Ideal theory’s responses to the paradox are limited: ideal theory is not doomed to failure but it does not overcome the paradox. It does not guide action per se. The best ideal theories provide elements that could be put to use in the formulation of principles in ‘reflective integration’, a thesis I will present shortly. In other words, ideal theory does not respond to the requirements of a robust account of action guidance, but it provides valuable theoretical inputs into the exercise of reflective equilibrium. In order to have a good understanding of the reflective integration thesis we need a more detailed conceptual framework about what constitutes ideal and non-ideal theory.
This section expands on two important works, by Hamlin and Stemplowska and by Valentini.45 They initiated the task of reviewing different definitions of ideal and non-
45 Hamlin and Stemplowska discuss some points found in sections 2.4 and 2.5 of this chapter, see Hamlin, A.P. & Stemplowska, Z., 2012. Theory, ideal theory and the theory of ideals. Political Studies Review, 10, 48-62. Our two analyses are different in several respects worth mentioning. The four formulations of the debate we distinguish are not the same. The authors do not point out the two possible interpretations of Sen’s account. Importantly, I do not reject the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory based on characteristics one, two, and three for the same reasons. Also, they do not believe these three characteristics apply to both ideal theory and institutional design. Valentini, like Hamlin and
ideal theory (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012, Valentini 2012). While I build on their work, I depart from it in order to define a theoretical framework that does not presuppose the analytical primacy of ideal theory. I will need to review some elements already addressed so far as they relate to the frame of this definitional work.
Fact sensitivity and fact insensitivity. One way to distinguish between ideal and non-ideal theory is to separate fact-insensitive from fact-sensitive theories. Fact- insensitive theories are those that hold that the formulation of principles of justice should not refer to any facts. G.A. Cohen, for example, claims that facts about human nature such as the relative altruism of agents in society should not influence the formulation of our principles of justice (Cohen 2003). More generally, Cohen claims that every fact sensitive principle depends upon a fact-insensitive principle (Cohen 2003: 218). Contrastingly, theories that refer to facts when formulating principles of justice are called fact sensitive theories. John Rawls considers limited scarcity and limited altruism in the justification of his principles (what he calls the circumstances of justice). Facts play a role in the process leading to the statement of principles. Yet, in order to make this distinction clear, let us call ‘fact-sensitive’ the positions according to which facts influence the 'formulation' of principles and indeed their 'content'.46 This would imply
that facts influence not only the applicability but also the content of principles.
Full compliance and partial compliance. A second distinction relates to the question of compliance. The full compliance assumption is the supposition according to which (almost all) people comply with (almost all) the demands of the principles of justice that regulate society (Simmons 2010: 8-9). As mentioned, it is often considered to be a central characteristic of ideal theory since Rawls identified strict compliance with Stemplowska, rightly points out the heterogeneity of the debate. This section wishes to build on this cartography. However, it ultimately offers a conceptual framework that does not presuppose the analytical priority of ideal theory. It goes beyond these views in that it argues that a comprehensive non-ideal work must be undertaken in order for principles of justice to overcome the critique addressed to John Rawls, according to which his principles of justice cannot ‘have an impact in real-world politics’ as Valentini puts it.
ideal theory: “Thus I consider primarily what I call strict compliance theory as opposed to partial compliance theory [...] The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for a systematic grasp of these more pressing problems [i.e. of partial compliance]” (Rawls 1999b: 8). Conversely, a non-ideal theory would be one that does not assume full compliance. According to Rawls, problems of non- compliance, punishment, and disobedience, among others, should be judged in light of the ideal principles once these have been worked out (Rawls 1999b: 215-216).
Maximalist theories and minimalist theories. Amartya Sen distinguishes between transcendental theories and comparative theories: ‘The two exercises for identifying perfectly just arrangements, and for determining whether a particular social change would enhance justice, do have motivational links but they are nonetheless analytically disjointed’ (Sen 2009: iv). Although Sen does not map his distinction onto the contemporary ideal/non-ideal theory discussions, his intuition describes an important understanding of ideal theory (Robeyns 2008). However, there are two plausible interpretations from Sen’s framing of the question.47
On the first, we should oppose maximalist theories to minimalist theories. The maximalist/minimalist distinction has two components, one about the scope and one about the demandingness of a conception of justice: scope in the sense of how it occupies the domain of justice (how perfect are its principles), and demandingness about how robust the principles should be in the sense of how much they ask of individuals or the state. A maximalist theory is sometimes called a theory of perfect justice. The characteristic of seeking the perfectly just principles that will regulate society relates solely to the component of scope: a theory of perfect justice defines principles above which no considerations of justice arise. It cannot be surpassed in terms of justice (Sen 2009: 6). A minimalist theory with regard to scope is one that identifies a particular
47 Robeyns (2008) as well as Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012) fail to see this. They seem to envisage, rightly so, that transcendental theories need not to be maximalist. Yet, they do not examine the implications from the two possible interpretations.
threshold of justice, under which injustices occur, but above which other principles could apply.
Rawls’s theory of justice is a maximalist theory with regard to scope and demandingness. The scope of its principles is meant to define the ‘perfectly just society’ – it does not require other principles – and the principles are demanding in that they require very extensive equal rights and liberties, equality of opportunity and fairness in the distribution of socio-economic advantages. Although linked and often associated, the characteristics of scope and demandingness are separable.48
Transcendental theory and comparative theory. There is a second and quite different interpretation of Sen’s distinction between the transcendental and the comparative. As argued, identifying a ‘transcendental’ value, aimed towards the evaluation of social and political issues, does not entail defining the perfectly just society. A theory is transcendental when it provides us with the values and tools to assess different social settings, and in this sense transcends the social settings. A theory of this kind needs not commit itself to describing the best or the perfectly just institutional setting. Contrastingly, a comparative theory focuses on comparing two institutional settings in order to know which is more just, without following the precepts of a transcendental principle. On Sen’s definition, a comparative theory need not appeal to transcendental values, let alone the perfectly just institutions, like the ones of a maximalist position.49
There is something particularly important in the intuition put forward by Sen: an exercise of comparative theory can be undertaken independently of the commands of ideal theory. This is the premise this chapter wishes to provide grounds for: non-ideal theory is not applied ideal theory. In other words, these two theories have distinct
48 We could divide them in two distinctions and make five distinctions in total. I use the notion of scope in different ways in this chapter and in the next. Scope in the sense of occupying the domain of justice and scope in a geographical sense are two different meanings of the notion.
49 Sen would admit that if there was a feasible transcendental theory that allowed us to construct a complete ordering of all possible state of affairs, then a transcendental view would be sufficient for comparative theory. The problem for Sen is that there is no such view and that a complete ordering is not necessary to effect a partial ordering.
functions, and when they connect, their connection is not simply that the latter is an attempt to implement the former. This premise is necessary to the validation of the reflective integration thesis.
Moreover, to distinguish ideal and non-ideal theory simply by appealing to a single dichotomy between two features is to fail to appreciate the many dimensions on which theories can vary. We should not presuppose that the content of non-ideal theory is determined by the content of ideal theory. And we should not assume that their relation is the one of non-ideal theory seeking to implement ideal theory.
That is because the implementation of justice requires a complex analysis of political structures and factors that are particular to non-ideal circumstances. A theory of action guidance involves providing analytical tools for problems that are of very different nature than the problems of ideal theory. If we do not assign different functions to ideal and non-ideal theory, neither will ever overcome the paradox of ideal theory, because neither has the necessary resources to finding ways to guide action.
The framework introduced in the next sub-section will emphasize the need to assign to each theory its own function. These functions will reflect the nature of the constraints faced by each theory. Therefore, it will highlight the importance of non-ideal theory in finding ways to guide action in the world today.