 2005). A third formulation is that there is a gap between ideal and non-ideal theory, and there is no way to bridge it (Feinberg 1973). A fourth one is that one might argue that ideal theories can mislead us in thinking about second bests (Goodin 1995b).
I will say a brief word about the last formulation of G3, for I will return to this in Chapter 4. This last formulation of the third interpretation of the paradox says: all the criteria needed for a first best option do not necessarily inform the criteria needed to select a second best (Goodin 1995b: 53). Think of Goodin’s example of the new silver Rolls Royce. If you want a new silver Rolls, although the attributes of a new silver Ford approximate better your new silver Royce than a one-year-old black Mercedes, your
second best option would still be the black Mercedes. There is a difference between surface attributes and underlying motives (Ibid. 45). That is because the reasons why you would choose the first best are more important than those characteristics. This explains why, for Goodin, political ideals are superficial.
The first formulation of G3 of the paradox is that the implications of ideal theory can be counterintuitive and harmful when the time comes to use them in the real world. This claim is not that ideal theory is not sufficient. This would only reiterate G2. The claim is that ideal theory is misleading. The real world interpretation of principles can have unintended consequences. For instance, consider the case of a principle for a strictly egalitarian distribution of GHG emissions per capita, with sensitivity for all past emissions (this example will receive careful attention in Chapter 6). If applied strictly to the distribution of GHG emissions, industrialized countries would be allocated very little emission rights. If that would truly set the emissions reduction target of all industrialized countries, the political ‘infeasibility’ (which should probably be understood as a lack of political will) of achieving such a demanding objective might discourage their climate change mitigation effort altogether. This could be considered as a negative unintended consequence of an ideal theory.
The second formulation of G3 is that ideal theory is part of the causes that prevent us from addressing crucial problems, such as real scarcity, when theorising about justice (Farrelly 2007). For example, it has been argued that ideal theory masks the background structures of power and institutional failures that must be tackled if justice is to be promoted. Another example is to say that ideal theory is counterproductive, in the sense of becoming ideological (Mills 2005). The focus on a fully just social order obscures power-relations, such as those of gender and race. They become blind to past and present injustices and thus contribute to their perpetuation.
The third formulation is unfortunately too vague. The supposed impossibility of bridging the gap is what motivates this thesis. The conceptual space that constitutes this gap has been underexplored in political philosophy. To occupy this space is the central objective of the next chapters. We should see that the first and second formulation of
this third objection will provide insights about how to occupy the space identified by this third formulation.
Versions of G2 and G3 have some authority. This gives us a sense in which ideal theory faces a paradox. G2 has been examined in Chapter 1. It is not a critique directed to all ideal theories but only to some, namely those that are fact-insensitive in a bad way. G3 stressed that normative theories want to guide action, and that normative theories must have an ideal component, but these ideal components risk rendering the theory blind to current injustice or risk leading to important counterintuitive results. This critique will be explored in further details and exemplified in the rest of this thesis. It enlightens us about the limits of ideal theory and the tasks that should be carried on by non-ideal theory.